14. Intelligence Note Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research1
PANAMA: AN IMPROVED ATMOSPHERE FOR TREATY DISCUSSIONS?
The Security Council meeting which Panama hosted in mid-March, condemning the US on the canal issue, was originally regarded as an enormous success by Panama. However, the meeting did not bring tangible benefits to Panama, and, ironically, it has been followed by increasing criticism of the Torrijos government. The hollow victory might lead to a more productive atmosphere for canal treaty discus[Page 46]sions, particularly if the US were able to provide interim concessions which Torrijos could use to counter the criticism.
Beating the odds. Perhaps the most significant point about the Security Council meeting is that Panama was able to pull it off at all, despite (1) Panama’s admitted intention to air its views on the canal treaty issue, (2) the absence of any Latin issues before the Council which warranted a meeting away from UN headquarters, (3) open US opposition, and (4) lack of enthusiasm among other potential participants. Panamanian lobbying succeeded because other Latin countries were reluctant to oppose a meeting in the hemisphere. Non-Latin countries went along because the Latins wanted it.
While Latin participants were dissatisfied by Panama’s continual focus of attention on the canal issue, their public reactions were almost entirely in accord with Panama’s wishes. Seventeen delegates from Latin American countries spoke at the meeting, and almost all made at least a passing reference to the canal issue in terms favorable to Panama. Some foreign ministers sent messages of congratulations; congressional support was voiced in Uruguay and Venezuela; and the meeting received generally favorable press coverage in the hemisphere. Most important for Panama were the affirmative votes on the canal resolution from all members of the Council except Britain (abstention) and the US (veto).
Reaction within Panama. Immediately after the Security Council meeting, top members of the Panamanian Government were euphoric because the meeting seemed to have succeeded beyond their wildest dreams. Leftist students and the Communist Party were pleased. Organizations normally opposed to the government felt compelled to express support for the meeting. Yet, when Torrijos went out on the road to deliver speeches on Panama’s great diplomatic victory and to seek votes of confidence to continue his policies, he discovered that the general public was apathetic to the “historic” event. Moreover, middle-level bureaucrats reportedly were not pleased because the cost of the meeting—estimated at between $500,000 and $1.5 million—had forced a crimp in government spending. Members of the business community were unenthusiastic and felt that the meeting was a failure for Panama.
Agonizing reappraisal? Torrijos hopes to be remembered as the Panamanian leader who brought his country social justice and who hammered out a new canal treaty with the United States. Both these goals still appear to be unattainable. Until now it seemed that Torrijos was under no serious internal pressure to seek an agreement with the US; ironically, in the aftermath of the Security Council meeting, such pressure may be beginning.
Criticism of the government has been increasing. Though some of the causes predate the Council meeting, business community uneasi[Page 47]ness seems to have been sharply accentuated by the meeting. The result has been fresh signs of student unrest, the appearance of defamatory underground newspapers, and more open opposition on the part of the business community. Torrijos’ concern over mounting criticism and economic difficulties, particularly the loss of confidence by the private sector (which is partly attributable to anxieties over the treaty impasse), could lead him to take a more forthcoming position on the canal treaty. Indeed, he may now fear that lack of progress in obtaining a new treaty will be seen by the Panamanian people as evidence that his government is a failure.
Past experience has shown that Torrijos has always placed great store in the value of pressure tactics—that if you kick the US hard enough it will respond. He may now have to reexamine this assumption since the Security Council meeting—his supreme effort at international pressure—brought him little or nothing in the way of concessions from the US. It will be difficult indeed to think up an encore to follow that act.
Implications for the US. To achieve progress on the treaty, Torrijos may have to change his tactics. He could, of course, move in the direction of violence against the US presence in the Zone. This, however, would endanger his position under the best of circumstances, as the Guard would eventually have to reestablish order. It would be particularly perilous in times of growing disorder in that dissident elements in the society could coalesce to overthrow him. Torrijos’ best hope of success appears to lie in the direction of a more conciliatory stance vis-à-vis the US. The most recent communication from Foreign Minister Tack to Secretary Rogers may reflect some change in policy.2
These indications of some give on Panama’s side may be a sign that canal treaty discussions can proceed in a more productive atmosphere, particularly if the US position were to provide some immediate interim concessions which Torrijos could present as a counter to the rising chorus of complaints. Such a move would also benefit the US by relieving the pressure of international criticism. The goal of a new treaty will probably still be elusive for the immediate future, but the present situation at least holds out hope for a less stormy period in US-Panamanian relations.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Intelligence Research Reports, Lot 06D379, Box 23, RAAN 1–24, Africa/American Republics 1973. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem; No Dissem Abroad. Drafted in INR/DRR/RAA; released by George C. Denney in INR.↩
- See Tab A, Document 13.↩