Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XIX, Part 2, Japan, 1969-1972

112. Memorandum for the President’s File¹

San Clemente, California, January 7, 1972, 9:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Meeting with Eisaku Sato, Japanese Prime Minister, on Friday, January 7, 1972 at 9:30 a.m. in San Clemente

PARTICIPANTS

• Prime Minister Eisaku Sato
• Ambassador Nobuhiko Ushiba
• Ambassador Genichi Akatani (Interpreter)
• The President
• Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• James J. Wickel, American Embassy Tokyo (Interpreter)

Kissinger Visit to Japan

The Prime Minister began by asking whether Dr. Kissinger could stop off in Japan at the conclusion of the President’s visit to Peking, provided of course he didn’t have a stomach ache from eating too much rich Chinese food.

The President agreed, in confidence, provided this not be announced publicly, and instructed Dr. Kissinger to coordinate with Ambassador Ushiba.

The Prime Minister expressed his appreciation, knowing how busy Dr. Kissinger is, and suggested that it would be helpful to set a date. He agreed, of course, to keep this visit secret.

The President asked that no public announcement be made of the subject of the visit, which obviously would be China, since this would precede his own visit to Moscow. He added that Dr. Kissinger could also brief the Prime Minister on the latest developments relating to his forthcoming visit to Moscow, and assured the Prime Minister that he could talk to Dr. Kissinger as if he were the President.

Dr. Kissinger said that the latter half of March would be the best time.

The Prime Minister asked the President to consider that he also would be pleased to meet with the President at any place he might wish to designate.

The President felt that Dr. Kissinger’s visit would cause some trouble with his European friends, but in view of the special relationship between the United States and Japan he felt it would be natural to have him go. The Europeans would be briefed about the Peking visit at the ambassadorial level, he pointed out, but Japan would be briefed at the Prime Minister level.

The Prime Minister expressed his approval, and inquired whether this would be Dr. Kissinger’s first visit to Japan.

Dr. Kissinger replied that, with the exception of brief stops enroute elsewhere, this would be his first visit since 1962.

The Prime Minister said that consideration should be given for an appropriate non-governmental group to extend an invitation.

The President agreed that it would be desirable to have an educational or cultural organization extend the invitation.

The Prime Minister felt that (Fuji Bank Chairman) Mr. Iwasa’s economic group would be pleased to extend the invitation.

The President felt that it might be better not to involve an economic forum, lest this appear to cut across Secretary Connally’s lines of communication.

The Prime Minister looked forward to speaking German with Dr. Kissinger, explaining that he had taken his degree at Tokyo University in German jurisprudence. He also added, with fervor, that he would pray for the President’s success in Peking.

President’s Visit and Other China Matters

The Prime Minister noted that he had expressed some reservations about the different positions of Japan and the United States vis-à-vis China. However, since Dr. Kissinger is arranging the visit to Peking, he assumed that everything would be all right.

Dr. Kissinger explained that he has had extensive discussions with the Chinese about what is, and what is not possible.

The President interjected that we have made no deal.

Dr. Kissinger said that all our friends would see, at the end of the meetings in China, that we had reaffirmed our commitments, and we would have no reason to explain that we had made a deal. China knew our needs, and had no interest in putting us on the spot; any uncertainties or doubts, he said, would soon be dispelled.

The President, by way of indicating an important difference which bears on our relations with Japan and the PRC, noted this morning’s report of the Chinese press attack on him, not personally, but for the failure of the United States economic policy. The Chinese are Communists, and we, like the Japanese, believe in a free economy. He surmised that this Chinese attack was prompted by some two weeks of Soviet press criticism of the PRC for its failure to criticize the United States, and felt that it was significant that the PRC did not respond with an attack on his foreign policy. In a sense, the PRC had to prove its virginity as a Communist power.

The Prime Minister said that he was not concerned with the differences between Capitalism and Communism. Rather, he hoped there is no difference between Japan and the United States on the abstract point that China is one, regardless of whether it is represented by the PRC or the ROC, as each claimed.

The President repeated his statement of yesterday, that each nation would have to make its own independent decision, but that we should consult fully with each other with respect to changes of policy. Nor did he think that the United States and Japan should engage in an obvious race to Peking, because in that case neither would win, only Peking could win.

The Prime Minister agreed and said that Japan did not intend to engage in any race. However, he noted that the announcement of the President’s visit to Peking had come as a great shock. He himself understood that this had not been arranged behind Japan’s back (over its head) but the Japanese people did not share his understanding. Japan was ahead, he added, in de facto relations, such as trade.

The President said that he understood the problem presented to the Prime Minister, but emphasized that the announcement of the visit was one thing, and did not involve a change in policy; however, a change of policy would be another thing, on which he would wish to consult fully.

The Prime Minister said that Japan is the major trading partner of the PRC, which must know that it should have governmental contacts with Japan. He speculated that Peking is considering now how such contacts can be turned to its own best advantage.

Dr. Kissinger said that one thing is indicated by our own experience. When the President first made his initiative years ago through an open channel, the PRC responded arrogantly and demanded many conditions, but the President continued steadily on his own course and eventually the PRC dropped all its conditions. Our experience has shown that it would have been incorrect for us in 1969 to have acceded to their conditions in order to open a dialogue.

For example, the President explained, the PRC demanded as conditions for talks that we get out of Asia, get out of Vietnam, and abrogate our Security Treaty with the ROC. We said no, firmly, and refused to accept any conditions.

The Prime Minister thanked them with some energy for the above indications, which would be of great value to him. The opposition parties in Japan and private groups have all been demanding of the GOJ, almost as if singing the same popular song, that it normalize relations immediately. The GOJ, he explained, could only continue, as it had, to defend its own position. Since Japan is already the major trading partner of the PRC, he did not believe Japan needed to bow its head. However, as the opposition parties continued to demand relentlessly that the GOJ bow its head to the PRC their refrain had gradually been taken up by the public as well, and has become a major domestic criticism of the GOJ. It is quite helpful to know, he said, that the PRC attitude toward the United States in 1969 so resembles the PRC attitude toward Japan today.

Dr. Kissinger explained that in every meeting Chou En-lai always followed the same sequence. In the first period, Chou always states his own position in a tough and unyielding manner, but, acting under firm Presidential instructions, he always replies in an equally tough manner. Following this phase, Chou would always change his attitude and move on to discuss other matters. Speaking not in ideological terms, but in terms of human analysis, he observed that those who started their revolution in the mountains of China over 25 years ago are tough and hard men, and respect tough, hard adversaries; soft ones they swallow and digest. He believed, therefore, that the way to negotiate with the Chinese is not belligerently, but firmly, without giving away the store before they come forward with something.

The President said that he could tell the Prime Minister privately, without giving away any confidences, that his reading of the records of Dr. Kissinger’s conversations shows that the PRC rates the USSR as its strongest potential adversary. Japan’s policy is correct, if this is any indication, because the PRC respects a strong, competitive adversary, and it does respect Japan. If Japan were to crawl, or to run to Peking, its bargaining position, he concluded, would evaporate.

The Prime Minister asked whether the Warsaw Talks provided the basis for Dr. Kissinger’s visit to Peking.²

The President said the Warsaw Talks were just one part, and not the most important; there were others, which were more important. However, he added, we do not do business in public.

Dr. Kissinger observed that while Mao exercised over-all control, Chou En-lai makes all the day-to-day decisions, and he moves at his own pace. If pushed, he will do nothing.

The Prime Minister asked whether Romanian Prime Minister Ceausescu had been instrumental in arranging the contacts.

The President said that he was one contact.

The Prime Minister murmured, of course, there were many. He continued, saying that Mr. Whitlam, head of Australia’s Labor Party, had passed on helpful information to the GOJ in Tokyo following his visit to Peking, but had declined to serve as any sort of emissary. More recently, Pierre Mendes-France had stopped in Tokyo enroute to Peking, and had received a briefing on the situation in Japan. He said that he would not know until later whether this had been useful.

The Prime Minister then said that Japan has two major Communist powers as neighbors. The USSR, he felt, is more concerned with Europe, and would pay little heed to Japan were it not for its problems with the PRC. With respect to normalizing relations with the PRC, which the Japanese wished to do in view of their historical relations with China, he said the GOJ would not act in haste, but neither did it wish to delay unduly.

The President agreed that the USSR looked to Europe, but noted also that it has developed an eye in its back to keep watch on China. In fact, he said, the USSR maintains more divisions on its China border than on its European border.

The Prime Minister suggested that the President, while in China, might inform the PRC, as appropriate, that the GOJ desires to normalize its relations with the PRC. It is ironical, he said, that LDP politician Kenzo Matsumura used to urge that Japan serve as a bridge between China and the United States, but now the roles have been reversed. He reiterated his request that the President, as appropriate, inform the PRC that the GOJ wished to normalize relations. Paradoxical as this seemed, he hoped that the President would be sympathetic.

The President said that we believed it to be essential that we move together on our terms, not theirs.

The Prime Minister understood, and said that Japan would not be too anxious to normalize hastily. He suggested that the discussion of China be left at this.

SALT and Strategic Deterrence

The Prime Minister asked if there would be a SALT agreement.

The President replied that he believed there would be one. In the SALT negotiations, he said, the USSR has sought to limit United States defensive missiles, while the United States has sought to limit USSR long-range missiles. He felt it important that the Prime Minister know that we have been negotiating realistically, without any idea of seeking an agreement at any price, and with the firm intention of not allowing the negotiations to weaken the deterrent capability the United States needed to honor its security commitments in Asia (including Japan) and Europe. If any agreement were to be reached that would permanently place the United States in second place to the USSR in nuclear capability, he was well aware of the devastating effect this would have on the world balance of power and on our allies throughout the world. As long as he is in office, he vowed, he would never allow the United States by virtue of an agreement, to take second place to the USSR. They understand and respect power, he added, and we intend to keep our power.

The Prime Minister asked a simple question: what degree of superiority should the Free World maintain over the Communist side?

The President said that this is a complicated question. The USSR is primarily a land power, while the United States and its allies are both land and sea powers. Therefore, what we need to provide an adequate defensive and deterrent capability differs from what the USSR needs; we need more sea power, and they need more ground divisions. The test, he stressed, is what degree of power is sufficient to deter the USSR, and eventually the PRC if they become a super-power, from attacking any part of the Free World. Such deterrent power would, of course, include all the Free World’s air, naval and land forces.

The Prime Minister asked whether it would be correct to say that it is important to keep submarines on station in the Far East.

The President agreed that it is, as well as maintaining air forces, and to continue the development of nuclear submarines.

The Prime Minister asked whether satellites are also important.

The President said that on our part satellites provided helpful intelligence, but there was no significant development of orbital nuclear weapons.

The Prime Minister stressed his belief that the Free World must continue to support a strategic deterrence, and maintain its competitive position to the maximum degree possible. Beyond any question of doubt he felt the USSR and PRC have an advantage in their ability to maintain military power, but even though they can require their people to make great sacrifices in their standard of living, there are built-in limits to their power.

The President said that the Prime Minister had struck a key point. Japan is now the world’s third largest economic power, with a GNP 2½ times as great as the PRC. Fundamentally the Free World is more productive than the Communist world, and will continue to maintain and widen the huge gap between them in terms of industrial capacity. This industrial capacity would be extremely helpful if an arms buildup were required. However, he said, our motivation is to work for an arms limitation, and to avoid an arms race, since neither side could win.

The Prime Minister agreed that this is probably true. Technologically, he said, Japan is dependent in this area on the United States, and furthermore without an armaments industry, Japan must procure defensive weapons from the United States. He asked whether there was any other point he should know about SALT.

The President replied that he had discussed everything we know at this point. In March, Dr. Kissinger could update this information, when he visited Tokyo, if there were any new developments by then. He noted that an agreement may be reached, but not before he visited Moscow in May. Both sides, he reiterated, are hard-headed in these negotiations.

Burden Sharing

The Prime Minister said that Japan’s purchase of United States military hardware contributes toward a better balance of trade.

The President agreed, but emphasized that the scale of our imbalance in trade is enormous. He explained that it would be most helpful if Japan decided to purchase the Northrup F–5 jet trainer. Conceding that all nations wished to build their own aircraft, nevertheless he stressed that the F–5 is the best trainer available, and costs less. Of course, as is the custom in these discussions relating to Okinawa, he reiterated that there is no direct link with trade and other problems, which in any case he understood would be settled satisfactorily next week.

However, in terms of the political situation in the United States, the President said that it would be most helpful if Japan, not directly but indirectly, could make purchases or other financial arrangements in respect to the extensive military establishment the United States maintains in Japan.

The Prime Minister said that Minister of International Trade Tanaka is now discussing this point.

The President said that Secretary Connally would appreciate the Prime Minister’s support on this.

The Prime Minister explained that Japan’s 4th Defense Buildup is being scaled down somewhat, but will include the purchase of new arms from the United States. In July, Secretary Laird visited Japan, and while he praised the Self Defense Force maintenance of its equipment, nevertheless he pointed out its obsolescence, which brought home to him (the Prime Minister) the need for Japan to purchase modern equipment.³

NPT and Nuclear Strategy

The Prime Minister asked whether Japan should move rapidly to ratify the NPT.

The President replied that each nation should handle this problem in the light of its own circumstances. It is not a matter for us to decide, and we respect the right of each nation to decide for itself in the light of its own interests and its own desires. The United States, he said, is not exerting pressure on Japan to ratify.

In fact, the President continued, Japan might take its time, and thus keep any potential enemy concerned. He then asked the Prime Minister to forget the preceding remark.

The Prime Minister asked Ambassador Ushiba if inspection is the only thing holding up Japan’s ratification. Ambassador Ushiba replied that it is.

The President emphasized that inspection is very important, indeed. What Japan should do about its own military establishment, he continued, is a problem for Japan to decide, in terms of all its deep-rooted historical and political ramifications. However, he pointed out, in his view Japan’s position in Asia and the world would be strengthened if those who might become Japan’s opponents were given cause to worry. For domestic purposes he understood that the GOJ had to say that Japan would not develop its military power, but in terms of serving Japan’s interest in foreign policy he felt it better to cause its neighbors some concern, and not say specifically what it would not do. He recalled that President Eisenhower always stressed that it is important not to tell an enemy what we would do, because he could prepare to meet it, but even more important not to tell an enemy what we would not do because it would encourage him to push us around.

The Prime Minister said that the anti-war, anti-security treaty feelings in Japan are deep-rooted. If the situation changed, Japan would wish to defend itself, but the shock of the war is still deep and more time is needed before a change could take place. This, of course, did not apply to those too young to remember the war and its aftermath. At present, Japan’s policy is to build its defensive capability in consonance with its own national power and in light of national conditions. However, defense officials could not at present postulate a hypothetical enemy without being subject to intense criticism. He noted that the budget for the Self Defense Forces is a bit less than 1% of GNP.

Continuing, the Prime Minister recalled the President’s first visit to Japan as Vice President, on which occasion he welcomed him at the airport in Tokyo. He also recalled the arrival remarks in which the then Vice President advocated that the Japanese draw up their own constitution.⁴ It is extremely ironical, he observed that the Japanese Socialist Party which otherwise advocates radical change is committed to defending the status quo of Japan’s Peace Constitution.

The President interpreted this to mean that the Socialists wished to keep Japan weak.

The Prime Minister agreed. He commented that the younger people are beginning to want to defend Japan themselves.

However, the Prime Minister stressed that all Japanese abhor nuclear weapons.

The Prime Minister then explained that considerable data on the atom bombing has been returned to Japan recently, and put on display at the Peace Museum in Hiroshima. Last year he said that he took part in the August 6 anniversary ceremonies at Hiroshima, the first time any Prime Minister has done so, and on that occasion he visited the Museum, which made him feel even more deeply the horror of nuclear weapons.

The President said that he also saw this in 1965.

The Prime Minister said that some additional material is reported to be still in the United States, and asked whether it too could be returned to Hiroshima, on the grounds that joint study of the material is best.

The President said that he would look into this.

The President recalled a hunting story, that a sitting duck could easily become a Peking duck.

The Prime Minister commented that he would probably have to take part in the anniversary ceremonies in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in alternate years, since it would be difficult to attend both every year.

Nuclear and CB Weapons

The Prime Minister expressed his conviction that there are no American nuclear weapons in Japan, but noted sharp Socialist and Communist Party criticism in the Diet about the alleged presence of American CB weapons. He asked whether the United States could handle this issue better than it has.

Dr. Kissinger said that he believed there are no CB weapons in Japan.

The President said that the United States has destroyed its stock of biological weapons, except for a minute quantity needed for medical research.

The Prime Minister specifically raised the code numbering system used to identify ammunition magazines, 1, 2, 3, and 4, of which it was generally believed that 4 indicated chemical weapons storage. When this issue was raised in the Diet some storage magazines at the Iwakuni MCAS were hastily repainted, which increased suspicion in Japan. He suggested that any code system is acceptable, provided it is not changed suddenly in the face of allegations.

The President assured him there are no chemical weapons in Japan.

The President then suggested that Secretary Rogers and Foreign Minister Fukuda be invited in to join the discussion of Okinawa.⁵

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President’s Office Files, Box 87, Memoranda for the President, Beginning January 1, 1972. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Wickel. The meeting took place at the Western White House. Holdridge sent Kissinger this memorandum under a January 21 covering memorandum. Kissinger approved it with no further distribution.
2. The Warsaw talks, which consisted of sporadic meetings (often in Warsaw) at the ambassadorial level between China and the United States, began on August 1, 1955. The talks received an impetus in September 1968 when the Chinese Government responded affirmatively to a U.S. proposal to resume them.
3. See Document 80 for Laird’s report.
4. In the fall of 1953, Vice President Nixon visited Japan and criticized the Peace Constitution.
5. See Document 113.