Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XIX, Part 1, Korea, 1969–1972

161. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea ¹

Washington, October 17, 1972, 0026Z.

188775. Subject: Secretary’s Conversation with Ambassador Kim on Martial Law. Following is uncleared memcon FYI subject to revision upon review:

1. Secretary called in Ambassador Kim Dong Jo at 1730 October 16 regarding ROKG decision to declare martial law. Green and Ranard present.

2. Secretary asked Ambassador Kim to inform his government that we cannot accept the reasons given for the decision to declare martial law and in particular cannot understand the attack on U.S. policy in Asia contained in the proposed presidential proclamation. Secretary read from text of proclamation and commented it called into question the wisdom and morality of U.S. policy and suggested that U.S. actions would adversely affect ROK security. He said such statements were not acceptable and added that President Nixon would react unfavorably to the language and that the proclamation could cause serious problems between the two countries. We would be obliged to denounce any such statements publicly.

3. Green said that ROK rationale for declaring martial law was erroneous and that its attack on U.S. policy would create dismay in U.S., Asia and elsewhere. It would be interpreted as an attack on U.S. policy by an old and trusted friend. Referring to recent UN vote on Korean question, Green stated ROK action could only embarrass all those countries who had worked to postpone debate on very grounds that inscription would create internal problems for ROKG.

4. Ambassador Kim asked if offensive passages in proclamation were removed would it be possible for U.S. to make positive public statement respecting martial law declaration which was essentially internal ROK matter.

5. Secretary responded that the rationale given by the ROKG was only one aspect of the problem; also important was the substance of the proposed constitutional changes. Green added that, for example, there will be difficulties with Congress which has made possible the implementation of the ROK modernization plan and the continued U.S. troop presence.

6. Ambassador Kim was clearly unaware of proposed actions. He said he was uninstructed in this matter but would report the Secretary’s views at the highest levels of his government. He asked that Ambassador Habib be requested to make representations to the ROKG.²

Rogers

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 543, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. V, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1972. Secret; Flash;Nodis. Drafted by Kriebel and cleared by Ranard, Green, and in S/S.
2. In telegram 188717 to Seoul, October 16, Rogers informed Habib of his forthcoming meeting with Kim. Rogers also instructed Habib to meet with Park and inform him that “while we will seek to avoid public comment on wisdom of Park’s actions, we will be unable to avoid dissociating ourselves from these actions or from commenting on proclamation statement re President Nixon actions.” (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–9 KOR S) According to telegram 5976 from Seoul, October 17, Habib was unable to see Park and instead presented the U.S. views to Kim Jong Pil. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 543, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. V, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1972)