Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XIX, Part 1, Korea, 1969–1972

165. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State¹

Seoul, November 18, 1972, 1022Z.

6684. Subj: Martial Law and Government Changes—The ROK on The Eve of Nov 21 Referendum. Summary: There is no doubt that constitutional changes will be approved in the Nov 21 referendum. The government is engaged in a massive campaign to present and gild its case. Extensive support for President Park and the constitutional changes is expected from rural areas and other quarters but there is also substantial opposition both to the changes and to President Park’s retention of power. Under conditions of martial law we have no reliable measure of the extent of approval or disapproval. The government has displayed its readiness to use repressive measures and the outlines of the more authoritarian state which is in prospect are already clear. Whether the government will become more repressive depends mainly upon the extent of dissent or active opposition. The government appears confident that it will survive the successive tests of its public acceptability as it moves through each step of the government changes to come in the next three months. End summary.

1. In the final days before the Nov 21 referendum there is no doubt in the mind of any observer that the constitutional changes will be approved. Most Koreans accept moreover that the government would be willing to alter the returns if necessary to assure that result.

2. In the last days before the vote, meanwhile, the government is engaging in an all-out campaign on behalf of the changes, setting aside any pretense of confining discussion to “explanations” or of observing its own ban on public argument for or against the changes. The campaign involves massive use of the media to present and gild the government’s case, employment of “enlightenment teams” throughout the country, endorsements and appeals on behalf of the changes by leading figures in all fields of endeavor, and mandatory letter writing by government officials to friends and relatives.

3. Under conditions of martial law, press control, and an evident reluctance of many Koreans to discuss the question, it is not possible to know the true extent of public approval or opposition. President Park probably continues to have heavy and largely unquestioning support in rural areas where roughly half of the electorate resides. Others, including some intellectuals, share the President’s view regarding the imperfections of political parties and the National Assembly, and use this to rationalize that there is something good in changes which are in any event inevitable.

4. It is clear, however, that there is substantial opposition both to the contitutional changes and to President Park’s retention of power. A growing number of Koreans are privately expressing reservations or outright opposition. These include not only intellectuals, members of the press, some members and followers of the opposition NDP party, and Christian groups, but also some establishment figures. One possibility which we frequently hear voiced is that opposition to the constitutional changes will find its expression mainly in refusal to vote in the referendum.

5. The loss of democratic processes may also give whatever opposition exists a quality of desperation which it did not have as long as it had recourse to constitutional democratic processes. It is not possible to know at this stage, however, whether opposition will persist, intensify, grow, or find more active expression in the period to come. The government has in the past shown a sophistication in its overwhelming display of force at the outset of such crises which it then tapers off as acceptance of the government’s position spreads. The Park administration undoubtedly intends to combine this tactic with massive use of the totally controlled media having as objective to persuade, pacify, or neutralize opposition.

6. There is little doubt, however, that the government will employ repressive measures if active opposition develops. The extent to which it does so will depend in part upon the extent to which people accept the changes without significant dissent or protest. The government’s readiness to use its powers, and the outlines of an even more authoritarian state than we have seen in the past, are already clear enough. We have evidence that at least six or seven members of the opposition NDP party were detained and beaten by ROK–CIA just after Oct 17, some apparently for past rather than current opposition to President Park. The government has similarly struck some high school students in connection with incipient protests at three or four high school campuses as previously reported. Despite reports that house arrests of opposition NDP leaders had ended, we have reports that Yu Chi San and Kim Hong Kil remain under effective arrest in their own homes. Courts-martial continue to mete out severe sentences of up to three years imprisonment for public cricitism of President Park or the constitutional changes, even in neighborhood gossip sessions. Newspapers and other media, meanwhile, have acquired a dull quality, serving as much as vehicles for government propaganda as distributors of news. There is no doubt of the government’s intention to stifle any meaningful dissent or opposition and to use any means necessary to that end.

7. Although daily life throughout Korea goes on largely as before, there is a discernible measure of increased tautness among the people with whom the Embassy is in contact. This does not approach a condition of general tension but rather reflects a realization that the rules of public expression on political subjects are changing and that people must be careful of what they say and do.

8. In this environment, we have thus far continued to say when asked that the U.S. will not interfere in Korea’s internal affairs emphasizing at the same time that we are not associated with the changes. Privately, we have in selected cases clarified that the changes are not being well received in the U.S. and that this could have an adverse effect on U.S. public and Congressional attitudes toward Korea. To the frequent query of ROK officials as to what the ROKG can do to gain U.S. approval, we have replied that given the substance approval cannot be expected, but that there are things it should do (i.e., avoid repression) to avoid making the reaction worse.

9. As the Park administration moves through successive steps in making the changes which are coming—the referendum, the Unification Council and presidential elections, the lifting of martial law, the National Assembly elections, and the reopening of the universities—it will be subjected at each stage to a new test of its public acceptability. Although there may well be strains, the government appears confident that with a skillful employment of its vast powers it will survive these tests.

Habib

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–8 KOR S. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Tokyo and CINCPAC.