146. Memorandum for the Record1



1. On the morning of 10 October 1970, the DDP discussed the Chilean situation on telephone with General Haig. DDP made the following points:

a. The situation looked dimmer now than at any time before.

b. We had made direct contact with a number of the senior military officers, especially those who had been reportedly very activist-minded and had received pessimistic reactions from all.2

c. The type of forward planning Ambassador Korry discussed in his messages should be followed at this time as we should be preparing ourselves to deal with an Allende administration. It would be foolish to “throw out the baby with the bathwater.” However, Korry in some of his reactions may be premature.

d. The above notwithstanding, we were continuing to do everything we could to reach the desired objective and were not slowing our momentum.

2. General Haig advised DDP that Ambassador Korry would be allowed to come to Washington. Under Secretary U. Alexis Johnson had argued that Ambassador Korry should not be allowed to state at a later date that he had been refused the opportunity to come to Washington for consultation.

William V. Broe Chief
Western Hemisphere Division
  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Chile–ITTCIA 1963–1977, Lot 81D121, Documents Requested by the Department of Justice, 1970–1977. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only.
  2. CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence also reported on numerous coup rumors in TDCS 314/10739–70, TDCS DB–315/05484–70, and TDCS DB–315/05583–70, October 9, 14, and 17. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 774, Country Files, Latin America, Chile, Vol. II) In telegram 4260 from Santiago, October 14, the Embassy provided a lengthy summary of all of the rumors of which it was aware, but suggested that a successful and serious coup was unlikely. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–9 CHILE) These reports were synthesized in an October 16 INR Intelligence Note, which concluded: “A well-coordinated institutional effort to block Allende and take over the government is unlikely. A precipitous move by several military units, however, is more possible than was the case several weeks ago. Such a move would present the leaders of the armed forces with a dilemma.” (Ibid.)