Office of the Historian

74. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State1

Tokyo, June 3, 1971, 0409Z.

5221. Subj: Rogers–Aichi Talk Re ChiRep in Paris. Summary: Both Emperor and PriMin Sato place highest importance on: a) keeping GRC in UN, and b) closest consultations with USG on China issues.

1. During 90-minute session June 2, PriMin Sato attached great hope to FornMin Aichi’s forthcoming discussion re ChiRep with Secretary Rogers in Paris.2 Sato noted he had just come from audience with Emperor. While Emperor is supposedly disinterested in political affairs, he had urged GOJ stand solidly with Chiang Kai-shek noting that Generalissimo had in times past done much for Japan.

2. Stressing importance of continued close USG–GOJ consultations, Sato observed that once course of action is determined, GOJ can lobby effectively with some countries, e.g. SEA nations, while USG can cultivate other territory, e.g. English speaking world.

3. Sato said he has impression USG is still gathering info. He indicated tempus is fugiting and much spadework will have to be done in anticipation of UNGA this fall. He noted that because of its involvement in Indo-China hostilities, in which PRC has direct interest, situation is in some ways more difficult for USG than for GOJ.

4. According to Sato, of utmost importance is close USG–GOJ consultation. I noted we staying in close touch but final USG decision re course to be followed not yet taken.

5. When asked specifically what message he wished conveyed to Secretary, Sato said it is GOJ’s determination to honor its treaty obligations with Taiwan, and to uphold its “international faith.” If GRC could keep its UNSC seat so much the better, but in any case GOJ wishes to take whatever steps may be necessary to assure that GRC stays in UN. He was glad to have reassurance that USG also wants GRC’s continuation in UN.

6. Sato said Japan’s new Chief Rep at UN Nakagawa has been instructed to sound out U Thant’s views.

7. Earlier in day, Vice FornMin Mori had suggested to me that while it is GOJ’s wish and PriMin Sato’s strong determination to assure [Page 204] GRC’s preservation in UN, impression in GOJ circles is that USG’s primary interest is maintaining bilateral commitment to GRC, with GRC’s status in UN of lesser importance.3 I assured Mori that we share GOJ’s desire to keep GRC in UN.

Meyer
  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 536, Country Files, Far East, Japan, Vol. IV, 1 Jan–30 June 1971. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to the Consulate at Hong Kong, Paris, Taipei, and USUN.↩
  2. A memorandum of conversation on Chinese representation between Aichi and Rogers, June 9, is ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM.↩
  3. On July 7, Ericson wrote a memorandum for Brown, indicating that “the Japanese are obviously beginning to suspect that our game is to delay a Chirep decision beyond the time when anything can usefully be done. If this is the case, the Japanese will feel they have been left holding the bag and Sato & Company will be in deep political trouble if their whole China policy is swept away by what happens in the UN.” (Ibid.)↩