98. Memorandum of Conversation1
PARTICIPANTS
- Mr. Takeo Fukuda, Foreign Minister of Japan
- The President
- Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
- Mr. James J. Wickel, American Embassy, Tokyo (Interpreter)
SUBJECT
- Textiles
During dinner Minister Fukuda noted Mr. Kishi’s reluctance to call on the President until he could bring a “gift” (i.e.—on textiles). Mr. Kishi, he stressed, wished very deeply to visit his old and highly regarded friend (the President) but felt that he could not do so until he could offer something on textiles.
[Page 326]The President requested that Minister Fukuda convey his own warm regards to Mr. Kishi.
The President explained that his own political position was most difficult, and that it has become almost impossible to restrain the explosive forces building up in the United States. October 15 is the latest date, he felt, that he could wait for a governmental agreement on textiles.2
Minister Fukuda asked what would happen on that date, but the President replied that he could not say.
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1025, Presidential/HAK Memcons, Memcon—The President, PM Takeo Fukuda, et al., Sept. 10, 1971 re: China/Japan. Secret; Nodis. The President’s Daily Diary indicates that the President hosted a dinner in honor of the Joint U.S.-Japanese Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs from 8:16 to 10:20 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files) In another memorandum of conversation from the same dinner, Fukuda described to Nixon the Japanese Government’s Cabinet reshuffle that had taken place in July. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 1025, Presidential/HAK Memcons, Memcon—The President, PM Takeo Fukuda, et al, Sept. 10, 1971 re: China/Japan)↩
- In a September 9 memorandum for the President, Peterson wrote, “Ambassador Kennedy told Ministers Fukuda and Tanaka that if the textile issue were not resolved satisfactorily on a voluntary basis by October 15 the United States would probably have no alternative but to take unilateral action.” (Ibid., Box 402, Subject Files, Trade, Vol. IV, Jul–Dec 71) In a September 21 memorandum for the President, Peterson noted, “At the August 15 Camp David meeting, you will recall deciding that if we could not get a voluntary textile deal by October 15th, you would then impose a settlement under the Emergency Banking Act Amendment of the Trading with the Enemy Act.” (Ibid., Box 400, Subject Files, Textiles, Vol. IV, Jul–Dec 71)↩