Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXII, Panama, 1973–1976

122. Memorandum From Stephen Low of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)¹

Washington, May 13, 1976.

SUBJECT

• Canal Negotiations

During the past week a number of people have asked me for guidance on continuing the Canal negotiations, indicating some difference between them.

On the one hand, both Ellsworth Bunker and Tom Dolvin have explained that they were operating on a “business as usual” basis but were getting no cooperation from the Army (Veysey and Hoffman). To both of them I said I understood the guidance as continuing careful and deliberate negotiations, recognizing that agreement was not possible before 1977.

On the other hand, Vic Veysey, former Congressman and presently Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works, has called me in alarm at what he considers the “flurry” of activity by the negotiators. He quite clearly wishes we had never gotten into the negotiations and does not want to provide the negotiators with the materials they have requested on specific negotiating issues.

Veysey understands and agrees that the negotiations should continue. He is worried that progress might be made which could be used against the President. I pointed out to him that no progress had been made in the negotiations since last September and that it was unlikely that any significant progress could be made until the negotiators came back to the President for further instructions since the duration issue was at the heart of the remaining issues and there is no room for agreement under present instructions.

There does not seem to be much substantive disagreement between the two sides, but working relations are at present bad, and there is a possibility that further misunderstanding could arise.

Bud² has asked that I let you know what events are presently scheduled by the negotiators. As of this morning, they had planned to go down to Panama about July 10 for a week to ten days. During the meeting all of the issues would be discussed on an exploratory basis. The attempt would be to clarify the issues, narrow the differences, and define positions. There was no thought of any agreement coming out of the meeting. Then the negotiators had in mind skipping a month and going back in September. In this country there is no testimony planned in Congress or any speeches scheduled. The negotiators are responding on a background basis in answer to questions. The testimony given recently before the Panama Canal Subcommittee has been corrected and is being returned to the Congress. It is understood that Representative Snyder will probably reintroduce his amendment to terminate expenditure of funds for the purpose of carrying on the negotiations.³

I continue to believe that to suspend negotiations now would be defensive and in effect would admit the correctness of the Reagan position. When I said that I understood our guidelines to be “deliberate and careful negotiations”, I meant that we should continue discussions with the Panamanians issue by issue, attempting to move the negotiations along so that by the time we get to 1977 we will have a feel for the shape of a possible treaty. By “deliberate and careful”, I meant that I saw no reason for our making any new concessions at this point but that we should continue discussing the issues with the Panamanians. The phrase also describes the pace which would be unhurried, but continue. We would neither aim at early agreement nor would we suspend all progress.

Veysey had said that he would not want to suspend the negotiations. I gather that he and Hoffman really do want to do so and have now convinced Clements of this.

In the meantime, I think Bunker will probably go to Buchen⁴ and others, including perhaps yourself, to express his concern at the new Clements position. The question, therefore, has now become whether or not to continue the negotiations. My own recommendation remains what it was in my May 13 memo.⁵ However, I do not know whether it would now be adequate to talk to Admiral Holcolmb.⁶ I would suggest you talk either to Clements or Secretary Rumsfeld. Alternatively, we could put it up to the President.

I suggest two things: that you confirm my understanding of our guidance as stated in the recommendation below and that you ask Admiral Holcolmb to clarify the matter with the Army in terms of the talking points below.

Dolvin also told me that while in Panama he met alone with Torrijos (with the full understanding and backing of Bunker).⁷ I think this is useful since it provides a helpful alternative channel to the General. Torrijos brought up with him the President’s statements on our retaining the Canal during its “usable life”, saying that this gave him great problems with his student opposition.

Recommendation:

That you confirm that our guidance is to continue the negotiations in a deliberate and careful fashion, recognizing that agreement is not possible this year but aiming at reaching an accord in 1977.⁸

And that you make the following points to Admiral Holcolmb for clarification with Army (Hoffman and Veysey):

—We do not want to appear to look defensive or as though we are reacting to irresponsible charges by appearing to have slowed down or stopped the negotiations.

—Therefore, we want to make it clear that as far as we are concerned negotiations should continue in a deliberate and careful fashion; and

—I wanted to be sure that all parties, including particularly the Army, understood this.

1. Source: Ford Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Box 13, 3–1 Panama Canal, 4/1/76–5/21/76. Confidential. Sent for action.
2. Robert “Bud” McFarlane of the National Security Council Staff.
3. See footnote 2, Document 85.
4. White House Counsel Philip W. Buchen.
5. Not found.
6. Admiral M. Staser Holcomb was Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s military assistant.
7. See footnote 2, Document 123.
8. Scowcroft did not indicate his approval or disapproval, but his interest in the issue persisted. On a May 17 memorandum from Low, Scowcroft added a note asking Low if the issue had been “taken care of.” (Ford Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Box 13, 3–1 Panama Canal, 4/1/76–5/21/76) In a May 25 memorandum to Scowcroft, Low wrote that Bunker’s “compromise idea that the negotiations would continue at a lower key” had won over Clements. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Latin American Affairs Staff Files, 1974–77, Box 7, Pan Canal Treaty Negotiations [8])