9. Record of a Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1

President said another option had occurred to him with greater symbolic meaning—a Navy blockade of the one port of significance. K said he was sure it could be done. President referred to Cuban blockade2 and said question is how long can it be maintained. K said that is the problem. President said he was thinking of the impact. President said people say it does not mean anything, but it means a lot to a lot of people. President said it is good when there is something specific that you want to get done—there is nothing they can do to get the blockade lifted. K said except to pay damages. President said that is what he meant—we want that and the return of the Pueblo. President said it would not take a lot to blockade that place. K said on the other hand there is not much going in or out either so it may be an empty gesture. President said they have to live so there is something going in and out. President referred to three Polish ships which have to come in—they could be kept out. K said they could unload elsewhere and ship down by rail. K said he would have it looked into. President said he wants to get something that has symbolism—that is what we are talking about. President said it could be signal of what we are [Page 21] going to do down below. President said we could keep it for a few months and then lift it but not say anything. K said if they wanted to play it nastily, we could get hit with it every day—harassing us, etc. K said he would look at it and give the President pros and cons tomorrow.

K said he has some more information on ship3—it is in the area of Capetown and supposed to reach Hong Kong on April 23 and go on to Korea. Told President about payment breakdown—20% down payment had been made by Koreans and they owe 80%; loan has been guaranteed by Dutch government. President asked about title. K said we do not think it has passed, it is still a Dutch ship. K said we would have to compensate the Dutch Government 5-1/2 million dollars. President said that is awful small compared to risks taken in other areas. President said there is a lot of symbolism in that.

K said we have assigned State to come up with legal opinion supporting President if he decides to seize ship. President said throw the blockade one at them too. K said o.k.—all of this will be discussed at 3:00 meeting tomorrow.4 K said the Cuban blockade worked because they thought we were heading for an invasion. President said he knows it is not on all fours at all.

President said he was just looking over military plans.5 They want to hit two other air fields because they are not so close to the Soviet border. President said there is something to be said about fields not so close to Soviet border. K said he told them to make a plan and give the President all reasons why they are opposed to it and then President can choose—K said we will throw blockade into it too. President said he thought blockade was better than mining.

President said he would like to make meeting in the morning relatively brief. K agreed.6

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 434, Korea: EC–121 Shootdown, North Korean Reconnaissance Shootdown 4/9/69–4/16/69, Vol. I Haig. No classification marking.
  2. Reference is to the naval quarantine that the Kennedy administration imposed during the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962.
  3. Reference to the tracking of a North Korean ship sailing under Dutch registry, crew, and flag.
  4. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Nixon met from 3:20 to 5:22 p.m. with Rogers, Laird, Wheeler, and Kissinger. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files) No record of the meeting has been found.
  5. See footnote 2, Document 10.
  6. See Document 13.