Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXII, Panama, 1973–1976

143. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, December 7, 1976.

PARTICIPANTS

• Ambassador Carlos López Guevara, Panamanian Treaty Negotiator
• Minister S. Morey Bell, Deputy U.S. Negotiator

SUBJECT

• Issues and Procedures in the Negotiations

Lopez said he had instructions from the “treaty commission” to ask several questions and make several points.

The first issue was “defense rights and neutrality”. Only recently, he explained, had Panama fully realized that the conclusion of a treaty almost certainly hinged on a Panamanian concession of major proportions respecting this issue. He explained further that the Jorden-Bell conversation with President Lakas had been critical.²

Could the United States consider a formula whereby defense rights/neutrality could be “covered” for a five-year period beyond the treaty’s expiration, with a provision that the “coverage” would be “reviewed” at the end of five years and perhaps extended for another five, it being understood that the review process could continue thereafter. I asked, first, whether he was talking about a joint United States-Panama “guarantee” or “arrangement”. He said, “Yes, only the United States and Panama”. I then asked whether he was talking about a troop presence. He said, “No troops, but maybe a base”. I replied that even if there were just a base, there would have to be people to maintain it. He answered by saying Panama and the United States could contract with those people.

I said that we always warmly welcome any ideas or initiatives from Panama, and that what he had just proposed was an interesting idea. He then interjected to say that the treaty commission is actively studying various formulae for resolving this problem quickly. I said that that was good to hear.

He said “they” had another idea. What about some arrangement for extending United States participation in Canal operation beyond the treaty period, but with Panama having the majority? He explained that this might somehow be helpful in resolving the defense rights/neutrality problem. I said that that was another interesting idea.

His third idea, he said, would probably surprise the United States. What about a formula whereby the United States would issue a unilateral declaration—as part of the overall treaty package—which would state that the United States would regard any threat to the continuous, safe, efficient, and neutral operation of the Canal as a threat to the United States, and would act to counter it by means of its constitutional processes? There could also be an initialed “negotiating minute” which would reflect that the United States had queried Panama on whether it objected to such a unilateral declaration, and reflect that Panama had stated that it had no objection.

I said that that was indeed somewhat of a surprising formula, and that it seemed to me that what he was suggesting constituted in effect an extension or adumbration of the Monroe Doctrine. He said that that was so. I asked how in the world Panama could possibly swallow that sort of thing politically. He replied smilingly that the Panamanian mentality works in mysterious ways, and that such a formula could conceivably be salable.

I said that it might be useful to probe these ideas further, but that Panama should understand two things. First, the United States negotiators have no authority whatever to pursue the defense rights/neutrality/duration problems at this time, and that they are in the position of needing signals from the President-elect. Second, the United States negotiators were exceedingly reluctant to enter into any “what if” conversations with Panama any more, because they could never have any assurance that their conversations would not reach the public domain quickly. Lopez said he and other members of his team fully understand both points.

Lopez then turned to an intense, serious commentary on the negotiating procedures. He said that the format of formal meetings of the two teams across a table had done much to preclude any informal chats and probing sessions between individual members of the two teams—sessions of the sort which produced new ideas, new formulae, that cannot be laid on the table officially. He said it seemed to Panama that the United States had chosen deliberately to eschew such informal encounters. The United States, he said, just seems not to want to get down to real talks. Could anything be done to change this situation?

I said that the United States negotiators in fact very much want to have the sort of encounters he was suggesting, but had felt that Panama did not want them because Panama wanted its entire team to hear everything, and engage in everything. I said also that we were a little reluctant to go into such talks because we had been so persistently and badly singed by revelations. He said he understood, and would see if “something can be done”.

I asked him whether Panama had any idea of broaching the foregoing subjects during the next round. He replied by saying “Would you object if we took the initiative?” I said only that this round was supposed to be “symbolic”, and one designed to “clear away the underbrush”.

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, USD/P Files, FRC 330–87–0068, 1975–1977 Memcons Re: Treaty Negotiation. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by Bell on December 8. Copies were sent to Bunker, Shlaudeman, Bray, Dolvin, Jorden, and L. The meeting was held at the 1925 “F” Street Club.
2. Not further identified.