Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XIX, Part 1, Korea, 1969–1972

119. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State¹

Seoul, December 13, 1971, 1016Z.

7507. Ref: State 219526.²

1. I called on President Park afternoon December 13 to deliver President Nixon’s letter (reftel). The letter was made available for translation just before I called so that he had sole knowledge of its contents.

2. Park opened conversation (which lasted one hour and ten minutes) by saying he appreciated reading the letter in which President Nixon showed such a keen understanding of the Korean situation and the security problem in the area. Without further ado Park launched into a fairly lengthy statement regarding the recent declaration of emergency in Korea. He said the Foreign Minister had explained to foreign representatives the scope and contents of the proclamation, but the President wanted to place particular emphasis on U.S. understanding of the matter because of our common concerns. He had decided the declaration of emergency was necessary after careful study of the situation in and around the Korean Peninsula. Some Korean and foreign observers seemed to doubt the situation on the Korean Peninsula had become so serious. This is understandable given the general trend in the international community toward peace and détente—particularly when relations between the U.S. and Red China are thawing. But when the big powers make an effort to ease tensions then perhaps some of the weak nations become prey to unexpected incidents. For example, as the U.S. and Red China moved toward each other the Republic of China suffered from these moves. The Republic of Korea was concerned that it too could become a victim like the Republic of China.

3. Korea recognizes we were seeking to ease tensions in this part of the world and favors such moves, but in their view, peace and reduction of tension in this part of the world required deterrents to any possible aggression. Korea looked upon the U.S. treaty commitment as serving as a mighty deterrent to war. Without it there would have already been a war. It is fortunate that President Nixon has a deep interest in Korea and they appreciate his reaffirmation of U.S. treaty obligations on a number of occasions. Although this treaty serves as a deterrent to war, it is not 100 percent sure. Park said he believes the Korean nation as a whole must have the self-determination and will to defend itself and improve its defense capabilities. This self-reliance together with the Mutual Defense Treaty will make for a more firm deterrent. It would not be right for Korea to depend solely on the U.S. commitment. He felt the need to tell his own people that they must be ready to defend their country and be resolute to this end.

4. Since Red China’s admission to the UN, Park continued, his government has been studying and evaluating the situation prevailing on the Peninsula in regard to its national security. They expected the Republic of China to speak on behalf of the North Koreans in the UN but the fact they had completely supported North Korean policies produced some concern because this meant they favored reunification of the Peninsula by force. This was a danger to Korean security because it must be assumed that statements made by the Chinese Communists were not simply rhetoric but intended to support North Korea fully. Thus the Korean Government had to come up with the necessary measures to cope with the situation.

5. I said I would report President Park’s views but had some questions and observations. We had been watching the security situation carefully and as the President must be aware we had no evidence a North Korean attack was imminent. If he had any information to indicate this assessment was in error we would appreciate a chance to discuss the facts. The sudden declaration of emergency had attracted attention of the Congress, press and the business community. The estimate that an attack was imminent had aroused concern. This was not surprising given the fact that generally speaking Korea was looked upon as a country which was stable and making rapid progress. Now suddenly the news contained expressions of immediate alarm and this aroused concern. We had already been queried by a number of American firms and others interested in Korea as to the situation.

6. I told Park we had recently reexamined and improved our intelligence about North Korea’s current preparations. On the basis of the latest information we could still see no indications an attack was imminent. The U.S. Command was in the process of exchanging information and analysis with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Minister of Defense. The results of this latest assessment will be available to President Park and I recommend it for his consideration.

7. Park replied that he realized there is a continuing joint assessment on the military situation. He will be interested in the latest one. Further, he also understands there are no indications of an imminent attack on the ROK. However, he said, we must always be aware of the Communist capacity to commit aggression at any time. There may be no indications today but Kim Il Song has the capacity to attack and can pick the time to do so.

8. I asked if he considered the possibility that the declaration of emergency and the precautionary steps taken by his military forces might appear provocative to the North Koreans and contrary to the trend exhibited in the opening of Red Cross talks and the general interest in negotiations in the area. Park did not reply directly but said the North Koreans were accusing him of being a puppet regime engaged in war preparations on U.S. instruction. This kind of propaganda was not new but at a time when North Korea was trying to make out that it was willing to talk peace they continued to send their agents across the DMZ. The ROK is a peaceful country but it is wary of North Korea. Kim Il Song knows this. The Korean declaration of emergency had two principal purposes: (a) To warn Kim Il Song that even though there are moves for lowering tension such as Red Cross talks he should not think the ROK is unwary. The Korean people know that Kim Il Song has a sword hiding behind his smile; (b) To warn the Korean public who had fallen into a degree of apathy by believing the international situation is such that war is not possible and peace is in the offing. Park wants his people to realize there is a threat and the North Korean danger still exists. People needed to be warned and shaken from their own apathy.

9. I reverted to something Park had said earlier about small countries being prey to the larger ones and reminded him of the assurances given in the letter from President Nixon that the U.S. would not seek accommodations at the expense of its allies and friends. I reminded him also of the President’s statement that if issues affecting Korea were raised by the Chinese in Peking the President intended to affirm our strong ties with the Republic of Korea.

10. At this point I said we were aware of President Park’s interest in a summit meeting. President Nixon greatly regrets that such a meeting with President Park is not possible. The President, however, in his letter sought to respond to all the points previously raised by President Park. We will understand if President Park desires to let his public and the press know he has received a personal letter of assurances from President Nixon stating that no agreements will be made in Peking regarding Korea. Of course, in accordance with the need for maintenance of confidential and privileged communications between the Presidents we would not wish to see the contents of the letter made public beyond the above statement.

11. Park did not comment on my statement rejecting a summit meeting. (I did not expect him to as it is quite in his nature not to appeal for such a meeting, rather leaving it to his subordinates. The Foreign Minister has been after me on this and I am sure we will hear more on the subject.)

12. Park said he agreed it was important to maintain the confidentiality of communication between President Nixon and himself and he would do so. He would not plan to use the assurances given in the letter at this time but will do so at an appropriate time. For example, under questioning in the National Assembly the Foreign Minister could refer to the assurances in the manner we had suggested. Or alternatively if some high official were being questioned by the press it would be very natural to speak of the message received from the President and the assurances contained therein. He would hope to do this in a natural manner rather than arouse too much concern.

13. In closing Park referred again to his comments about the emergency declaraton (he appeared anxious to reassure us of his intentions but he also was making it clear that he believed he had good reason to pursue them). Park said he does not expect complete understanding in the U.S. for his actions. There are even people in Korea who do not understand the true picture. Nevertheless he felt it was necessary to warn his people. It was better to do that than to worry about the apprehension of others. As President he was responsible to take all measures to protect the security of his country. If Canada was in the hands of an aggressive Communist determined to crush the U.S. he was sure that the President of the U.S. would do no less. I replied we understood his concern for the security of his nation and we had demonstrated our commitment to that security for many years. I was sure that between us we could see to it North Korean aggression did not materialize again just as we had seen to it ever since the Korean war.

14. We agreed that in response to press queries about my call on him today we would merely say I had delivered a personal message from President Nixon and we had had a general conversation covering matters of interest.

Habib

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 KOR S. Secret; Priority; Nodis.
2. See footnote 4, Document 115.