6. Telegram From the Embassy in Panama to the Department of State1

1457. Please pass to White House Immediate and USUN Immediate. For the President and the Secretary from Ambassador Scali. Subject: Conversation with General Torrijos. Ref: Panama 1456.2

1. In 1½ hour conversation with Gen Torrijos today, I found him extremely tense and seemingly close to limit of frustration. Torrijos never relaxed, although I believe I achieved some personal rapport and he seemed to appreciate fact that White House directly interested in successful outcome of our bilateral negotiations and prepared to make generous concessions. He professed to believe that I was sincere in wanting new agreement and said he accepted fact that US does not have colonial attitude even though his students don’t believe it. He cited generous return of Okinawa to Japan and said this made Panamanians resentful US not making adjustments here to meet 70 years of Panamanian striving to remedy unjust situation.

2. He said he has held Panama in check for four years without single tear gas cartridge being expended, despite at least five dates a year which formerly caused demonstrations with property damage in [Page 18] both Canal Zone and Panama. US has never even noticed these four years of peace and, significantly in his opinion, there has never been shown slightest appreciation to him for his efforts. US complains about fiery rhetoric on Panamanian radio, but he considers he is protecting Canal by allowing an escape valve of words to take place of rocks and violence. His is peace with freedom, rather than peace of Papa Doc variety. He considers he is governing most nationalistic people in LA, not because they are the bravest but because Panama has borders in all four directions and in its center as well.

3. Torrijos asserted 200,000 Panamanians ready two years ago to go into Canal Zone and “sacrifice themselves” in confrontation with US. He barely prevented violence by telling people he would negotiate Panamanian rights and equalize treaty arrangements. Now two years later Panamanians treated worse than ever. They have lost faith in negots. He must have concrete action from US. Small things happen every day that show Canal Zone condescension and mistreatment of Panamanians such as arrests by Canal Zone police for minor infractions. It is the small daily incidents that “could be detonator of explosive crisis”. Lack of results makes him a liar to his people. He noted tersely that he is very much afraid of what may happen next Jan 9 which 10 year anniversary of 1964 violence against Zone.3

4. Torrijos complained bitterly of local division of US authority between Amb, CINCSOUTH and Canal Zone Governor. He characterized Amb Sayre as understanding Panama but was particularly scathing in his comments about the Governor both as individual and as regards his exercise of his powers. He described Governor as “colonialist by conviction” and went on at length. He also came down hard on US treaty negotiators, asserting that Anderson living in another century and not flexible enough to understand reality of present-day Panama. He commented US seems to have a policy of sending insensitive men as governors and negotiators in order to ensure lack of results. He said it was as though he had sent the head of Panama’s Communist Party to negotiate with US.

5. Torrijos said he believed he had convinced Jorden on latter’s recent visit that he is true nationalist rather than opportunistic firebrand. He had no intention of playing with flames of ultra nationalism since there is no extinguishing them once started. He said first duty of a ruler is to keep calm when others are excited.

6. While Torrijos seemed somewhat responsive to my firm position that we would not accept SC res which dictated details of bilateral [Page 19] negot with Panama, he gave no commitment. He suggested private negots between USDel and GOP to work out appropriate compromise res but he did so without enthusiasm. I expect rough session when I meet tomorrow morning with Fon Min Tack and Perm Rep Boyd, both hard-liners who believe that they have overwhelming support for their position.4

7. While most LA speakers have called for continuation bilateral talks, there no doubt Panama has solid sympathy from them in simplistic oratory about Canal Zone situation and Panamanian objectives. Fon Min of Peru, other LA member of SC and co-sponsor with Panama of res, warned me in friendly conversation this afternoon that US veto would cause wave of sympathy for Panama and strong anti-American reaction throughout hemisphere.

Both Amb Bennett who accompanied me and I came away from today’s conversation with strong impression that Torrijos is in mood of smouldering frustration. His rather stiff politeness scarcely contained what appears to be genuine bitterness. If we end SC session here with a US veto, I believe Torrijos is capable of reacting by setting off violence. Amb Sayre concurs in this assessment. Other operational tels are being sent but I want you personally to know seriousness with which we here view developing situation.5

Sayre
  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 791, Country Files, Latin America, Panama, Vol. 3, January 1972–August 1974. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.
  2. In telegram 1456 from Panama City, March 19, Scali, who was in Panama for the Security Council meeting, reported his concerns about a “potentially explosive” confrontation with the Panamanians at the meeting, which began on March 15. He stated: “It now seems likely I will have to veto SC resolution if it proves impossible tomorrow to work out reasonable language with the Panamanians.” (Ibid.)
  3. See Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XXXI, South and Central America; Mexico, Documents 367379.
  4. Telegram 1515 from Panama City, March 20, reported on Scali’s morning meeting with Tack. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]) The draft resolution they discussed was introduced by Panama and Peru; see Yearbook of the United Nations, 1973, pp. 167–168. Jorden quoted portions of the resolution in a March 20 memorandum to Scowcroft. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 791, Country Files, Latin America, Panama, Vol. 3, January 1972–August 1974)
  5. A March 19 memorandum from Jorden to Scowcroft references telegrams 1456 and 1457 from Panama City. Jorden stated: “I am assuming we do not want to burden the President with this tangle [regarding the Security Council meeting] at the present moment,” adding “we should not be too apologetic or appear to be rushing in with concessions under pressure.” (Ibid.)