Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXII, Panama, 1973–1976

60. Memorandum of Conversations by the Ambassador to Panama (Jorden)¹

Washington, December 6, 1974.

Over the past few days (December 2–5), I have met with several members of Congress for informal discussions of the Panama problem. The MOC involved were:

• Senator Roman Hruska
• Senator John Tower
• Senator Glen Beall
• Senator Sam Nunn
• Rep. Wayne Hays
• Senator Robert Taft
• Senator Paul Fannin

I took the same general approach with each one, as follows:

I was in town on consultation with the Department of State and other agencies. I had heard that the MOC concerned had an interest in the Panama situation and I wanted to share with them some of the perceptions that had come to me through living and working in Panama for the past eight months. I said I could not get into the nuts and bolts of negotiations because they were in midstream and were, in any case, Ambassador Bunker’s responsibility. But I thought it might be useful to them—as they viewed the situation now and in the future—to have an idea of the way the problem looked from the other end.

I usually gave a quick, thumbnail sketch of Panama today—a “revolutionary” government, moving ahead economically, but with plenty of problems (inflation, unemployment, etc.), and with political forces ranging from extreme left to extreme right. The one issue—indeed the only issue—on which I found unanimity was on the need for a change in status of the Canal Zone. While individual Panamanians might differ with one another concerning the specific shape of changes that should take place, they were solidly united in insisting that major changes were long overdue. I said it was my judgment that the present Government and most thinking Panamanians wished to have those changes occur in an atmosphere of friendship and cooperation with the United States. They had no illusions, for example, about being able to take over and run the Canal immediately or even in a few years. But they wanted to move in the direction of increasing participation and responsibility. Similarly, they had no capability to take over defense of the Canal in the short term. Here again, they wanted to work with us—steadily increasing their own capability for military defense through training, joint exercises, etc.

But our view was that for the duration of a new treaty, the U.S. would and should retain primary responsibility for the operation and defense of the Canal. I believed most Panamanians understood this and accepted it.

In the long-run, I said, it seemed to me that the only real guarantee of continued successful and smooth operation of the Canal was through Panama’s wholehearted cooperation. Similarly, there was no way in the world to guarantee the successful protection of the Canal in a physical and psychological climate of hostility and confrontation.

For Panama, the principal immediate goal was our recognition of her sovereignty over the territory through which the Canal passes. They could not accept rules adopted 70 years ago under which a Panamanian could be arrested for speeding or some other offense and find himself being tried under U.S. laws, by U.S. judges and sentenced to a U.S. jail. The rules of the game as they have been applied for the past 70 years were simply not good enough for 1975.

In this context, I could see no reason why we could not shape a new relationship that took Panamanian aspirations into consideration while preserving what were for us the major interests—continued effective operation and protection of the Canal. Moreover, I felt this could be done in a way that would put U.S.-Panama relations on a new and modern footing—setting an example to all for the way in which a large world power could deal fairly and honorably with a small but proud country.

If we failed to reach a new agreement—or if we got one and then had it turned down by the Congress—it was clear to me that we would quickly move into an atmosphere of tension, of demonstrations, with riots and violence probable. I did not believe any American could think without concern of the prospect of U.S. troops having to use force to impose its will on Panamanian citizens—to say nothing of having to kill many of them. I doubted that the Congress or the American people would welcome a new “mini Algeria”² and perhaps having to send a division of armed troops to a small country to show how tough we could be. In such a situation, opinion in Latin America, and indeed throughout the world, would clearly be on Panama’s side and against us. We would be attacked by the entire world, in the press, at the UN, etc. And then, if we tried to work out a new arrangement, it would be done in a spirit of bitterness and hatred—and would doubtless produce far less for us than we now can reasonably expect.

It seemed foolhardy to me to follow this latter course, when the road to an amicable and cooperative agreement was open.

All of the Senators expressed their appreciation that I had taken the trouble to call on them. Most said that the discussion had given them a quite different insight into the problem than they had before. The biggest problem cited by almost all of them was the absence of any clear support among their constituents for change in Panama. Most people looked at the problem in simplistic terms—“we dug the ditch and paid for it; why should we give it away?” Many of them said that the only mail they received on the problem was along this line. They underlined the need for broader public education and information.

Some of the individual reactions follow:

Sen. Hruska: He was worried about what some future Panamanian government might do under a revised treaty—demanding more and more concessions. He was concerned that any change might open the door to increased unfriendly foreign influence. He also recalled the “flag incident” of 1964 which produced rioting and some bloodshed. He thought the U.S. commander who “protected our flag” was a hero.³ Nonetheless, he was reasonable during our talk and willing to admit elements of the problem that he had not fully considered before. (COMMENT: a likely negative vote but perhaps could be swayed by sufficient mail from his home state or through the arguments of respected colleagues.)

Sen. Tower: Stressed the lack of support for any change on the part of his Texas constituency. But he did say that he was prepared to support a treaty that adequately protected our basic interests. (COMMENT: an intelligent man; more receptive than I had expected. But he will want to put any treaty under a Senatorial microscope.)

Sen. Beall: After hearing me out, said he recognized how easy it was for some of his colleagues to get swept up by emotion without looking hard at all the facts. Said he was happy to get a reasoned and balanced viewpoint. Argued that “people need to know more.” (COMMENT: thoughtful and receptive; can be persuaded by facts and logic.)

Sen. Nunn: Also quite reasonable. Appreciated getting facts and viewpoints he had not considered. But noted there was little or no support for change. Noted that members of the DAR and other groups were opposed, and were highly vocal. He stressed the need for considerable broadened education—well in advance of presentation of a final treaty to the Congress. (COMMENT: another intelligent and responsible man who listens to facts and appreciates insights that he had not heard or considered.)

Rep. Hays: Listened very little. Talked at length about the “untrustworthiness” of all Latins. Said we could not trust them to live up to any agreement. If he were President, he would simply tell the Panamanians that we were going to live by the agreement of 1903 and if they didn’t like it, that was too bad. (COMMENT: a negative vote on anything to do with a new treaty or any concessions to Panama. Not susceptible to facts or argument.)

Sen. Taft: Listened carefully. But expressed concern that the Panamanians would continue to press for more and more concessions once an agreement was reached. Thought that our ability to protect the Canal and resist physical pressures would be greater under the present treaty’s concession of sovereign rights than if we abandoned them in a new arrangement. Was impressed by the argument that the use of force to impose our will could mean killing perhaps hundreds of people. That was an unpleasant thought. (COMMENT: intelligent, reasonable. Can be approached with sound arguments. Will probably view any treaty through legalistic eyes.)

Sen. Fannin: Listened carefully. Very much appreciated getting a new point of view. Noted that technological changes (in pipelines, bulk cargo conveyors, etc.) might well diminish the importance of the Canal in a shorter time than most people realized. Was interested to hear that Panama is, in fact, considering putting in a new oil pipeline and studying a bulk-cargo conveyor system. (COMMENT: reasonable, rational, intelligent. Can be influenced by thoughtful argument.)

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Ambassador Bunker’s Correspondence, Lot 78D300, Box 3, Congress. Confidential. Sent to Bunker, Jenkins, Bell, and Morris. Sent to Bunker under a December 6 covering memorandum from Bell who wrote: “You and Bill Rogers and Kempton Jenkins had asked Ambassador Jorden to brief various members of the Congress on the situation in Panama, and thereby lay the groundwork for a future dialogue with them on treaty matters.”
2. Presumably a reference to the war between Algerian nationalists and the French from 1954 to 1962.
3. The “flag incident” touched off the January 1964 riots in the Canal Zone. See Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XXXI, South and Central America; Mexico, Documents 367 and 368.