Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XIX, Part 1, Korea, 1969–1972

169. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea¹

Washington, November 25, 1972, 0120Z.

214182. Ref: State 211818.² Subj: Assistant Secretary Green Conversation with ROK Opposition Leader Kim Tae Chung.

1. Summary. Kim said even though he saw little hope of peaceful transfer of power in Korea, he intended to return there and do what he could to further the cause of democracy regardless of personal consequences. Speaking with restraint, Kim said that Park had capitalized on a US tendency to accept accomplished facts and that, despite its unhappiness with events in Korea, USG did not seem to want to complicate situation for ROK in its dealings with the North. Kim thought the Nixon Doctrine implied less US forces and influence in Asia, implying that there was therefore all the less hope for freedom in that part of the world. Green responded that Kim had many in this country and abroad who sympathized with his cause and believed he had a responsible role to play in Korean affairs, though cautioning that violence was not to anyone’s advantage. Green expressed personal view that the trend of history was on the side of forces which recognized the free spirit of man and he was hopeful that there would be a return to normal political activity in the ROK. He emphasized USG desire to maintain good relations with ROKG and that we would not intervene in Korea’s internal affairs. He added that the Nixon Doctrine in no way implied US withdrawal from the Western Pacific. US is a Pacific power with deep interests in Asia and in the Asian people. End summary.

2. Kim Tae Chung met with Assistant Secretary Green November 21. EA/K Director Ranard present. Accompanying Kim were Lee Sang-ho (Kim’s brother-in-law) and Yu Ki-young.

3. Conversation was lengthy and cordial. Kim began by apologizing that as an opposition leader he had been unable to prevent the arbitrary changes in the Korean Government. In response to questions, he said he would probably go to Japan in early December and return to Korea at the end of December or early January according to the situation. He thought there would be some personal danger and, in response to Green’s concern for his safety, Kim said he hoped there was nothing to fear but the situation under Park could not be predicted.

4. Kim said the great defect of Korean democracy was that it had not been deeply rooted through the efforts of the Korean people. He returned several times to the theme that Koreans must fight for democracy themselves and that he wanted to be in Korea during this politically difficult period. He had concluded that it was now almost impossible to accomplish a peaceful transfer of power in Korea and that the choice was between unconditional acceptance of the government or its violent overthrow. Several times he asked in rhetorical fashion if there were any other way. Kim said that whatever style Park affected and whatever terminology he used, there was no democracy if there was no freedom of expression or criticism.

5. Kim said he understood the limitations on the US and Japanese Governments in influencing Park but that unfortunately democratic forces in Korea were oppressed by arms and money supplied by these two governments, both of which were the friends of the Korean people. Kim said US and Japanese journalists had told him that while the US was not happy with events in Korea, it would generally be willing to accept what was an accomplished fact primarily because it did not want to weaken the ROK in its confrontation with the North. He thought Park had deliberately capitalized on this tendency. Kim concluded that there was a tendency toward dictatorship in Asia. He said his understanding of the Nixon Doctrine was that it implied less US forces and influence in Asia and he wondered what the future of US policy in Asia was to be.

6. Throughout conversation Kim responded warmly and with appreciation to Green’s remarks of personal esteem and sympathy.

7. On this last point Green responded that the Nixon Doctrine does not mean the withdrawal of the US from the Western Pacific but takes the position that other countries should be more responsible for their own affairs. The Nixon Doctrine did not imply US withdrawal, retreat or isolation. On the question of dictatorship, Green thought authoritarian trends in Asia were not permanent and that people like Kim were on the side of history.

8. Green said he was pleased to see Kim both because of his position as a distinguished leader of the opposition and because he considers him a friend.

9. Commenting on Kim’s remarks about the lack of democratic roots in Korea Green said he recognized the validity of these remarks. He added that the US was not interested in seeing American style democracy in Korea as is sometimes alleged but it does believe the essence of democracy relates to the fundamental nature of man: that he is a free spirit and wishes to participate in the formulation of his own destiny. He thought that countries seeking progress also sought stability and that most had no democratic tradition to guide them. Nonetheless, the trend was towards self-expression and authoritarianism could not last long where people could think for themselves. Those peoples who strive for institutions of this sort will find sympathy among the American people. In the case of Korea, the search for democratic institutions had been uneven but there was no doubt that it would be successful or that Mr. Kim would have a constructive role to play.

10. Green emphasized that the US wished to maintain close relations with the ROKG and to give the government our support. He noted particularly the past close relations between the US Congress and the ROK National Assembly and thought the Congress would follow events in Korea closely. He hoped martial law would soon give way to normalcy and that there would be a return to normal political activity. He emphasized that the US would not take actions which could harm the Korean people; that as Kim knew we thought the extraordinary measures taken by Park were unnecessary but we did not intend to intervene in Korea’s affairs nor create difficulties for the ROKG. He did not think that violent reaction would be to anyone’s advantage and reiterated that in the long run governments must tolerate criticism and opposition. He thought the international community could play some role in encouraging this process in the ROK. For our part we would as appropriate counsel moderation on the part of the ROKG.

11. Ranard suggested Kim make his presence known to the American Embassy in Tokyo after his arrival and said the US Embassy in Seoul would be interested in maintaining contact with him to the extent Mr. Kim thought prudent in terms of his personal safety. Mr. Kim understood that his conversation with Assistant Secretary Green was privileged and that it was not to be discussed with the press.³

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 KOR S. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Kriebel and approved by Green and in S/S. Repeated to Tokyo.
2. In telegram 211818 to Seoul, November 21, the Department reported that Kim had previously met with Ranard on November 20. In this meeting, Ranard observed that “ROK Embassy here has shown great interest in Kim’s movement and appointments, and apparently is moving to block appointments Kim hopes to be able to make.” Nevertheless, Ranard set up Kim’s appointment with Green for November 21. (Ibid.)
3. Printed from an unsigned copy.