Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XIX, Part 2, Japan, 1969-1972

82. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon ¹

Washington, July 22, 1971.

SUBJECT

• Prime Minister Sato’s Reply to your message to him

When I met Ambassador Ushiba of Japan on July 19 to discuss developments on China, he gave me the following language from a telegram which he said was a message from Prime Minister Sato he had just received in response to your personal message to the Prime Minister of July 16.²

Begin text. The Japanese Government welcomes your recent decision to visit China in the belief that the improvement in the Sino-American relations will contribute to the reducing of tension existing in the world.

Japan, however, cannot but feel deeply concerned over the future development in the relationship between the United States and China, as it is bound to have an extremely important influence upon the situation in Asia.³ Furthermore, in order to maintain and strengthen the relationship of mutual trust between Japan and the United States which has been cultivated over so many years, it is earnestly hoped that the United States Government will hold close consultations well in advance with the Japanese Government on such matters as will seriously affect Japan, including the China problem.

It is the hope of the Japanese Government that the President’s visit to China will contribute to the solution of the Indochina problem, since an early settlement of Indochina problem, as well as the improvement in U.S.-China relations, will greatly help reduce the tension in Asia. End text.

William P. Rogers

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 757, Presidential Correspondence File, 1969–1974, Japan (Sato Corr) 1969–8 July 1972. Secret; Nodis. An August 2 note indicates that Rogers’ memorandum was incorporated into the President’s brief. (Ibid.)
2. Document 79.
3. Sato met with David Kennedy on July 24, and “raised the question of the President’s decision to make a trip to Peking. He started by saying the President’s trip has thrown his entire nation and, for that matter, the entire Far East into a period of speculation and concern. The speculation is relevant to the question of what President Nixon intends to accomplish and the concern particularly relates to whether or not the U.S. was changing her stance with respect to former allies. Does the U.S. intend now to drop her ʽlittle friendsʼ by the wayside in order to take up a relationship with the ʽbig boysʼ. The Prime Minister repeated these expressions several times. He said he had always followed the ʽbossʼ in these policy matters but this time he was left out and caught unprepared with both the Diet and the press. He also touched on the fact that President Nixon was going to Peking and not vice-versa, implying that the U.S. had already make a most significant concession in the oriental way of thinking in the Far East.” Kennedy sent this account to Peter Peterson on July 31. Peterson marked this passage for emphasis before passing it on to Nixon. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, Box 1, Peter Peterson, Subject Files, Textile Negotiations, April–July 1971)