74. Memorandum of Conversation1


  • Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary and Member of the Politburo, CPSU Central Committee
  • Andrey A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Member CPSU Politburo
  • Anatoly Dobrynin, USSR Ambassador to United States
  • Andrey M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, Aide to General Secretary Brezhnev
  • Georgiy M. Korniyenko, Chief, USA Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
  • Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Second European Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Interpreter)
  • Oleg Sokolov, USA Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
  • Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
  • Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., U.S. Ambassador to USSR
  • Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department, Department of State
  • Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, Department of State
  • William G. Hyland, Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
  • Jan M. Lodal, Senior Staff Member, National Security Council
  • A. Denis Clift, Senior Staff Member, National Security Council
[Page 262]

(The meeting began at 7:10 p.m. following a 4:30–7:00 p.m. meeting in General Secretary Brezhnev’s office involving Brezhnev, Gromyko and Sukhodrev on the Soviet side and Kissinger and Sonnenfeldt on the U.S. side.)2

Brezhnev: Our colleagues don’t know what we decided on. I want to review it. Tomorrow morning, we’re leaving for Zavidovo for a hunting trip. It was Sonnenfeldt’s idea. Dr. Kissinger agreed; I was very pleased. I certainly wouldn’t mind if all the others present joined us.

Well, unfortunately because of other matters, we weren’t able to meet this morning, but we didn’t lose too much time. Since the basic objective of this meeting is to debate the principles which could form an agreement, we should talk about the principles. The details can be elaborated later, but not the major issues. So, if you agree, we can spend some time discussing those principles.

Kissinger: I agree.

Brezhnev: Do you have anything new to tell me for the U.S. side?

Kissinger: I have given you the substance of our position yesterday, Mr. General Secretary.

Brezhnev: No, I meant maybe something more interesting that may have happened in the United States. I haven’t been able to follow events there. Maybe Jackson’s invented something new. Maybe you have something new by way of instructions.

Kissinger: Any instructions that Jackson sent me would have to be sent to our Secret Service first. They might explode.

Brezhnev: So, in short, there has been nothing new in the United States since our last meeting—anything new in Ethiopia, perhaps?

Kissinger: The Emperor is still alive and well.

Brezhnev: You’re a very humorous man.

Kissinger: The Emperor of Ethiopia makes the longest toasts of any man.

Brezhnev: I’ve met him, but I’ve never had the occasion to hear his toasts.

Kissinger: His private conversation is like his toasts. His speech is like King Faisal’s.

Brezhnev: I haven’t had the pleasure of listening to it.

Kissinger: Faisal or the Emperor?

Brezhnev: The Emperor.

Kissinger: I can tell you that King Faisal thinks that Moscow is run from Jerusalem.

[Page 263]

Brezhnev: I liked the photo of you two.

Kissinger: He made an exception for me.

Brezhnev: See the privileges you enjoy!

Well, let’s get down to the specifics we wanted to discuss. First, by way of summing up, from the political point of view we can state that both sides reaffirmed their determination to make every effort to improve relations between their countries in accordance with previous agreements, and to endeavor to make that progress irreversible. And, I feel that this is in line with the President’s wishes.

And, secondly, as I see it, to those ends, both sides will do all they can not only to develop their bilateral relations but also in international matters to closely coordinate and maintain a parallel line with respect to the European Security Conference and the Middle East.

And, thirdly, we agree that the agreements signed in 1972 and 1973 retain full validity. The two sides underline their determination strictly to observe them, especially so far as the question of strategic arms is concerned, without allowing any violation of those agreements through the very end of their duration. And fourthly, the two sides have agreed for the purpose of preventing the danger of thermonuclear war and in the interests of peace not only between the two countries but also the peace of the world, to prepare for signing next year a new agreement on strategic arms to run until 1985. The following basic principles should underline that new agreement. Each side should by the termination of the duration of the new agreement—i.e., by the end of 1985—have an equal quantity of strategic arms vehicles, that number to be 2,200 (corrects himself) that number to be 2,400 strategic arms vehicles.

The Soviet Union, considering the geographic and other factors, will be entitled to carry out its program of vehicles to a limit of 2,400 strategic arms vehicles, choosing at our discretion where those vehicles are to be placed—that is, land-based, sea-based or placed on bombers.

Within the same period, the United States will fulfill its program or plans de facto of 2,200 strategic arms vehicles with the same right of choice as to how they are to be distributed, but with the understanding that by the end of 1985 the total quantity of strategic arms vehicles on each side should be equal.

The United States and the Soviet Union agree that the total quantity of MIRVs should be equal by the end of 1985 and amount to 1,320 on each side.

Each side undertakes in this period to act in accordance with previously concluded agreements and not to violate previous agreements on either side by including new strategic arms vehicles. But both sides shall be entitled in accordance with previous agreements to carry out [Page 264] modernization and improvement of existing land-based ICBMs as provided for in the agreement of 1972.

(Brezhnev: Do you understand this, Sonnenfeldt?

Kissinger: We understand. We are awed by your ability to do it without paper in front of you.

Brezhnev: Well, everything is so clear, one doesn’t need any paper.

Kissinger: I’m impressed.)

Brezhnev continues: After the end of the duration of the previous accord—that is, after 1977—the United States will be entitled up to the end of 1985 to build other, more modern submarines of the Trident class to the amount of 10 such submarines. The Soviet Union in the same period of time will also be entitled to build 10 modernized submarines of the Typhoon class.

The number of missiles on these submarines on each side should be part of the total quantity of strategic arms vehicles provided for in the agreement.

The United States will build its B–1 bombers carrying missiles with a range of not more than 3,000 kilometers. The total number of missiles of these bombers will be determined by the United States, but also will be part of the total number to be included by the end of 1985. The Soviet Union will be entitled to take a decision at its own discretion as to whether to build a strategic bomber capable of carrying nuclear weapons vehicles, or instead to deploy such vehicles on land or in submarines. The proportion of these numbers may be subject to additional understandings which, for example, in substance means that if one aircraft can carry 20 missiles this does not mean that if they are not used on planes they must be replaced by the same number of land-based launchers—for example, there may be 15 or less.

The two sides have agreed that the total number of missile-armed vehicles should be equal on both sides but with due account taken of the third country vehicles of such countries as are allied with the United States by the end of 1985.

The aforesaid has been initialled by Kissinger and Gromyko to be subsequently signed by President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev.3

(At the conclusion of Brezhnev’s presentation in Russian, the following dialogue took place—prior to Sukhodrev’s translation.)

Brezhnev: After you have heard this, we can ask for some cognac to be brought in and some hot frankfurters and have a drink. It’s worth drinking; I have forwarded such a mutually worthy agreement.

[Page 265]

Kissinger: Mr. General Secretary, without having heard the translation, my colleagues and I are extremely impressed over the way you have all the elements of such a position in your head. We would have to draw diagrams.

Brezhnev: This is easy. There are more complicated things.

Kissinger: Before I have heard the translation . . .

Brezhnev: I don’t think we should argue about one rocket here, 17 there, where the cement dries quicker—yours doesn’t seem to dry at all. However, I am sure your concrete is quite dry by now. I’m sure it won’t rain while you install new missiles.

Kissinger: Dobrynin, who reads our Defense Budget, knows we are not putting new missiles in silos.

Brezhnev: Pity poor Comrade Dobrynin having to write reports about Comrade Kissinger having a net over his house. What’s the matter; is your roof leaking?

Kissinger: Will you translate, or should I sign it in Russian?

Brezhnev: Let’s do that! (He offers Secretary Kissinger a pen.)

(Sukhodrev then translates Brezhnev’s SALT proposal, as set forth in the paragraphs above.)

Brezhnev: We can say the sides have agreed to be guided by the aforesaid principles in their further working negotiations on this issue.

Kissinger: Let me first ask a few questions.

Brezhnev: Please.

Kissinger: First, this is a serious proposal which gives us a basis for discussion, and obviously serious work has been done which also tries to understand our point of view. There are aspects which give us difficulties. But, it gives us a framework in which to talk.

You say that by the end of 1985 the figure for the Soviet Union should be 2,400. The U.S. figure . . . and so will the U.S. figure . . . by the end of 1985, but not before then. Before then you say it will be 2,200. My question is: Can I understand this to mean that at no time between 1977 and 1985 will the Soviet force exceed 2,400?

Brezhnev: It will not exceed 2,400.

Kissinger: So, in the whole period from 1977 through 1985, the Soviet force will be 2,400? And in this whole period, the U.S. force will be no more than 2,200? That’s an important question.

Dobrynin: You have 2,200.

Kissinger: And will at no time have more than 2,200? I just want to have an understanding.

(Gromyko, Dobrynin and Korniyenko and Brezhnev consult.)

Kissinger: (Aside to Aleksandrov) Aleksandrov must have worked on this.

[Page 266]

Aleksandrov: I was present.

Kissinger: They couldn’t have done it all this morning.

Aleksandrov: (Nods affirmatively)

Kissinger: We can’t accept all of it but we can work from it.

(The full meeting resumes after 15 minute break.)

Kissinger: What is the answer to my question?

Brezhnev: Well, do you want to ask me all your questions first, making it easier? Otherwise, you’ll start undressing me article by article.

(Brezhnev gestures as if stripping off his clothes.)

Kissinger: No, no. I’m not debating. My first question is that you say 2,400 for you and 2,200 for us. That means that at no time can we exceed these numbers after the end of 1977. My second question: You said there could be partial modernization of land-based missiles provided for under the agreement as under the interim agreement. How about sea-based missiles other than the 10 Tridents? We understand that only 10 Trident boats can be built, but what is the coverage of other boats?

Brezhnev: Well, we will be guided by the principle established in this regard—until 1977, building the submarines we are allowed and installing the same rockets we are building already. You will install new missiles on your Trident and we will install new missiles on our new boat. But, it’s hard to say now how many rockets will be installed on your Trident or the Typhoon in our case. But, speaking informally, and being frank, my personal estimate is that the number of missiles on our Typhoon will be less than the number on the Trident.

Kissinger: We know how many we will have—24.

Brezhnev: Again, informally, we will not have as many on our Typhoons. Although I said that I was mentioning this informally I don’t rule out absolutely the possibility of an equal number of missiles on the Typhoon, but, in no event will there be more.

Kissinger: It counts against the total so it does not matter.

Brezhnev: Of course. Equally, it doesn’t worry us. You can have 26 if you like. Any way, the old agreement says we have 950 missiles until 1977. It makes no difference whether they are all on one boat or spread out on 50.

Kissinger: That’s right.

Brezhnev: Obviously, you will scrap part of your old submarines and so will we. You’ll say: What the hell!

Kissinger: But then, there’s a question: If one scraps old submarines can one replace them with submarines of a comparable type?

Brezhnev: Practically, that’s out of the question.

[Page 267]

Kissinger: Why?

Brezhnev: Because they’re not up to the mark in terms of their size. They’re morally obsolete.

Kissinger: Morally?

Brezhnev: Morally, although it is true you are installing MIRVs on your Poseidon, the agreement stipulates nothing on missiles for that boat, and I, of course, have nothing new to add to a treaty which I have already signed.

Kissinger: As I understand it, each side is free to compose a force up to 2,400.

Brezhnev: Yes.

Kissinger: But, if you can’t build new silos and if you can’t replace old submarines, you have not got a choice. I am not arguing; I am trying to understand.

Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger . . .

Kissinger: I’m not debating; I am trying to understand.

Brezhnev: To be absolutely frank, let me explain why we want our total number at 2,400 and yours at 2,200. You will realize that unless we set those levels we will have to scrap a certain number of our land-based missiles.

Kissinger: I understand that.

Brezhnev: That’s all there is to it.

Kissinger: I understand . . .

Brezhnev: So there will be factual equality even if it will appear on paper that we have more than you do. That’s the mechanism. There it is laid bare before you.

Kissinger: One other question: I don’t understand this business of missiles on bombers. Would you count any missile? Supposing there is a missile with a range of 100 kilometers, does that count too?

Brezhnev: Well, (Brezhnev confers with Gromyko and Korniyenko) well, Dr. Kissinger, in our previous agreement there was no mention of bombers. So when I mention bombers today I did not mean old types of bombers; I was referring to nuclear, missile-carrying bombers.

Kissinger: In other words the B–1?

Dobrynin: The B–1 type. Now you don’t have a B–1 type with nuclear missiles.

Kissinger: You won’t count B–52s in this program?

Brezhnev: Generally speaking that is one point we should give additional thought to. (He again confers with Gromyko, Korniyenko and Dobrynin.) So, since it is a new matter not covered in the previous agreement, we need not elaborate right now.

[Page 268]

Who knows, maybe as we go into the program further you might want to scrap your program and we might not go ahead with our program.

Kissinger: I understand. Let me . . .

Brezhnev: Because, I guess that one of the reasons why under the previous agreement we were given a certain advantage in the number of missiles was because you had an advantage in bombers.

Kissinger: That’s correct. I understand. May I have an answer to my first question?

Brezhnev: You have no further questions?

Kissinger: I have questions for technicians, but no other questions worthy of your attention.

Brezhnev: There are no questions in your mind about MIRVs?

Kissinger: We have noticed that you have said nothing about heavy missiles.

Brezhnev: They shouldn’t be mentioned.

Kissinger: That is something we can negotiate.

Brezhnev: I don’t think we should end our discussions as to the number of 1300. On your bombers, you may want to have MIRVed missiles. You may want one heavy instead of smaller ones. Let’s consider it settled.

Kissinger: Don’t assume that the things about which I ask no questions are agreed. I have to discuss them with my associates. It just means that I understand it. As I told you, there are many positive elements in your proposal.

Brezhnev: Well then, how do we end our work?

Kissinger: First, can we get your proposal in writing?

Brezhnev: Your associates have it in your notebooks.

Kissinger: That’s an unreliable way of proceeding, but we can take it from our notebooks.

Gromyko: Well you didn’t give us any formal documents.

Kissinger: No, but we gave a written document to Dobrynin.4

Gromyko: At some stage this can be done.

Kissinger: It just makes it harder for us to study, but we can put it together from our notes.

Brezhnev: Well, Dobrynin will have this as a working paper.

Kissinger: Good enough, a working document.

[Page 269]

Brezhnev: He hasn’t the right to alter a single word but he will have the . . . One question: How many missiles do you plan to put on the B–1’s. I ask this out of curiosity, not subject to controls.

Kissinger: Yes, but you count them.

Brezhnev: Of course. What they are are airborne launchers. Come here. (Brezhnev gestures to Secretary Kissinger; they both rise and Brezhnev leads the way to a large wall map of the world. He points to the USA and the USSR.) They can enter either from your own territory or the territory of your allies. You fly to a certain point and launch your missiles. They cover a certain part of the territory and thus they are airborne launchers.

Kissinger: But that is not the purpose of the B–1, because if so it wouldn’t be built as a supersonic bomber. If we wanted to shoot a missile with a range of 5000 kilometers we would stay out here (he points into an area in the vicinity of the United States).

Brezhnev: That’s exactly what I say, they are nothing but an airborne launcher. Another thing you can fly over the Pole like we can; that’s a reply to your question.

Kissinger: I have to get to the hot dogs before Sonnenfeldt does.

Brezhnev: I have a question: Why fly at all?

Kissinger: You mean, why should we fly when we can launch a missile from the United States?

Brezhnev: Why build the B–1?

Kissinger: I have been asking our Generals that one for years.

Brezhnev: That’s why I say if you want it go ahead. That’s why I said we will be entitled to build an equal number.

The other point to further confuse matters, what about installing rockets in the Arctic and covering them with snow?

Kissinger: We have a bomber which plays the national anthem of the country it is flying over. (They both return to the table.)

Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger, your question is really warranted. Your question about us giving you a piece of paper with our position set out. I told you Comrade Dobrynin would have a piece of paper. I agree that at some point you will have such a paper.

Kissinger: It doesn’t have to be signed. It would enable us to study your proposal.

Brezhnev: So, so, please don’t understand me as having said there will be nothing in writing.

Kissinger: Would you answer the first question: At no time after 1977 will you have more than 2,400?

Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger, by the end of 1985 the total number on each side will be the same. We will be equal. Throughout that period [Page 270] we will not have a number in excess of 2,400, but account will be taken of the missiles at the disposal of your allies.

Kissinger: How?

Brezhnev: In the total quantity of missiles.

Kissinger: On whose side?

Brezhnev: Both. Our allies have neither missiles or submarines capable of carrying nuclear arms.

Kissinger: The Chinese do.

Brezhnev: That changes things. If we have reached that point then let’s have a drink, a toast. Sonnenfeldt! (Sonnenfeldt downs his drink) That’s an honest man; all the others have nets over their glasses. (To Hyland): Are you the guy who puts the nets over the missiles?

Kissinger: What is the compensation for the missiles of the allies you’re thinking about?

Brezhnev: There’s no compensation; we will count them in the total number.

Kissinger: (laughs) On your side or on ours?

Brezhnev: Your side. Now, if and when Mr. Wilson comes to the Soviet Union and tells me Great Britain is going to join the Warsaw Treaty, then we will add his missiles.

Kissinger: Does that mean we are to deduct France and Great Britain from the 2,200, or is that deducted before?

Brezhnev: No, they are already incorporated in the 2,200.

Kissinger: I understand. My question is: Under those 2,200, can we have 2,200 U.S. systems or 2,200 minus the French and British?

Dobrynin: The 2,200 can all be American.

Brezhnev: We regard that as the total number of rockets aimed against us.

Kissinger: 2,200 minus the 64 British?

Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger, we unfortunately don’t have any ally we can either add or subtract.

Kissinger: I wonder by what theory you explain an advantage of 200, and then subtract the British force.

(A 25-minute recess)

Brezhnev: This recess has deprived us of all of our pleasure. Let me make a correction as to numbers and in doing so reply to your questions as to what 2,200 means—that is, purely U.S. or not. By way of equalization, the 2,200 will be purely American missiles after the numbers have become equal.

Kissinger: I understand: 2,400 minus the U.K. force. Mr. General Secretary, may I make a suggestion. I believe we should proceed as [Page 271] follows. I will speak frankly, and I believe Dobrynin will confirm the correctness of what I say. If we put this proposal in its present form to our bureaucracy, it will lead into a process in a way most unfavorable to the Soviet Union—and not useful to the talks at Vladivostok. I propose that Ambassador Dobrynin is given a rough piece of paper when he comes to Washington and that we keep the discussion for the time being entirely in this channel. Because then we can refine many considerations. I think there are positive elements in your proposal that we can take seriously. There are some considerations that we have that you may take seriously. I would prefer to handle this in the channel until after the meeting in Vladivostok. I propose that Dobrynin and I have a number of meetings in Washington about this—not to negotiate, but to clarify points. Then you and the President can talk in Vladivostok. And, I do this in order to prevent those people who are looking for difficulties to cause trouble because I believe there are many aspects here we can take very seriously. And, I will work on it only with my closest collaborators—all who are in this room. But, we will say you haven’t given us a formal proposal; this is a sign that we are taking you seriously. Otherwise, we will have Senator Jackson. You know what will happen—he will hold hearings.

Brezhnev: I agree with you on one condition: That whatever amendments you make will not be in the nature of fundamental new proposals or new in principle. Because, I don’t want this forthcoming—this first—meeting with the President to begin with a dispute.

Kissinger: If it looks difficult, we will eliminate it from the agenda and have further discussions. There would be no surprises at Vladivostok. I can give Dobrynin our considerations and then, if it looks difficult we will just defer it. But, we are not intending to come up with anything radically new. I think we have come closer together in this visit than ever before. And, our intention will be to narrow the distance further, not to widen it. But, if on analyzing your proposal we find difficulties we will defer discussion. But, my expectation is that we will come closer together. Our considerations will be in the area in which I have asked questions; so they will be quite predictable.

Brezhnev: You did understand what I said about the B–1’s?

Kissinger: Yes, but we will have to study it because I don’t have a precise answer. I want to study the range of missiles and other matters. For example, I know we have some missiles that are only air defense, short distance. This is why I would like to analyze it before giving my reply. But I understand the principle.

Brezhnev: When I refer to the B–1’s, I was referring only to bombers carrying strategic missiles.

Kissinger: I understand, but this is what I would like to study.

[Page 272]

Brezhnev: Of course. Then I will have one question to ask Dr. Kissinger face to face. Here, I would like to express appreciation and satisfaction that we have worked constructively and usefully.

Kissinger: I believe we have worked seriously and that we have made good progress. We will try to work by all available means to come to an agreement by the time you visit the United States in 1975, and we will do our utmost to make the meeting in Vladivostok a success—and the beginning of close cooperation between you and President Ford.

Brezhnev: Thank you. That is what I want!

Please do not forget not only the substance of this discussion on missiles but also what we discussed on the first day. I know you have not forgotten, and I won’t discuss it any more. I endeavored to set out our position as clearly as possible, and I trust you will not disagree.

Kissinger: I take it seriously. I talked with your Foreign Minister at luncheon telling him, for example, there is a chance I will visit Ankara next week, and I promised to be in touch afterward.

Brezhnev: Good. Those very small minor amendments to the overall communiqué5 we’ve made in the belief that it might be useful in terms of Vladivostok.

Kissinger: I agree. You understand our problem on MBFR.

Brezhnev: We can accept it.

Kissinger: And we accept. If you make many more concessions like this you’ll have Alaska by next year.

(Sukhodrev translates; Gromyko translates again and Brezhnev and Soviet side laugh.)

Kissinger: On the timing of the communiqué release—(asks U.S. side) what’s the time difference between Delhi and here (two and one-half hours)—can we say 9:00 p.m. in Delhi and 6:30 here? That way I can give out the communiqué on the plane.6

Now, Sonnenfeldt and Hartman are going to talk to Schmidt, then we will talk to Schmidt when he comes to Washington. If we keep each other informed on how that concerns CSCE we can make some progress.

Brezhnev: I agree.

Kissinger: We’ll keep you informed.

[Page 273]

Dobrynin: One suggestion for the communiqué; one phase (relating to the Middle East): The two sides have agreed to make efforts to bring about the early convening of the Geneva Conference, without mentioning any dates.

Gromyko: Otherwise we will have lost the Conference.

Korniyenko: The sides have agreed to make efforts to obtain the early convening of the Geneva Conference.

Brezhnev: Otherwise, there would be an unfavorable reaction in the Arab world, and with respect to you and us.

Kissinger: The two sides agree to make efforts to bring about the convening of the Geneva Conference at an early, appropriate date. Can I discuss this with my Middle Eastern expert and call Korniyenko at home?

Brezhnev: Let’s try to meet a position.

Kissinger: As far as I can see this is your position, and I have given you a compromise. (Further give and take in the communiqué language.)

The two sides agree that the early convening of the Geneva Conference could play a useful role in finding such a settlement.

Gromyko: Should play.

Kissinger: O.K., should play.

Brezhnev: (The General Secretary gets up and walks around to the American side of the table.) It remains to shake hands. (He shakes the hands of the U.S. participants.)

Kissinger: And to say that we will meet in one month’s time.

Brezhnev: I attach great importance to that meeting, and I appreciate that the President wants to have a working meeting. It is a big step forward toward my visit to Washington, and I believe that the meeting will be instrumental in terms of the political situation in the United States.

Kissinger: That’s no longer so important.

Brezhnev: The important thing is that Ford and Kissinger shouldn’t be under fire—only Sonnenfeldt!

(The meeting concluded at 10:20 p.m., and Secretary Kissinger and General Secretary Brezhnev then had a private discussion.)7

  1. Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East Discussions, 1974–1976, Box 1, USSR Memcons and Reports, October 27, 1974—Kissinger/Brezhnev Talks in Moscow (3). Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Drafted by Clift. The meeting was held in the Old Politburo Room in the Kremlin. Sonnenfeldt’s handwritten notes on the meeting are in National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 5, Misc. Memcons.
  2. See Document 73.
  3. A copy of the Soviet proposal on SALT is in National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 6, SALT, October 1974.
  4. Reference is presumably to Document 53.
  5. For the text of the final communiqué on Kissinger’s visit, released in Moscow on October 27, see Department of State Bulletin, November 25, 1974, pp. 703–704.
  6. Kissinger was continuing on to New Delhi on the second leg of a 3-week trip, during which he visited India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Romania, Yugoslavia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, Israel, and Tunisia. He returned to Washington on November 9.
  7. See Document 78.