Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXI, Chile, 1969–1973

41. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, June 27, 1970.

SUBJECT

• Minutes of the Meeting of the 40 Committee, 27 June 1970

PRESENT

• Mr. Kissinger, Mr. Packard, Mr. Johnson, and General Cushman.
• Mr. Mitchell was unable to attend.
• Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Mr. Thomas Karamessines, and [name not declassified] were present for all items.
• Mr. William Broe was present for Items 1 through 4.
• Mr. John Hart was present for Item 1.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Chile.]

2. Chile—Political Action Related to 1970 Presidential Election

a. Mr. Broe outlined what had been done so far in the Chilean election campaign and what the current situation was as election day approaches. He went on to describe the Korry proposals which, those present agreed, were really two separable concepts.

b. At the present time, the Chilean Congress divides as follows: for Alessandri, 43; for Tomic, 75; for Allende, 82.

c. The most recent poll, which is 99% complete, shows the voters leaning toward Allende 28.4%, Tomic 29.9%, Alessandri 35.6%, and the remainder undecided. If a clear majority is not obtained, under the Chilean constitution the two highest vote-getters are dumped into a selective process by the Congress.

d. Mr. Broe indicated that Alessandri was slipping and was conducting a campaign based on the past; Tomic’s program lacked clarity for the Chilean voter; Allende seemed to be gaining a head of steam with an attractive package of promises for the have-nots.

e. Mr. Kissinger, the Chairman, wondered why more active support of Tomic would not cause the most damage to Allende.

f. Mr. Broe replied that “ground rules” in Chile had prevented our dealing with Tomic’s Christian Democratic Party mechanism, [1½ lines not declassified].

g. Mr. Johnson said that Messrs. Meyer and Crimmins from ARA were negative on both Korry proposals and that he himself had philosophical reservations. In these times when we are getting away from traditional election management, he compared Chile to the Italian situation where there was plenty of money within the country if it would only mature politically. The Chairman’s comment was, I don’t see why we need to stand by and watch a country go communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people.

h. It was agreed following the lengthy exchange of views: (1) to approve Part 1 of the Korry proposal for the infusion of $300,000 more for anti-Allende activity, and (2) to defer any decision on the buying of congressional votes should the election go to Congress; [1½ lines not declassified]. The risks in eventually embarking on this course were apparent and no action would be undertaken without further deliberations by the 40 Committee.

i. The critical indicator for Korry’s second proposal would be, if at the end of the election, Alessandri’s margin fell below 5%.

j. The Committee will keep close watch on Chilean developments from now until September.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Chile.]

1. Source: National Security Council, Nixon Intelligence Files, Subject Files, Chile, 1970. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Jessup on June 29. Copies were sent to Mitchell, Packard, Johnson, and Helms.