222. Memorandum From Arnold Nachmanoff of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1

SUBJECT

  • Korry’s Report to 40 Committee

You asked what Korry was talking about in para. 2 of the [less than 1 line not declassified] message at Tab C.2 CIA has sent a memo which explains the matter (Tab A).3 Korry apparently asked the Agency to help obtain some [less than 1 line not declassified] which might have been helpful to the PDC in its campaign attempt to link up government figures to the so-called copper plot. (You will recall that the government charged a number of Chileans and foreigners with a plot to lower copper prices and damage Chile’s interests; the charges backfired somewhat when the PDC counterattacked and noted the involvement of some government officials in an attempt to manipulate prices for their own benefit.) The CIA memo indicates that [less than 1 line not declassified] was [Page 613] unable to recover the messages requested by Korry and that it was unable to develop further information which might have assisted the PDC.

You also asked about Korry’s comments in para. 3 relating to the senatorial race. I referred to this in my cover memo of April 7 (Tab B),4 which you apparently did not have when you read the message. To summarize, Korry opposed CIA’s efforts (which were based on the 40 Committee guidance) to persuade the third party candidate to leave the race. The implication is that Korry did not believe the PDC candidate, Zaldivar, would win, and hence he wanted to deny the UP candidate an absolute majority. This is what resulted (the UP candidate received just under 50%), and Korry feels vindicated. The assumption we operated under, however, based on Embassy reports and CIA’s assessment, was that Zaldivar stood at least an even chance of winning a two-way race; and, therefore, we should make every effort to pull the third candidate out.

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 778, Country Files, Latin America, Chile, Vol. I, Korry File. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only; Outside System. Sent for information. The memorandum was initialed by Kissinger.
  2. Document 219.
  3. Tab A, an April 13 memorandum from Helms to Kissinger, is attached but not printed.
  4. Attached but not printed. See footnote 1, Document 219.