167. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State 1
6745. Subj: Assessment of Referendum. Summary:President Park and his advisors undoubtedly expect that the lop-sided referendum vote will be understood as evidence that the South Korean people almost unanimously support the President and his goals.2 We see it rather as an exercise in conformity reflecting acceptance of the inevitable. The numerical accuracy of the results is difficult to assess and appears less important than the way that they were achieved.
2. We see the referendum results as more an exercise in conformity than a reflection of national sentiment for or against the constitutional change. The pressures for conformity on the voters were both official and social. No dissenting voices were permitted. The imposition of martial law and the energetic enlightenment campaign left no doubt that the government valued each man’s vote. This worked to produce a high turn-out, since the voting polls would show whether a man voted or not. The intimate and hierarchical relationship of Korean villagers meant that once a consensus was determined there was social pressure for individuals to concur. Because this “tribal” element is much weaker in the cities, the large pro-amendment vote in Seoul and Pusan is less likely to be accepted by Koreans as completely valid than results elsewhere.
2. Whether or not the ballot boxes were stuffed is, as usual, difficult to surmise and impossible to know. The absence of critical observers would seem to make it more likely. On the other hand, the reputation of “Korean democracy” and President’s mandate would be seriously tarnished if evidence of vote counting irregularities were to come to light. On balance, there seems no reason to question that an overwhelming majority of the voters have for a variety of reasons accepted the government’s new direction.
[Page 431]3. Apart from extending the President’s tenure indefinitely the government’s massive drive to achieve the largest possible favorable vote in the recently completed referendum can be seen as a harbinger of things to come as the government moves in the direction of the national solidarity and discipline for which President Park is appealing. It has among other things shown that factional strife and dissent, identified with the old system, will be tolerated within much narrower bounds if at all. The goal of a “total consensus” (ch’ongui) was among those proclaimed in the “voter enlightenment” campaign we have just been through.
4. President Park now appears to have set aside any desire or need to prove that he is more popular than any available alternative ruler. In its place, his retention of power is now based on (a) the fact that he is firmly and permanently established in office and (b) the promises he made that he would unify the country and promote prosperity. It is now understood that President Park can be removed from office only by death or a military coup. In the long run this may give his regime additional strength or expose it to weakness, depending on his ability to show progress toward the presidential goals, on the manner in which he exercises the vast powers he now has, and the extent to which the people approve or tolerate government under the new constitution. In the short run, his position appears secure.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–5 KOR S. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to Tokyo and CINCPAC.↩
- In telegram 6777 from Seoul, November 24, Habib reported his conversation with Prime Minister Kim Jong Pil. Kim said that the referendum was overwhelmingly successful (it passed with 92 percent of the vote) because “people generally recognized that President Park’s leadership had been successful and they saw no viable alternative for the future.” He said that the President would be “exercising his vastly increased powers with restraint” and that there would be a major Cabinet reshuffle after the inauguration on December 27. (Ibid., POL 15 KOR S)↩