Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXII, Panama, 1973–1976

120. Minutes of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Principals and Regionals Staff Meeting¹

Washington, April 15, 1976.

[Omitted here are a list of attendees and discussion of unrelated matters.]

Secretary Kissinger: —and maybe have another briefing on the Panama Canal.

That was a great thing that Bunker did. What got into him, Bill?²

Mr. Rogers: He thought it was all off the record.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, there is no such thing as off the record.

Mr. Rogers: You know that; I know that. But he was nice to the Committee. They swore to him that it would be absolutely protected and not released.

Secretary Kissinger: First, we can’t protect Top Secret papers. Why should we be able to protect Congressional hearings? And, secondly, why couldn’t he stick to the formulations we’ve been using formerly?

Mr. Rogers: To “Are we going to give it away?” he said, “Yes.”

Secretary Kissinger: Then why couldn’t he put it on the basis of “We don’t know what it’s going to be until we have the negotiation completed”?

Mr. Rogers: Of course. And then we’re not giving away anything; we’re protecting our interests. There are a lot of ways he could have answered it better than he did. The answer is he was lulled into it, like a witness is lulled into a cross-examination.

Secretary Kissinger: Everybody is thinking he can protect himself with his constituency. He’s created a massive problem for the President for no reason whatsoever and for us, because in order to pick ourselves out now we have to say so many things that are going to come back to bite us in Latin America that it’s a massive problem.

Mr. Rogers: You bet it’s a massive problem, but we ought to be honest about it. Half of the problem is the President’s—what he said in Dallas³—

Secretary Kissinger: Sure.

Mr. Rogers: —and it was the conjunction of what Ellsworth said and what the President had said the week before.

Secretary Kissinger: But Ellsworth should have kept his mouth shut.

Mr. Rogers: Of course he should have.

Secretary Kissinger: (A), we’re protecting our interests. Anytime anybody asks the question, I give a long explanation of what the problem is. Then they have to fight the problem rather than the specific negotiating position. All he has to do is explain the problem and say, “We’re not sure how it’s going to come out. We’re protecting our rights in defense. What that is we don’t know until we complete the negotiation.”

Mr. Rogers: That’s the line I’ve been following. I was dumbfounded.

Secretary Kissinger: But how can people just go up there without telling anybody?

Mr. Rogers: No. The hearing we heard about for a long time. The hearing they called about a month and a half ago, but it was stalled. They had Vessey up, they had Marty Hoffman up; there were three days of hearings. Ellsworth came at the end of the whole thing. And we prepared a statement for him that, you know, was down the line, with no problems in it. But it was cross-examination. Snyder lulled him like a good cross-examiner does into good confidence and security. That was the trick.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but it’s not that Bunker is a Junior Officer.

Mr. Rogers: No. He made a mistake; there’s no question about that. The reasons I’m giving you—(1), he was—

Secretary Kissinger: Because if you think what the President said in Dallas was bad, you wait and see what he says the next time he goes down there.

Mr. Rogers: I hope if he follows along the lines of what Ron Nessen said yesterday⁴ we’ll be in better shape, because he talks about interests.

Secretary Kissinger: He was going to talk about defense, that we were going to maintain the defense. I made him change it to interests in defense. But if you think you can get that settled in a day of campaign speeches, you’re crazy.

Mr. Rogers: No; it’s a messy problem.

If there’s anything else we can do about it we will do it, but I can’t think of anything.

Secretary Kissinger: We can keep quiet.

Mr. Rogers: It’s the first preaching we’ve had on him.

Secretary Kissinger: But it was absolutely predictable.

Mr. Rogers: It wasn’t predictable.

Secretary Kissinger: It was predictable in that it would happen once he said what he said.

Mr. Rogers: Of course, but the prepared statement that we had arranged—and I followed the whole line that we’ve been following right down through here—

Secretary Kissinger: In fact [giving] the Canal to Panama is already the wrong way of stating it, because we haven’t got it to give.

Mr. Rogers: That’s what I say. Bunker made the first mistake.

Secretary Kissinger: So he shouldn’t have accepted the question.

Mr. Rogers: Correct—never accept the questioner’s formulation. Never say yes or no. Never get trapped into that formula—that’s the first principle. (Laughter.)

[Omitted here is discussion of unrelated matters.]

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, Lot 78D443, Box 9, Secretary’s Staff Meeting, April 15, 1976. Secret.
2. On April 14, Congressman Snyder leaked portions of Bunker’s closed-door testimony before the Panama Canal subcommittee of the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, including Bunker’s statement that acknowledged Presidential guidelines to “give up the Canal Zone over a period of time.” (“Ford Clarifies Stand on Canal After Conservatives’ Criticism,” The New York Times, April 15, 1976, p. 19) In a meeting with Rogers, Bunker maintained that his remarks were intended to be off-the-record and that Snyder broke his confidence. (Memorandum of conversation, April 15; National Archives, RG 59, Ambassador Bunker’s Correspondence, Lot 78D300, Box 8, Chron Jan–June 1976)
3. In an April 10 news conference in Dallas, President Ford hedged on whether his administration would cede control of the Canal, stating instead: “I can simply say—and say it very emphatically—that the United Sates will never give up its defense rights to the Panama Canal and will never give up its operational rights as far as Panama is concerned.” He concluded: “I can assure everybody in the United States that we will protect defense and operational responsibilities as far as the Panama Canal is concerned.” (Public Papers: Ford, 1976–77, Book II, p. 1066)
4. Nessen stated on April 14 that “there could of [sic] been a great deal more precision and detail given” in President Ford’s April 10 statement. (“Nessen Tries to Clarify Ford Stand on Panama Control,” Chicago Tribune, April 15, p. 2)