125. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon1
SUBJECT
- Your Meetings with Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka and Foreign Minister Ohira
Your meetings with Tanaka and Ohira come at an opportune moment. Tanaka and Ohira (who could be the next prime minister) are already convinced that to maintain a cooperative relationship with the U.S. is in Japan’s and their own political best interest. Their immediate problem is to demonstrate that this relationship brings dividends for Japan while they respond to domestic pressure to undertake new departures in foreign policy with Peking and Moscow. The Japanese have been at pains to reassure us that normalization of relations with Peking will be sought on a basis that is no threat to essential U.S. interests in Japan’s pursuit of these goals.
The most important outcome of the meeting will be the tone it sets for the future relationship between Japan and the United States during a period of considerable flux in international relations affecting the two countries.
Our Objectives
—To emphasize that it is essential for the Japanese to move toward elimination of the present trade imbalance between our two countries, in order to maintain our close political relationship. This meeting is not in any sense a negotiating session on specific items. Tanaka will probably not be able to go much beyond the positions he has already stated on economic matters. However, it is important that you stress the continuing urgency and importance you attach to this issue. The discussion should not be put in terms of Japanese concessions to the United States, but rather on the need to maintain our close political relationship, which we both desire, and assure continued Japanese access to the U.S. market.
—To provide evidence both within the U.S. and Japan that we are consulting with the Japanese leadership about our intentions and expectations with respect to U.S. policy in Asia.
—To provide a further opportunity to make explicit to the Japanese leadership that developments in U.S.–PRC relations should cause no [Page 455] difficulties to the Japanese in pursuit of normalization of relations with Peking or in their domestic political competition. (A popular election is likely in Japan any time from late October to early 1973.)
Japanese Objectives
—Tanaka wants very much to establish his relationship with the U.S., Japan’s most important ally, prior to Japan’s pending negotiations with both China and the Soviet Union. At the same time Tanaka must bear in mind that it is up to him to demonstrate a more “independent” policy toward the U.S. while simultaneously stressing our mutuality of interests. It would be disastrous for Tanaka to allow the impression to arise that the U.S. was constricting the terms of Japan’s approach toward the PRC.
—The Japanese also want evidence that we acknowledge and support Japan’s status as a major power. (We can provide this evidence by making it clear that we support Japan’s desire for a permanent seat on the Security Council.)
—The Japanese want to protect their economic position without injuring U.S.-Japanese bilateral relations.
Talks on China
—Our experience with the Chinese leaders should be shared with Tanaka to the maximum extent possible in order to provide him with a feel for the nature of negotiations with the Chinese.
—We hope the Japanese will stress to the Chinese our shared view that the Taiwan question should be solved “peacefully,” and that Japan intends “to strengthen” its relationship with the U.S. based on the present Security Treaty.
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 926, VIP Visits, Tanaka Visit (Hawaii) 31 Aug–1 September [1972] [1 of 4]. Secret.↩