54. Letter From the Ambassador to Panama (Jorden) to Ambassador at Large Bunker1
I thought it might be useful if I were to pass along to you an estimate of the mood at this end of the negotiating track, as well as some thoughts on possible next steps. I should say at the outset that what follows is more than speculation and intuition. It is based on talks with numerous Panamanians, but most important on a lengthy discussion I had recently with General Torrijos.
The latter was rather unusual in several respects. First, I believe the General had never before visited the Residence for more than a quick entrance and exit—and not even that over the past few years. In this case, he called on Sunday afternoon2 and asked if I had guests. When I said that Mili and I were alone, he said he would be over. He came and stayed for several hours—including a family supper. He said he had nothing particular in mind, simply that he wanted to visit a friend and relax.
At several junctures he stressed that he hoped our meeting and talk could be kept strictly confidential and so I have respected his [Page 149] wishes. For this reason, the fact of his visit should be held between us. But I think it is important that you have the “feel” of his mood.
First, you should know that he has the highest respect for and trust in you and Kissinger. He believes we are all doing our best to push a treaty to a successful conclusion. He is bothered that things seem to be moving so slowly. By this, I think he means the pace of negotiations themselves. But he does not assign the blame to us any more than to his own people. For this reason, he has decided to take a more direct role—in the sense of overseeing—than he has in the past. He has said he is tired of being told by his people that this or that proposal is “unacceptable.” He has said he wants to know why something cannot be accepted and what can be accepted.
But a basic source of frustration for him is the lack of anything he can point out to his people as marking progress. He believes we are sincere and have the best intentions. But he notes a striking lack of positive actions. We promised to do something about the lottery sales in the Zone—and nothing happened. We said we would transfer Old and New France Fields—and nothing happened.3 He understands the difficulties we face on the Hill. But from his point of view, the net result has been little or nothing in terms of forward movement on specifics.
This brings me to the main point I wished to share with you. It is clear to me that the one thing at this particular moment that would have the greatest impact here is something we have been considering for some time. That is the appointment of a Panamanian as Vice President of the Canal Company. Torrijos would regard this as a major step forward and a considerable concession to his views. He could use it inside his government and with the critics as proof positive of US goodwill. He also sees it as a highly useful way in which to establish closer liaison with the Canal Company and the Zone. His representative could come to understand Zone problems and methods of operation so they could be explained to others. And if the General had a problem either with the Zone or on some matter that he thought the Zone could help with, he would have his own representative there as the point of contact.
The man he would appoint to this position—and this fact must be tightly held and discussed with no one—is Edwin Fabrega. This choice clearly underlines the importance Torrijos places on this matter, because Fabrega is one of the most capable and intelligent men in this Government. He is also a very decent human being. He was Dean of the University when it was an intellectual institution and not a political hothouse. He is currently head of the Institute of Water and Power Resources. I know Edwin and have the highest regard for him. I know [Page 150] Torrijos has considered him for posts of the highest responsibility. The fact that he would put him in the Canal position is proof of the priority the General puts on this.
I am certain that it would give the process of negotiations a major impetus if the Secretary—at his meeting with Foreign Minister Tack in New York—could tell him that we have given the whole question of forward movement deep consideration and have decided that the naming of a Panamanian to the Vice Presidency of the Canal Zone would mark a major step ahead.4 I know the General would react highly favorably. It would also give him the assurance he seems to need that our government can act as well as talk.
You will wish to consider whether this can be done promptly and what technical obstacles may exist. Could the Governor simply do this on his own? Would approval of the Canal Company’s Board of Directors be required? I understand that Bo Calloway has accepted the idea in principle.5 I believe Governor Parker would accept this approach. And I think it is the kind of positive action that would appeal to the Secretary of State.
You will know best how to handle this. If it cannot be arranged in time for the Secretary’s meeting with Tack, then perhaps you would wish to convey it in the course of your talks with him. All I can say is that the proposal would have the most salutary effect on our relations and on the atmosphere surrounding the negotiations.
I hope this finds you in the best of health and good spirits. We look forward with great anticipation to your next visit. Do let me know anytime you feel I can be helpful to you from this end.
Warmest personal regards.
Sincerely,
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Ambassador Bunker’s Correspondence, Lot 78D300, Box 3, General. Official–Informal; Confidential. A copy was sent to Bell.↩
- September 22.↩
- For more information about the above unilateral actions, see Document 28.↩
- No record has been found of a meeting between Kissinger and Tack in New York during the U.N. General Assembly.↩
- In backchannel message PNA 804 to Koren, September 27, Parker quoted a letter from Callaway that discussed the possibility of appointing a Panamanian as Vice President of the Panama Canal Company. Callaway commented that the Board of Directors had been polled and they “felt that the title of President for Panama-U.S. Relations is not desirable because, for one thing, it seems inconsistent with the role of the US Ambassador to Panama and other officials with responsibilities in this important area of Panama-U.S. relations. The title quote Vice President for Panama Liaison unquote is preferred and this is the title that was used in polling the members of our Board of Directors.” (National Archives, RG 185, Subject Files of 1979 Panama Canal Treaty Planning Group, Box 5, Messages Jul to Dec 1974)↩
- Jorden signed “Bill” above this typed signature.↩