Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XIX, Part 1, Korea, 1969–1972

87. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea¹

Washington, February 3, 1971, 0125Z.

18192. Subject: Kim Tae-chung in Washington. Ref: State 17347.²

1. Kim Tae-chung and party met with Green for second discussion following courtesy call on Secretary (reftel). Meeting came at request of Kim for follow-on discussion to earlier one with Green on January 30,³ and lasted about hour and quarter.

2. Kim opened discussion on foreign affairs with brief comment regarding his plan for a four-power security pact, which he reported he had discussed with Reischauer last weekend. He reported Reischauer skeptical regarding willingness of China to become involved, but Kim commented that notwithstanding he believed pact a reasonable “political goal”. Green responded that China’s course of action would probably depend at least in part on North Korean reactions. Kim took no initiative to expand topic further.

3. Turning to question of China’s entrance to UN, Kim raised variety of questions regarding U.S. position, probability of entrance, likely conduct in UN, impact on Taiwan, etc. Green made clear we support GRC and will oppose any move to unseat her from UN but that at same time we are seeking better relationship with Peking. We have not yet established position as to ChiRep tactics this year and are re-examining question and will be consulting with friends. During discussion this topic Kim raised question of universality. He said that NDP would find unversality impossible to accept “because it would perpetuate the division of Korea.” Kim implied, however, he has not reached final judgment but is rather “polishing up his thought”. Prospect of universality, he said, is a painful problem and experience for ROK.

4. On two separate occasions Kim veered away from foreign affairs focus to refer to DRP-inspired rumors of military opposition to his candidacy and possibility of military coup. As in meeting with Secretary, Kim’s question was pointed: “What would U.S. do?” Green declined direct response, indicating, however, that USG deeply interested in government that represents the will of the people.

5. Comment: Prior to initial meeting with Green, Kim requested opportunity to have few minutes alone with Green and Brown with no Koreans except interpreter present. While private meeting did not transpire, it would appear that what Kim had in mind was question of U.S. role in event of coup.

Rogers

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 KOR S. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Ranard, cleared in S/S–O, and approved by Green.
2. Dated February 1, it reported on a meeting between Rogers and Kim Dae Jung. According to the telegram, Kim presented a summary of his domestic and foreign platform proposals. Rogers assured him that the United States “favors free, fair and impartial elections and intends to follow a policy of non-intervention.” Kim asked what the U.S. role would be if he were elected and there was a coup. Rogers replied that it would be inappropriate for him to comment on the question “inasmuch as it highly speculative.” (Ibid.)
3. Telegram 16424 to Seoul, January 29, reported Kim Dae Jung’s first meeting with Green and Brown. Kim stated that based on Park’s broken pledge of not running for a third term and his recent appointment to government positions of Lee Hu Rak and Paik Tu Chin, who were known as rough political in-fighters, “the signs are clear government is gearing up for a rigged election.” (Ibid.)