Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XIX, Part 2, Japan, 1969-1972

97. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 10, 1971, 7:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• Mr. Takeo Fukuda, Foreign Minister of Japan
• Ambassador Nobuhiko Ushiba
• Ambassador Genichi Akatani, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Interpreter)

• The President
• Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• Secretary of State William P. Rogers
• Deputy Undersecretary of State U. Alexis Johnson
• Mr. James J. Wickel, American Embassy, Tokyo (Interpreter)

SUBJECT

• China and Internal Politics in Japan

The President and Minister Fukuda exchanged warm greetings and congratulatory remarks on the successful conclusion of the 8th U.S.-Japan Joint Cabinet Committee on Economics and Trade.

Minister Fukuda noted his previous two visits to the White House, first, during a 3-day visit by Prime Minister Kishi during the Eisenhower administration, and second, during the Johnson administration as Finance Minister.

Minister Fukuda conveyed Mr. Kishi’s warm regards to the President, as well as Kishi’s message that he wished to call on the President even though he had no particular business to discuss.

The President said that he would welcome a visit by his old friend Mr. Kishi at any time.

Minister Fukuda also conveyed Prime Minister Sato’s warm regards to the President.

Minister Fukuda then reviewed the changes in the political situation in Japan, of which he had already informed Secretary Rogers in detail.

The President noted that this had been reported to him.

Minister Fukuda noted that the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) had won its greatest post-war victory (303 seats) in the general election (House of Representatives) of December, 1969, and that Prime Minister Sato last fall won re-election to a 4th term as LDP President. (The President of the majority party is then elected Prime Minister by the Diet.) In the process, however, Prime Minister Sato announced that he would not run for a 5th term, and ever since then unity within the LDP has been weakening.

Following the June, 1971 House of Councillors election Fukuda pointed out an unprecedented political development: a sufficient number of dissident LDP Councillors joined the opposition party coalition to elect an anti-Sato LDP candidate as President of the House of Councillors, rejecting the incumbent regular candidate backed by Prime Minister Sato.

In the Diet to be convened October 15, Minister Fukuda explained that China would be the biggest, by far, of all the political problems. Both he and Prime Minister Sato agreed the development of the China question is being greatly influenced by the President’s announcement of his forthcoming visit to Peking. Both also regretted that Japan has been unable, as yet, to develop its own relations with such a large neighboring country as China, and they both agreed that Japan should somehow normalize relations with Mainland China. However, both were fully aware that Japan should exercise great caution lest the process of normalization “shake” its relations with Taiwan and the other nations in the region. He noted that Japan could also lose the respect of the 700–800 million Mainland Chinese if it appeared to be moving opportunistically with the tide. The majority of the LDP supported this position.

With respect to handling of the Chinese representation question in the UNGA this fall, Minister Fukuda explained that the fundamental view of the LDP is to support the entry of the PRC and to oppose the exclusion of Taiwan. How to attain this common objective has been a subject of close consultation between the governments of Japan and the United States, he said, and the GOJ would support and campaign in favor of the two resolutions about to be put forward in the U.N. by the USG. However, Minister Fukuda cautioned that the LDP is not united in favor of co-sponsorship. The China question does provide excellent ammunition for the LDP factions seeking to undermine the Sato government and the slightest mistake in handling Chinese representation could precipitate the greatest political crisis faced by the Sato government since coming to power.

Minister Fukuda noted that he wished to repeat this to the President in detail even though he had already reviewed it thoroughly with Secretary Rogers because he was not certain they really understood the magnitude of the political crisis in the offing.

Minister Fukuda explained that the anti-Sato forces within the LDP opposed co-sponsorship for a variety of other reasons, but all were united in their suspicion that the United States must have made a promise to the PRC during the discussions about the President’s visit to Peking, that the United States would abandon Taiwan and “shake hands” with Peking. Therefore, they are urging, Japan should not be left out. Even if one conceded a certain amount of campaign rhetoric in this, Minister Fukuda pointed out that this argument is pervasive.

The President expressed understanding for the delicate political position of the GOJ. It is important, he said, to recognize what the United States position is, to respect the position the GOJ is in, and to point out the need for each government and nation to determine its own course of action on the basis of its own national interests. We, like Japan, have a long and close relationship with Taiwan; we, like Japan, believe that peace in the Pacific, in the long run, requires the participation of the PRC. With respect to the technical problem with the U.N., Secretary Rogers has stated the United States position publicly, and to Minister Fukuda privately, that is, that we would support the PRC entry but would oppose the expulsion of Taiwan from the U.N. We believed this to be a correct position.

For Japan’s part, the President said, the GOJ needed to consult its own interest to determine whether to support our position, which the GOJ agrees is the right one, or whether to go further and co-sponsor the two resolutions. However, he felt that Japan must do this in terms of its own view of the situation. We would proceed to work for our position; he said, but would respect other nations’ rights to make their own decision with respect to the degree of support it would give, especially a nation so closely identified with this question.

With respect to the long term, the President said that as realists we both knew that we are only beginning what might be a better relationship with the PRC. The President assured Minister Fukuda (as he assured Prime Minister Sato) that when we begin our discussion with the PRC there are no conditions on either side; there is no condition for the PRC to do something in Southeast Asia, and there is no condition that we do anything about other situations. Each side is as aware as the other that we are beginning a basic dialogue. In the light of it, he said, the necessity is clear for continued close relations between the governments of the United States and Japan, because, even though we are strong economic competitors as discussed in the ECONCOM, our friendship is essential to the peace of East Asia and the Pacific, and indeed the entire world.

By this, the President said, he did not mean that our positions should be identical, for each nation is a strong independent power, which must consult its own interests.

The President suggested that we continue our personal relations, and the consultations between us, noting that he would see Minister Fukuda again in Anchorage September 26, together with Secretary Rogers. This situation is difficult for both of us, but the President noted that our interests are somewhat common.

The Secretary pointed out the illogical and false position of Sato’s political opponents who did not wish to help maintain Taiwan’s seat in the U.N.

Minister Fukuda said that the LDP and GOJ leadership had no doubts about the President’s position; but some dissident factions were using this issue to undermine the Sato government. Therefore he welcomed the President’s encouraging remarks, and expressed the wish to convey their substance to the political leaders in Japan. Although he had earlier promised the Secretary to keep this conversation in complete confidence, he now believed that it is best to say something.

The President noted that the United States’ position has been stated publicly by the Secretary. He understood that the GOJ supported that position, but was also presented with political problems, and recognized that the GOJ must make its own decision based on its evaluation of the situation, just as we do. He said that he was not putting pressure on the GOJ.

Minister Fukuda said that he wished only to inform political leaders in order to correct erroneous reporting about the President’s visit to Peking. As he said earlier, neither he nor Sato had entertained any doubts, but he did wish to inform other political leaders of these encouraging remarks by the President.

The President did not believe there would be any harm in doing so.²

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1025, Presidential/HAK Memcons, Memcon—The President, PM Takeo Fukuda, et al., Sept. 10, 1971 re: China/Japan. Secret; Nodis. On September 9, Rogers submitted a memorandum and talking points to Nixon for this meeting. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 JAPAN) Fukuda had asked Ushiba to meet with Kissinger, prior to Fukuda’s meeting with Nixon, in order to brief Kissinger about Japan’s domestic problems. This meeting took place on September 8 at 2 p.m. in Kissinger’s office. (Memorandum of conversation; ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 536, Country Files, Far East, Japan, Vol. V, 1 Jul–Sept 1971) As preparation for Nixon’s September 10 conversations with Fukuda, Hormats sent Kissinger a memorandum on September 10, which provided advice on issues to raise, including yen revaluation, import liberalization, and the textile controversy. (Ibid., Box 402, Subject Files, Trade, Vol. IV, Jul–Dec 1971) On September 9, Rogers also sent the President a memorandum with attached talking points for his meeting with Fukuda. (Ibid., Box 285, Agency Files, Department of State, Vol. 13, 1 Sept–31 Dec 1971)
2. At 7:50 p.m., following this conversation, Nixon, Fukuda, Kissinger, and the two interpreters met privately to discuss the textile issue before dinner. Fukuda informed Nixon of his unsuccessful efforts to resolve the textile dispute, and Nixon expressed appreciation for Fukuda’s comments and stressed the importance of reaching an agreement as soon as possible. (Memorandum of conversation, September 10; ibid., Box 1025, Presidential/HAK Memcons, Memcon—The President PM Takeo Fukuda, et al., Sept. 10, 1971 re: China/Japan)