58. Memorandum From the Deputy U.S. Negotiator (Bell) to Ambassador at Large Bunker1
PANAMA-U.S. TREATY NEGOTIATIONS
The Question of the Approach to the Congress
I regret having missed your meeting November 21 on this subject,2 because I had hoped to present for consideration the arguments in favor of an exceedingly cautious approach to the Congress at this juncture. There are seven of them. The Negotiating Staff joins me unanimously in forwarding them to you and the other interested officers.
I. The Arguments
A. A treaty is “in sight”—but far from certain. It would seem unwise to start selling a commodity we do not yet have excellent prospects of putting our hands on.
B. The Defense Department is almost certainly not willing to be helpful at this time in any approaches to the Congress—and might well be unhelpful. That is so for these reasons:
1. DODhas not yet seen, in the draft Threshold Agreements, the full protection of its interests. You intend over the course of the negotiation to obtain that full measure of protection, of course—but it is not there at this time.
2. There are those in DOD, in positions of some importance, who do not wish a new treaty and will resist, vigorously, any effort to involve DODin preparing the way for a treaty in the Congress.
3. There are those in DOD, in positions of particular importance, who although favoring a new treaty will be extremely skittish about involving DODin congressional approaches, for fear of their impact on members of the Armed Services Committees, many of whom oppose a treaty. They will be most reluctant to go to bat until they are compelled to do so.
4. Rumors are rife in DODthat Secretary Schlesinger has ordered a review of all existing DODpositions on major worldwide issues, from “détente” to Panama, with a view to ascertaining whether the [Page 160] DODpositions should not be “hardened”. The idea seems to be that vital “lines of communication” are being jeopardized.
C. Any full-blown initiative with the Congress would almost certainly provoke the congressional opposition into retaliation, and we are not yet ready to counter it. When the Negotiators are convinced that a treaty is within easy reach, then we can bear up under the opposition’s attack and counter it. Perhaps we might be in such a position by early January.
D. Extensive consultations with Congress significantly increase the possibility of leaks. Panama, at least, could not stand leaks now, and the course of negotiation would be very much prejudiced by them. Later, Panama will be in a better position on this score.
E. Premature congressional contacts could prejudice our tactical position vis-à-vis Panama in the negotiation. The Panamanians would learn of it promptly, and would interpret it as an effort by the Administration to make certain it can move a treaty through the Congress. We need to continue to use congressional approval as leverage in our bargaining with the Panamanians.
F. Given the Administration’s domestic difficulties at this time, it is doubtful that the White House (the “domestic side”) would want any more problems with the Congress than it already has. An organized approach now to the Congress on the Panama matter would provoke the congressional opposition and, thus, a “problem”. One can conceive of a treaty with Panama being viewed as a foreign-policy coup, but a domestic political disaster. At the least we should be moving slowly and cautiously enough in the congressional approaches to give the White House time to provide us with critical, not off-hand, guidance.
G. There is in fact very little which you can say to members of the Congress, at this time, which (a) you have not already said, or (b) is so general in nature that your approaches could not be truly productive. We should bear in mind the futility of the approaches made in the Anderson-Ward negotiation—several hundred individual calls, in all. They were made too early: the general reaction was “I’ll make up my mind when you show me a draft treaty.”
II. Suggestion for a “Cautious” Approach
A two-track system might be in order.
One track would consist of efforts aimed, not directly at the Congress, but rather at private groups which are influential with the Congress. We plan to forward a separate memorandum to you on this subject but, briefly, we have in mind, as mechanisms, (a) a few major speeches, (b) articles in leading periodicals, (c) formation of a Citizens Committee, (d) briefings of Editorial Boards of major non-Eastern newspapers, (3) démarches to Meany,3 the League of Women Voters, and the like.
[Page 161]The second track might go somewhat like this.
You would brief the Secretary on what we perceive, at this juncture, as the shape of a new treaty, and suggest that the following steps might now be appropriate.
1. The Legislative Liaison Staff of the White House—and perhaps Ambassador Rumsfeld as well—would be informed as to the possible shape of the treaty, and its advice sought on the timing and nature of any approaches to the Congress.
2. The majority and minority leadership of the Congress would also be briefed on the possible shape of the new treaty, and their advice sought on congressional approaches.
3. The Vice President-designate would be similarly briefed, and his advice sought.
4. We would proceed thereafter in accordance with the advice and guidance received.
5. Depending on the nature of the advice and guidance, members of the Congressional Relations and Treaty staffs of the Department would move into a low-key educational effort aimed at selected congressional staff members.
- Source: National Archives, RG 84, American Embassy, Panama, Panama Canal Treaty Negotiation Files, Lot 81F1, Box 124, Treaty Negotiations, Nov–Dec 1974. Secret; Nodis; Stadis. Copies were sent to Rogers, Bowdler, Feldman, Low, Jenkins, Richardson, Bell, and Gonzalez-Revilla.↩
- No record of this meeting has been found.↩
- George Meany, President of the AFL–CIO.↩
- Bell initialed “SMB” above this typed signature.↩