Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XIX, Part 1, Korea, 1969–1972

155. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)¹

Washington, September 5, 1972.

SUBJECT

• Retention of ROK Forces in South Vietnam

Our Embassies in Seoul and Saigon have replied to cables requesting their views on the desirability and feasibility of retention of ROK forces in South Vietnam beyond CY ‘72. Our memorandum to you of August 22 (Tab A)² summarized the outgoing cables and noted that NSDM 161 of April 5, 1972³ requested the Under Secretaries Committee to review the question of continued ROK presence in South Vietnam and submit a report to the President not later than September 29, 1972. The cables, summarized below, will be included in this review and will be discussed at a meeting—which we shall attend—at the State Department on September 6. Ambassador Habib, who is in Washington for two days of consultations, will chair the meeting.

Ambassador Bunker and General Weyand have reported (Tab B)⁴ that the retention of one ROK Division in MR–2 appears a necessity through CY ‘73 and possibly even FY ‘74. They claim that ARVN will not be able to develop the divisional size force necessary to replace the ROK troops in MR–2 and that despite its new battalion upgrade program, the Regional Forces are not expected to assume the security mission in this area during CY ‘73. The GVN recently has expressed its desire to the Korean government that it agree to schedule one ROK Division beginning withdrawal in July 1973 and a second Division for withdrawal beginning in January 1974. (The Korean government replied on September 4 that its remaining forces will begin withdrawal in January 1973.)

Concerning logistical support, Bunker and Weyand note that transfer of additional logistical responsibilities to RVNAF would neither be desirable for the Vietnamese nor acceptable to the Koreans. They conclude, however, that expanding current ROK support capability to the point of relative self-sufficiency would be both feasible and probably acceptable to the Koreans. The Embassy–MACV message does not provide estimates on the extent of the expansion which the ROKs would consider acceptable for self-sufficiency.

Ambassador Habib in Seoul has cabled (Tab C)⁵ that we must be prepared to pay a high price if we wish at least some ROK army units to remain in South Vietnam beyond their publicly announced withdrawal date of June 1973. Habib noted that a U.S.–GVN request to retain ROK forces in Vietnam through CY ‘73 will face strong resistance from both opposition and ruling parties. Many Koreans reportedly find it difficult to justify ROK troop levels higher than the U.S., which would not necessarily be the case if the ROKs keep one Division and we don’t go below the currently planned 27,000 figure until there is a settlement. They also resent inadequate levels of consultation on our negotiations and view continued troop presence as a major handicap to broader contacts with non-aligned countries and “non-hostile” Communist nations.

Ambassador Habib nevertheless believes that we might prevail on President Park if President Nixon made a direct approach for retention of Korean troops in Vietnam. Our approach probably would have to include the following specific inducements: unequivocal U.S. assurances of logistic support; retention of all U.S. titled equipment in ROK hands; equipment to activate two army assault helicopter companies and for each division, one tank company; continuation of net additional cost payments at current rates and agreement to ROK requests for severance payments and retirement fund contributions. Ambassador Habib also warned that we need to obtain Korean agreement within the next month or so to keep open the option of continued ROK troop presence in South Vietnam.

Subsequent to Ambassador Habib’s cable, the Korean Foreign Minister delivered to our Chargé a copy of an aide-mémoire reminding the GVN that the local ROK commander has now been instructed to prepare for a withdrawal beginning in January 1973.⁶ The Minister stated that it would be “impossible” for Korean troops to remain through 1973 but noted that, in his personal opinion, some delay within the one year schedule could be made “if the U.S. were in a difficult military situation at that time.”

The Korean Desk officer at the State Department has advised us that Ambassador Habib’s estimate of Korean demands probably are excessive; he believes that the Koreans may settle for less. We are inclined to agree and view the Korean aide-mémoire to the GVN as a bargaining tactic to strengthen their position in our forthcoming consultations on further ROK withdrawals.

This judgement appears corroborated by a recent [less than 1 line not declassified] report [1 line not declassified] that the Foreign Ministry is the only element of the Korean government that desires a complete ROK force withdrawal. The Economic Ministry, the President and the military reportedly have ambivalent feelings on withdrawal with the Army favoring continued commitment. The impression of flexibility is further indicated by the [less than 1 line not declassified] prediction that the Koreans would bargain over terms for a continued ROK presence at the U.S.-Korean discussions scheduled for late November. The Koreans reportedly will use their plans to withdraw the Capital Division in early CY ‘73 as a ploy to obtain firm U.S. commitments either for continued U.S. direct combat and service support or for the addition of new tank and helicopter units to their remaining troops.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 543, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. V, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1972, Part 2. Secret. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Odeen and Kennedy. Froebe also initialed the memorandum. Haig, who initialed the memorandum, crossed out his own name on the addressee line and wrote in “HAK.”
2. Attached but not printed.
3. Document 132.
4. Telegram 12754 from Saigon, August 30, attached but not printed.
5. Telegram 4980 from Seoul, August 26, attached but not printed.
6. Telegram 5165 from Seoul, September 4, reported that Foreign Minister Kim Yong Shik had given an aide-mémoire to the Vietnamese and also provided a copy to Habib. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 6 KOR)