Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XIX, Part 1, Korea, 1969–1972

138. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, May 3, 1972.

SUBJECT

• South Korean CIA Director’s Further Comments on His Visit to North Korea May 2–5 for High Level Discussions

South Korean CIA Director Yi Hu-rak on April 25 gave [less than 1 line not declassified] the following additional particulars on his planned visit to Pyongyang May 2–5 for political discussions:²

• —Yi believes the time is propitious for the meeting: U.S. forces and UNCURK (U.N. Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea) are still in South Korea, the U.N. declaration on Korea³ remains in force, and President Park’s domestic political position is strong enough to support such an initiative.
• —Yi believes his discussions could be kept confidential or could result in a joint communiqué outlining specific areas of agreement. Yi favors the latter, because it would detract from the current North Korean diplomatic offensive and would forestall the development of an adverse political reaction in South Korea. Yi doubts, however, that his own government would go along with the idea of a communiqué.
• —[1 paragraph (4½ lines) not declassified]
• —Yi said President Park asked whether the President is aware of the exchanges with the North and his impending visit. [less than 1 line not declassified]assumed the President knew.
• —Yi said he thought his Government would welcome strong U.S. Government support should his visit become known publicly, either through a communiqué or through leaks. U.S. support would help counter domestic criticism in South Korea, as well as improve Seoul’s position in dealing with Pyongyang.

Chargé Underhill reported that South Korean Foreign Minister Kim Yong-sik told him May 1 of the Yi mission.⁴ [Yi had told us earlier that Foreign Minister Kim was not to be cut in on the plans for his Pyongyang visit until Kim’s return from the U.S.]⁵ Kim said that his Government would want to consult immediately with us in the event that North Korea detained Yi. Kim also pictured Yi’s mission as intelligence-oriented, and stressed its non-political nature. [It was not clear whether Kim is only partially informed, or knows better but is taking this line for face-saving reasons.]⁶ When asked for his opinion, Underhill said the ROK initiative was bold and courageous, and if made known publicly later should improve Seoul’s position in its diplomatic competition with Pyongyang, most immediately as regards the U.N. consideration of the Korean question next fall.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 543, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. V, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1972, Part 2. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Froebe also initialed the memorandum. A notation on the memorandum indicates Kissinger saw it.
2. Lee Hu Rak’s comments were reported by Helms in an attached memorandum to Kissinger, April 28.
3. Yi probably was referring to the U.N. General Assembly’s resolutions of 1948 which recognized the Government of the Republic of Korea as the sole legal government in Korea. [Footnote is in the original.]
4. Underhill’s report is in attached telegram 2468 from Seoul, May 1.
5. Brackets are in the original.
6. Brackets are in the original.