30. National Intelligence Estimate1

NIE 42–69

The Outlook in South Korea

Note

This estimate assesses the outlook in South Korea with particular reference to the 1971 elections, the impact of likely North Korean actions on the ROK, and (at the request of the staff of the National Security Council) the effects of certain possible US courses of action.

Conclusions

A.
Well in advance of the 1971 presidential election, political tensions in South Korea are acute and growing. Pak’s political associates are pressing for a third term for him, but he has not yet made his decision. For him to run would require passage of a constitutional amendment and there is strong opposition to such a move even within some circles of the ruling party.
B.
Passage of the amendment requires a two-thirds vote of the National Assembly followed by majority approval in a popular referendum. The first step is likely to be the most difficult. Pak’s supporters are conducting an intensive campaign of pressures and inducements to line up the necessary National Assembly votes, but it may prove a [Page 78] close thing. If the amendment is passed by the Assembly, the government can probably arrange to secure a majority for it in the referendum, though at this stage too it might feel compelled to use heavy manipulation to assure success.
C.
The most serious source of trouble for the regime is likely to come from the students—whose potential for disruption has been clearly demonstrated before and who largely oppose amending the Constitution. Student disorders can probably be handled by security forces, but serious and prolonged turmoil might seriously test the latter’s reliability.
D.
All things considered, however, Pak probably has at least an even chance of gaining a third term. But events could easily take other turns: if student or other resistance proves strong enough, Pak might decide not to run, especially since he could designate a successor candidate. Whoever runs as the ruling party’s nominee would probably win, though in a completely free election an opposition victory is conceivable. Should it occur, the regime and the army would be tempted to retain control by force; their decision would depend heavily on Pak himself.
E.
The contest in South Korea is essentially a struggle over political power rather than over particular domestic or foreign policies. The opposition leaders are as opposed to North Korea’s pretensions as is the administration, and equally aware of the ROK’s essential dependence for security on the US. The main political question is whether South Korea’s fledgling constitutional democracy can undergo something like a free political contest, or whether the government’s desire to keep control, and its fear that political turmoil would benefit North Korea, will lead it to heavy-handed suppression of its opponents.
F.
During the coming years of political stress, North Korean military harassments of the ROK are not likely to be abandoned and may even be stepped up. These actions are unlikely to constitute a major threat to the ROK regime, and within limits a fear of the North works for unity in the South. Nonetheless, if Pyongyang is willing to take the risks, it may be able to create divisive strains among South Koreans (and between the ROK and the US) over how to deal with Communist tactics.
G.
For the foreseeable future, the ROK will remain, in fact and in attitude, heavily dependent on the US for military support against North Korea. The impact of various possible US decisions concerning the level of such support is assessed in Section III.

[Omitted here is the “Discussion” section of the estimate.]

  1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, ODDI Registry of NIEs and SNIEs, Job 79–R01012A. Secret. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense and NSA participated in the preparation of this estimate. The Director of CIA submitted this estimate with the concurrence of all members of the USIB with the exception of the representatives of the AEC and FBI who abstained on the grounds that it was outside their jurisdiction.