Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXII, Panama, 1973–1976

50. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, July 25, 1974, 10:30–10:45 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Courtesy Call by Ambassador Bunker (U)

(U) PARTICIPANTS

• Department of State

  • Chief U.S. Negotiator, Panama Canal Treaty Negotiations—Ambassador-at-Large Ellsworth Bunker
  • Advisor for Panama Canal Treaty Affairs—Mr. Richard Wyrough

• Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense

  • Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)—Mr. Robert Ellsworth
  • Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA–IA)—Ambassador R.F. Corrigan
  • Director, Inter-American Region (ISA–IA)—Maj Gen G.M. Wallace, USA
  • Assistant for Panama Canal Treaty Negotiations—Col T.W. Swett, Jr., USA

1. (C) Status of Panama Canal Treaty Negotiations.

Ambassador Bunker stated that he had requested an opportunity to talk further with Mr. Ellsworth in order to emphasize several points which he had made during his 9 July briefing of SecDef.² He wanted to do this because he and Mr. Ellsworth had not had much opportunity to talk during that meeting. Ambassador Bunker proceeded to reiterate the major points covered during the 9 July meeting. A summary of these points follows:

a. There is no particular Panamanian time pressure on the United States, probably because of the eight principles already agreed upon. Principle VII, involving Panamanian participation in Canal defense, will be addressed during Ambassador Bunker’s next visit to Panama, tentatively scheduled for 8 August.

b. We do not know how long the negotiations will take to complete.

• (1) They will not be completed in 1974.
• (2) We may or may not get the treaty through the Senate (Senators Scott, Mansfield, and Fulbright, and Congressman Morgan believe that there is a good chance of Senate ratification if the draft treaty is reasonable).
• (3) Negotiations will probably be complete during 1975; if not, 1976 will be a bad year for the treaty to be presented in the Senate.
• (4) It is conceivable that the treaty could await Senate action for as long as a year or two. Even if this were the case, the fact that a draft treaty had been prepared could relieve tension between the United States and Panama.

c. The Panamanians are not the most efficient negotiators, as shown by their recent counter-proposal to the formerly agreed-upon threshold agreement concerning Principle VI (Panamanian participation in Canal operation and administration).³ Ambassador Bunker has informed Panama’s Ambassador Gonzalez-Revilla that the Panamanian paper is not acceptable as a negotiating paper, but the United States could consider it a philosophical paper to be noted and set aside. He has refrained from pursuing this issue pending receipt of formal Department of Defense comments on the Panamanian proposal.

d. Ambassador Bunker received a message from Brigadier General Torrijos to the effect that 10 years was a long time for the negotiations to have been in progress. Ambassador Bunker told Ambassador Gonzalez-Revilla that if the Panamanians persist in “consulting everybody, including businessmen, labor leaders, and students,” on every treaty issue, negotiations will likely last for 10 more years.⁴

2. (C) Attitude in Congress.

Ambassador Bunker explained that except for preliminary, low-key efforts, he had refrained from substantive contacts in Congress. He mentioned that in keeping with instructions from President Nixon, he had discussed treaty negotiations several times with Senator Thurmond, who thinks there are “a good many things we could do with Panama short of giving up sovereignty and terminating the 1903 Treaty.”⁵ Senator Mansfield has told Ambassador Bunker that there is no point in talking about the treaty in the Senate this year.

3. (S) Unified Command.

Ambassador Bunker stated that if SOUTHCOM is to be disestablished, he would appreciate being able to use this fact during negotiations. Mr. Ellsworth responded that SecDef had told him Ambassador Bunker’s idea on making use of such a decision, if and when it is made, makes sense; and that he would see SecDef shortly and clarify for Ambassador Bunker the SecDef’s desires in this regard. (Later, Mr. Ellsworth informed Ambassador Bunker by telephone that SecDef had agreed that if SOUTHCOM were to be disestablished, Ambassador Bunker should first be informed to permit him to convey this information to the Panamanians when he thinks it is appropriate.)

4. (C) Concluding Remarks.

Mr. Ellsworth said that he was glad that Ambassador Bunker was keeping in touch with Senator Thurmond, as maintaining this contact is important for all. He expressed appreciation for Ambassador Bunker’s complimentary remarks concerning Department of Defense cooperation with the United States negotiators and remarked that he had been especially interested in Ambassador Bunker’s views on the Panamanian counter-proposal previously discussed. Ambassador Bunker replied that he felt the Panamanian paper to be harmless; that Ambassador Gonzalez-Revilla had expressed the Panamanian problem as frustration from a long series of disappointments which raised emotions and thus dictated that the Panamanian Government coordinate its negotiating positions with all interested sectors, including the hardliners. Ambassador Bunker had subsequently pointed out to Ambassador Gonzalez-Revilla that such an approach could further delay negotiations, particularly since his responsibilities in the Middle East negotiations might require him to shift the dates of his next visit to Panama.

5. (U) Meeting Subsequent to Courtesy Call.

Following the Courtesy Call on Mr. Ellsworth, Ambassador Bunker and Mr. Wyrough joined Ambassador Corrigan, Major General Wallace, and Colonel Swett for coffee in General Wallace’s office. During this period, Ambassador Bunker was shown a blown-up aerial photo of the tactically important Ancon Hill complex in the Canal Zone. Ambassador Bunker asked several questions concerning the specific locations in the photo and was especially interested in the proximity of the Albrook Air Force Base Runway to Ancon Hill and Panama City. Ambassador Corrigan, in view of the earlier conversation about SOUTHCOM, used this opportunity to emphasize that a decision has not yet been made concerning SOUTHCOM’s possible disestablishment.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P740100–1428. Secret. Drafted by Swett; approved by Corrigan. The meeting took place in Ellsworth’s office.
2. See Document 49.
3. See footnote 2, Document 47.
4. No record of the meeting, presumably during which Gonzalez-Revilla gave Bunker Torrijo’s message, was found.
5. See Document 45.