78. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon 1
SUBJECT
- Koreans Abandon Efforts to Obtain Diplomatic Assurances Regarding U.S. Troop Reductions
President Park has agreed to a suggestion from Ambassador Porter that the Republic of Korea Government (ROKG) set aside its request for new “diplomatic assurances” in regard to further reduction of U.S. forces in Korea. The ROK had earlier submitted an eight point “Agreed Minutes” paper2 to be issued jointly by both sides when our talks were completed. The most controversial point was a proposed requirement for “full prior consultation” in connection with future reductions, and a statement that we would take no actions contrary to the wishes of the Korean Government. We had informed the ROK both in Seoul and in Washington that their paper was unacceptable and that we could not grant the ROK such veto power over the deployment of our forces. We told them, however, that we would see value for both sides in a statement, either by President Park unilaterally or jointly with Ambassador Porter, that we had reached satisfactory agreement on both the extent and manner of troop reductions and on modernization. In this we would also reaffirm our treaty commitment. President Park has agreed to such a statement.
A draft statement is under discussion with the Department of Defense and we hope to send it to the White House for clearance very shortly.
In making his decision President Park was probably motivated by the need—for both domestic and diplomatic reasons—to show satisfactory results in his negotiations with us. His opponent in next May’s presidential election, Kim Tae-chung, has charged that the President has made a mess of relations with the Americans. Kim has also charged that the President has deliberately fostered an atmosphere of tension and fear, fear of North Korean aggression and fear of abandonment by [Page 198] the Americans, in his efforts to prolong the life of his regime. Park is very sensitive to both charges. He has probably realized that there is no chance that we will reconsider our positions and that further adamancy on his part could cost him heavily with both our Congress and the Korean electorate. Whatever the reasons for Park’s apparent acquiescence, the result is entirely favorable.
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 542, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. III, 6/70–Dec 70. Secret. A copy was sent to Kissinger. Additional notations on the memorandum read: “Haig: FYI” and “Action: Smith/Holdridge.” Another notation on the memorandum indicates that Haig saw it. In a memorandum to President Nixon, December 8, Kissinger summarized this memorandum for the President. The December 8 memorandum bears Haig’s initials and a notation that Nixon saw it. (Ibid.)↩
- See Document 74.↩