Office of the Historian

52. Briefing Memorandum From Ambassador at Large Bunker and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Bowdler) to Secretary Kissinger1

Washington, August 23, 1974.

Panama: Relations with Cuba and Canal Negotiations

In accordance with the decision that we reflect our concern over Panama’s unilateral action on Cuba by slowing down the Canal negotiations, we have already taken one step and plan another.2

Yesterday afternoon Jack Kubisch called in the Panamanian Ambassador and in a low-key but firm way conveyed officially how seriously we regard Panama’s decision to reestablish relations with Cuba. Silence on our part after the act would have been interpreted as a lack of conviction in the representation you made to Tack last week. Jack’s [Page 146] presentation (talking points used are attached)3 was designed to underscore our continuing concern without provoking the Panamanians to further ill considered action.

We plan to extend the signal to the negotiations by delaying the renewal of talks scheduled for next month. At present no negotiations are going on. Early in September the Panamanians have promised to present a paper on Canal defense arrangements. Instead of the Deputy Negotiators meeting quickly to exchange views on the paper as has been the past pattern at the Deputy Negotiator level, we will take our time in responding. This will push back the timetable for the Principal Negotiator talks scheduled for mid-September.4

In executing these steps we will have to monitor Panamanian attitudes closely and perhaps adjust them to changes of mood and circumstance. They are emotional, volatile and immature. Their dispute with United Brands over the banana tax question which has been smoldering for weeks is now about to reach a showdown, with the possibility of the government intervening or nationalizing United’s holdings.5 It is important to make the point about their Cuba action but in a way which minimizes the risk of a breakdown in the negotiations with all the complications that would bring in our bilateral and hemispheric relations.

  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P860119–0832. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Bowdler.↩
  2. In telegram 176392 to Panama City, August 13, the Department instructed the Ambassador to tell Tack that Kissinger had received and was “dismayed by Tack’s message on Panama’s intention to resume diplomatic relations with Cuba. I am especially concerned that Panama is considering taking unilateral action now on such a highly important matter which calls for collective action.” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Latin America, 1974–77, Box 6, Panama—State Department Telegrams from SECSTATE NODIS) In an August 20 memorandum to Kissinger, Kubisch revealed that Torrijos had considered delaying recognition because of pressure from the United States, Colombia, and Venezuela. The Cubans, incensed by Torrijos’ waffling, threatened to pull all Cuban personnel out of Panama, so the Panamanian leader changed course yet again and made recognition official on August 20. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840153–0939)↩
  3. Attached but not printed. A summary of Kubisch’s presentation, including the talking points, is in telegram 185224 to Panama City, August 23. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D740232–0952)↩
  4. See Document 57.↩
  5. In telegram 186637 to Bogota, August 26, the Department transmitted Gonzalez-Revilla’s account of the dispute between the Government of Panama and United Brands. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]) In telegram 5217 from Panama City, September 5, the Embassy reported that Torrijos and United Brands had reached a settlement. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D740246–1132)↩