Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XIX, Part 2, Japan, 1969-1972

83. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, July 23, 1971, 3:15 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• Nobuhiko Ushiba, Ambassador of Japan
• Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• Mr. John H. Holdridge, Senior Staff Member NSC

SUBJECT

• Dr. Kissinger’s Conversations with Ambassador Ushiba on His Visit to Peking and the Announcement of the President’s Trip to China

Ambassador Ushiba expressed pleasure at Dr. Kissinger’s ability to see him in what must be an extraordinarily busy period. Dr. Kissinger said that he was delighted to talk with Ambassador Ushiba about something other than textiles, which must be one of the most disastrous negotiations in history on the part of both sides. Ambassador Ushiba agreed that the circumstances of the textile negotiations had been very unfortunate. Dr. Kissinger noted that he had sat on the issue in the hopes that it would go away; Ambassador Ushiba responded that it had, in fact, gone away but had come back again.

Turning away from the textiles problem, Dr. Kissinger said that he had wanted to talk with Ambassador Ushiba about recent events. He recognized the shock that these events (his visit to Peking and the announcement of the President’s trip) had caused Prime Minister Sato, and had read the account of Ambassador Johnson’s conversation on this subject with Ambassador Ushiba.² He very much regretted this situation. Maintaining a close friendship with Japan was an absolutely key element in US policy, which our agreement on Okinawa had been intended to establish on a concrete basis. The last thing we wanted to do was to change our relationship with Japan.

In this instance, however, there had been a particular problem. Our domestic pressures were such that if anything had come out in advance, they would have become so great as to either kill the visits or raise expectations unduly. We had a security problem in the Government, and there were actually many senior officers in it who knew no more than Prime Minister Sato. Also, to be candid, our dealings with the Japanese were not entirely free of leaks on the Japanese side. These were not on major issues, but they did exist.

Therefore, Dr. Kissinger continued, we did not know how to handle the problem of getting word to Prime Minister Sato. Originally there had been some thought given to his, Dr. Kissinger’s, going to Korea as a pretext for visiting Peking, in which case he would have stopped in Japan and seen Prime Minister Sato. Secretary Laird’s trip to Korea had then been announced, though, and this could not easily have been turned off. Dr. Kissinger wanted Ambassador Ushiba to understand that what he was saying was completely confidential.

Dr. Kissinger pointed out that the past was now behind us, and we had to look to the future. We wanted Ambassador Ushiba to know that, first, we really considered our relationship with Japan as the center of our policy in the Pacific; and, second, that we are not replacing Japan with China. We want Japan as a friend, and while we also want discussions with the Chinese, we are under no illusions that we will be able to change their basic orientations. On our side, we have the greatest interest in maintaining our old channels of communications, and even of strengthening them.

Dr. Kissinger observed that on communications one problem was that we did not have a private channel to Prime Minister Sato. We had once believed there was one on textiles, but occasions had arisen in which our bureaucracy was told by Ambassador Ushiba’s bureaucracy about private communications which we had kept from our people. Speaking on behalf of the President, Dr. Kissinger asked Ambassador Ushiba if he could make a proposal to Prime Minister Sato to “put these two gentlemen in touch with one another.” Perhaps he, Dr. Kissinger, could speak with Ambassador Ushiba on sensitive matters, and Ambassador Ushiba could give the message privately to Prime Minister Sato; the Japanese for their part might do the same for us. Some mechanical arrangement for this might be set up. Dr. Kissinger suggested that the Japanese might make a proposal on this; he personally did not know how it might be done. Confidentially speaking, we had such an arrangement with one or two other governments, for example the British.

Ambassador Ushiba said that Prime Minister Sato would certainly make some proposal. Dr. Kissinger emphasized that the major thing for the people in Tokyo to understand was that we were most eager to strengthen our relations. As the man who conducted the US talks with the Chinese, he could assure Ambassador Ushiba that there were no surprises in these talks, and no secret deals.

Ambassador Ushiba declared that from the long range standpoint the President’s future visit to Peking was a good thing for the world and for Japan, but in the short term would cause problems in Japan. Oka of the New York Times had written about the shock and resentment created among staunch friends of America in Japan. This was not because of the concerted pressure of events, which was understood in Japan, but because the President’s going to China was such an extraordinary thing from the Japanese point of view. There were “too many lawyers” in Ambassador Ushiba’s country, and these had come to the conclusion that there must have been some US commitment to Peking in connection with the normalization of US/PRC relations, and since this was not possible from the Chinese point of view without the US dropping its relationship with Taiwan, the US must, therefore, be ready to drop Taiwan.

Dr. Kissinger declared that he could assure Ambassador Ushiba there were no such commitments. He remarked that he was the only American who couldn’t possibly have lost his shirt in his conversation with the Chinese because he didn’t have one in the first place. He had forgotten to pack his own shirts and had been obliged to borrow two shirts from Mr. Holdridge. Mr. Holdridge, who was present, could verify this.

Ambassador Ushiba asked, could Dr. Kissinger see the logic in the Japanese suspicions? Dr. Kissinger replied that he could see their logic, but it simply wasn’t true, it had the disadvantage of being incorrect.

Ambassador Ushiba wanted to know how the Chinese could tell Dr. Kissinger that he was welcome and not at the same time ask the US to do this, i.e., break off with Taiwan. Dr. Kissinger asserted that he was not saying that they didn’t raise the problem. However, Ambassador Ushiba would see that when the President went to China we would still have an Ambassador in Formosa. Ambassador Ushiba wondered if the outcome of the visit would not be a break with Taiwan. Dr. Kissinger stressed that he did not expect any such outcome. The President could not possibly do this.

Ambassador Ushiba remarked again that the Japanese were surprised over the fact that the President would be paying a visit to China. This was an extraordinary thing from the Japanese point of view, and so everyone naturally jumped to a conclusion. Dr. Kissinger agreed that it was not too usual for a head of state to visit a country with which his own country had no relations. Indeed, this may never have happened before.

Ambassador Ushiba surmised from what Dr. Kissinger had said that the Chinese had not pursued too deeply the matter of US breaking relations with Taiwan. Dr. Kissinger said that he didn’t want to go into his conversation in Peking too closely. The Chinese had certainly expressed their point of view, but Ambassador Ushiba should not expect a break in relations with Taiwan as an outcome. It would be inconceivable that the President would or could break off relations established over a generation as a result of his visit.

Dr. Kissinger said that in making this observation he hoped what he was telling Ambassador Ushiba would not appear in the Japanese press. Ambassador Ushiba said that he would report only to Prime Minister Sato and the Foreign Minister. Dr. Kissinger hoped that they would be on their guard, and Ambassador Ushiba assured him that they would be very cautious. Dr. Kissinger, referring to past leaks, observed that there was no evidence that Ambassador Ushiba personally was involved in them. The only foreign ministry, though, which leaked more than the Japanese was our own. Ours couldn’t keep any secret at all.

Ambassador Ushiba wanted to know if Vietnam had been discussed in Peking. The Japanese were very concerned about the outcome in Vietnam. Dr. Kissinger stated that if we had wanted to sell out Vietnam, we didn’t have to go to Peking to do it, but could accomplish this in Paris. Ambassador Ushiba commented that for a peaceful settlement, the support of China would be needed to bring one about. To reach a definite conclusion in Vietnam, the cooperation of the Chinese was needed. Dr. Kissinger agreed that this might be the case. He noticed that Hanoi was yelling every day about great power pressures being placed against it. Ambassador Ushiba concurred, adding that to this extent at least, Dr. Kissinger’s Peking trip had been quite effective. He raised the question again of whether, except for discussing peace in a broad framework, there had been any commitments. Dr. Kissinger declared that none had been made either on our side or on the Chinese side. This was the first time any senior American official had a chance to talk to senior Chinese officials, and the conversations were, therefore, in the nature of an exploration.

“Ah so, an exploration,” Ambassador Ushiba remarked. If he could say so, the Chinese would be quite happy to see an American President in Peking. Dr. Kissinger asked if Ambassador Ushiba could possibly imagine that we had invited ourselves to Peking? A more logical way to have this happen was for the side which wanted the other side to come to extend the invitation. There were no preconditions, and we wouldn’t have accepted any even though, as circumstances worked out, the issue never arose.

Ambassador Ushiba raised as his next question (admittedly a far-fetched one) what possible advantage there would be from the US point of view if the President had a talk with Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai in Peking and returned home without any visible result? Was this possible? Dr. Kissinger asked Ambassador Ushiba what he would consider an advantage from the US point of view, to which Ambassador Ushiba suggested some kind of Chinese commitment to a solution in Vietnam, and at least no acts of violence regarding Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait—something like that. For example, if Prime Minister Sato were to go to Peking to have talks, this fact alone would limit action on Japan’s part.

Dr. Kissinger said that if this Administration had proved anything, it had shown that it was able to ride out public opinion. We had done this for three years now, and would continue to do what we believed was right. We didn’t expect any big results in Peking. In any event, we would keep in close touch with the Japanese on the President’s trip, although there might be some minor things which we couldn’t discuss.

Dr. Kissinger said that it was hard to know what public opinion would expect out of any announcement following the President’s visit. What was startling about the last announcement was not the content but what had actually happened. With respect to the President’s visit, however, he, Dr. Kissinger, not only did not expect, but was certain, there would not be any bombshell coming out of the meeting. Ambassador Ushiba observed that this was reassuring for them.

Dr. Kissinger expressed the view that from the standpoint of our immediate problem, the moves toward the PRC were the right thing to do; from the long range standpoint, though, our relationship with Japan was extremely important. We had arranged the first visit without discussing it with the Japanese, but it didn’t have any content. It would be inconceivable that if it had had content, or would have been inconsistent with the views of the Japanese, that we would not have discussed it with them.

Ambassador Ushiba wondered where the UN question rested. Dr. Kissinger referred to what Secretary Rogers had said to him, Ambassador Ushiba, on this point.³ We were willing to have the PRC in the UN, but did not want Taiwan out. Ambassador Ushiba had had many talks with Marshall Green and others on the UN question and knew our views.⁴ The UN issue had nothing to do with his, Dr. Kissinger’s, trip. He didn’t believe that Peking would necessarily be happy over the way things would work out. Ambassador Ushiba thought that Taiwan might possibly feel that Dr. Kissinger’s trip and the announcement of the President’s proposed trip might have diminished its chances in the UN this fall. Dr. Kissinger acknowledged that there might be some tactical questions involved here, but we would nevertheless proceed along the line which we had discussed with the Japanese. As for the President’s trip, we were not operating under the assumption that we were doing the PRC any favor. If the Chinese didn’t want this trip, they would find an excuse to cancel it; if they wanted it, it would take place. We simply couldn’t throw over an ally of 25 years standing, and would actively support it in the UN.

Ambassador Ushiba remarked that it was most important that the US actively support Taiwan. He wondered what tactics the US proposed to follow. Dr. Kissinger noted that the tactics issue was one which did not concern the White House as much as it did State, where much better information was available. The point he wanted to stress was that we would make a significant effort to keep the ROC in the UN, which was the major issue we were concerned with. Nothing had changed as a result of his visit to Peking. The Japanese knew that we were going in that direction—i.e., better relations with Peking—anyway.

Ambassador Ushiba recalled that Taiwan’s position was that if the ROC lost its Security Council seat, there was not much point in keeping the General Assembly seat. Dr. Kissinger commented that our decision was to fight for the ROC anyway regardless of what it did as a matter of principle.

Ambassador Ushiba asked, what was the timing of the President’s visit? Would it be before the General Assembly debate, that is, before the end of October? Dr. Kissinger replied that this would be a surprise to him and that he wouldn’t expect the trip to come that soon. Ambassador Ushiba pointed out that “some people” were guessing the President might go in September because this would be a convenient way to deal with the UN issue. There were rumors to this effect in Japan. Dr. Kissinger responded that there have been no discussions at all on the timing, although these might start very soon. It was his impression that the trip could not take place before the end of the year at the very earliest, and there was a good chance it would not be this year at all. The earliest that it could be technically feasible at all was the end of the year.

Ambassador Ushiba wondered if Dr. Kissinger had noticed any adverse reaction from the USSR, for example, in the SALT talks? Dr. Kissinger replied that he hadn’t noticed any difference. We did not intend to let the Soviet attitude figure in on the President’s visit because this would be giving the Soviets a veto. Ambassador Ushiba again asked if Dr. Kissinger foresaw any great impact on the SALT talks, and Dr. Kissinger replied negatively. Of course, if the President went there (to Peking) at the time the SALT talks were going on and behaved as if we were engaging in an alliance against the Soviets, this might happen.

Dr. Kissinger reiterated what he had said before about private communications. Ambassador Ushiba should feel free, particularly if he had a message of sensitivity and importance, to get in touch with him, Dr. Kissinger. The President had asked him to make this point.

Another point which the President had wanted him to raise was to pass on the information that when the Japanese Cabinet Council delegation came in September, the President wanted to give a dinner in its honor. Ambassador Ushiba would be seeing Secretary Rogers in the morning and would be hearing this from him as well, and should work out the arrangements in the State channel. Again, we wanted to do what we could to continue our close relationship with Japan, and if the Prime Minister or Foreign Minister had something which they wanted to get to the President, they should do so through Dr. Kissinger.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 536, Country Files, Far East, Japan, Vol. V, 1 Jul–Sep 1971. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in Kissinger’s office. Kissinger approved this memorandum, which Holdridge had sent him under an August 20 memorandum.
2. See Document 81.
3. Telegram 130519 to Tokyo, July 20, describes Rogers’ July 19 meeting with Ushiba. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL CHICOM–US)
4. On April 26, Ushiba had met with U. Alexis Johnson to discuss Chinese representation at the United Nations. (Ibid., POL 17 JAPAN–US) On July 28, Green and Okawara met to discuss the Chinese representation issue. (Telegram 137043 to Japan; ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 536, Country Files, Far East, Japan, Vol. V, 1 Jul–Sep 71)