195. Memorandum of Conversation1


  • Andrey A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee, CPSU, and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
  • Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the U.S.
  • Georgiy M. Korniyenko, Member of the Collegium and Chief, USA Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
  • Vasiliy G. Makarov, Chef de Cabinet to the Minister
  • Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Counsellor, Second European Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
  • Yuliy M. Vorontsov, Minister-Counselor, Soviet Embassy
  • Yuriy E. Fokin, Special Assistant to the Minister
  • Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
  • Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
  • Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
  • Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., American Ambassador to the USSR
  • Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department of State
  • Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
  • William G. Hyland, Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research
  • Peter W. Rodman, National Security Council Staff
[Page 787]


  • Cyprus; CTB and Ban on New Systems; Korea; MBFR; Middle East

Sisco: Did you hear the story of Malik and Moynihan? Moynihan said to him after the Special Session speech: “You see, we’ve learned to give Presidium-length speeches.” Malik said, “Yes, but have you learned to get Presidium-length applause?” [Laughter] I think it was Moynihan.

The Foreign Minister has given more General Assembly speeches than anyone.

Kissinger: Every single one?

Gromyko: [thinks] I think so. But not every Special Session. Not this last one.

Sonnenfeldt: When you were in the Oval Office, you had been there before anyone else.

Kissinger: By far.

Gromyko: When Roosevelt was there I first was there. When I presented my credentials. What did we talk about? About the forthcoming Yalta Conference.

I had my papers and a set speech. And he had a speech. He said: “They’ll be published an hour from now, so let’s forget it.” So neither of us delivered any speech. [Laughter]

Kissinger: Was he in good health?

Gromyko: Not in very good health.

Kissinger: Particularly after Yalta, he was in poor health.

Gromyko: At Yalta he spent one day in bed. Stalin, Molotov and I visited him in his room.

Gromyko: You still doubt the existence of Leningrad?

Kissinger: Absolutely.

Gromyko: Then in what city did our Revolution begin?

Kissinger: St. Petersburg. [Laughter]

Gromyko: Recognized! Recognized!

Kissinger: It would have been interesting if Lenin, for some reason, hadn’t made it. Because in the top leadership, there were very few who wanted to make a Revolution. It was his will power, really.

Gromyko: It raises an interesting question about the role of personality.

Kissinger: Yes.

Gromyko: But the trend of the times was towards that. Timing maybe. Most were in favor of Lenin’s view.

Kissinger: Because of his personality. He drove them to it.

[Page 788]

Sonnenfeldt: In the State Department we deny the role of personality. [Laughter]

Kissinger: True.

Hyland: Objective factors!

Gromyko: There was an interesting book by a Marxist, Plekhanov, on the role of personality.2 The monistic view of history.

Kissinger: It is an interesting question, for Marxists, because there have been so many developments in the history of Marxism that were produced by strong personalities.

Gromyko: But Marxism doesn’t deny the role of personality. Maybe this will help the State Department. [Laughter]

Stoessel: Time will tell!

Sisco: It was also true in the birth of our Nation, our Revolution.


Gromyko: Is there anything new on the Cyprus problem now?

Kissinger: I don’t think much can happen until our Congress has acted on Turkish aid and Turkey has its election.

Sisco: And Cyprus wants to go through a General Assembly exercise.

Kissinger: What will be your position on Denktash?

Gromyko: On what?

Kissinger: If he comes.

Gromyko: It is impossible for two speakers to come and speak for the same state.

Hartman: It’s in the Political Committee.

Gromyko: But it’s one state. Cyprus is a member of the General Assembly, not Cypruses. It will be the most unusual thing.

Kissinger: [smiles] You’ll have a tough decision to make if Congress doesn’t lift the ban.

Gromyko: In what way?

Kissinger: Whether to move towards Turkey or the other way.

Dobrynin: What is the other way?

Kissinger: Towards Greece.

There are no negotiations going on now.

Gromyko: I read they were stopped in New York.

Hartman: Effectively suspended.

Kissinger: Is there a date for resumption?

[Page 789]

Hartman: After the Turkish elections.

Gromyko: It’s not very encouraging, not very encouraging.

Hartman: It’s very bad.

Gromyko: I’ve met Makarios but not Denktash.

Kissinger: I’ve never met him. When we were there,3 Makarios asked me to help with the communal problem. I said “That’s one problem I’ll never touch.” Two months later it blew up.

Gromyko: In that palace . . .

Sisco: He escaped through the back door.

Dobrynin: Sometimes it’s helpful to have a back door!

Kissinger: I don’t know what the Greeks expected to accomplish by that coup. Because enosis would never be accepted.

Comprehensive Test Ban and Ban on New Systems

Gromyko: In your speech, will you propose anything for the agenda?

Kissinger: No. If we did, we would tell you. Will you?

Gromyko: One we already proposed.

Kissinger: The complete test ban.

Gromyko: Yes. We may add another, which I wanted to tell you: the banning of new types of weapons. We discussed this before.

Kissinger: I remember. I don’t understand what you have in mind.

Gromyko: New systems of mass destruction, new kinds of weapons.

Kissinger: What would be your definition of new systems?

Gromyko: In a sense broader, in a sense narrower than new types of weapons. Generally, when we are asked, our answer is: If and when concrete negotiations take place, we’ll be ready with the details.

Kissinger: When you build that new missile that’s 32% deeper than other missiles, is that a new system? [Laughter]

Gromyko: Not quite. Not quite.

Kissinger: Does “new” mean new for a country or new in the world?

Gromyko: That did not exist in the world. It will be negotiated.

Kissinger: So India can build missiles up to the SS–19, or planes up to B–1.

[Page 790]

Gromyko: That can be discussed too. We won’t say that from the first discussion in the Assembly we worked out a complete proposal. It’s subject to negotiation.


Kissinger: The only thing we’re thinking of proposing is a four-power arrangement to replace the [Korean] Armistice Agreement if the UN Command is abolished. I don’t think it will be accepted.

Gromyko: We would put it in general, our proposal.

Kissinger: I’ll have to think about it.

Gromyko: You rightly mention about the spreading.

Kissinger: That’s more interesting to me than that others prevent us. If it’s about our armaments, we should discuss it in SALT. If it’s about the whole world, it’s a matter of defining what is new.

Sisco: Will you be submitting a resolution?

Gromyko: Yes.

Kissinger: [rises with his glass] Your visits here are regular now, Mr. Foreign Minister. And that shows the role that our two countries have in keeping the peace and in building a constructive environment for the world. We have in the past two years made our meetings regular features of the international landscape, and we attach great importance to this relationship. Even if events do not often go as smoothly as one of us may want, the trend is clear. We will work so that history will look back on this as the period when this became permanent. As one who was one of its architects, you are always welcome here. So, I propose a toast to the Foreign Minister, to our relationship and to the friendship of the Soviet and American peoples. [All toast]

Gromyko: Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your very kind words. They are very close to our own thinking. There are indeed no few questions that require our consideration and discussion. And even now when we have traversed an important road in the last years, a great effort is required to resolve important issues. The first is the need to prepare and elaborate a new agreement on SALT. And I would like to emphasize that our interest in this has not diminished, absolutely. We believe—and this is the view of General Secretary Brezhnev personally—that a new agreement would have a tremendous importance for our relationship and for the entire world. And we are prepared to have solutions on every question that is before the Soviet Union and the United States; the inventory of issues doesn’t boil down to the one I mentioned. And as before, we would like to go on discussing these issues at all levels, including the Foreign Minister level.

I want to thank you for the hospitality here in Washington. I had a very useful meeting yesterday with the President. And whenever you are willing to meet with us, we are always ready.

[Page 791]

So, I propose a toast to the Secretary of State, to further successes in this field, to the further development of our relations, and to all your colleagues and co-workers and assistants in this room.

Kissinger: Those are my sentiments exactly. This is a task to which we must devote ourselves.


Before we turn to our main subject, do you have any ideas on the direction we might take in Vienna? Or is the present framework . . .?

Gromyko: First, some time ago you will recall you intimated to me, in Vienna or in Geneva, that you were considering discussing in the framework of the Vienna talks new types of arms. Notice I don’t say “new systems”! But since then we have seen nothing new in the Western positions. So we come to the conclusion there is no new Western view.

That is my first point. My second point is: we feel now that what is being demanded of us by the Western side is completely unjust. All these bargaining points—and that’s what they are—are impossible. We are told we have too many tanks. And we should just take them out—just for a thank you. And all this is called a mutually advantageous agreement. Maybe I’m exaggerating a little bit, but all this really conveys the spirit of what is happening in Vienna.

Now my third point is: It may well be that soon we may have the urge to discuss this again, maybe on a bilateral basis with the United States, before we decide on what further steps we may take in Vienna. I don’t want to be ahead of myself, but this may happen.

Kissinger: It is not excluded.

Gromyko: Not excluded.

Kissinger: Its rejection is not guaranteed. I’m practicing double negatives. But I’m a minor leaguer!

Can I interpret your beginning remarks about nuclear weapons to mean that if this were included, our proposals might look less unequal?

Gromyko: We said in Vienna that it would certainly facilitate matters if there could be a broader approach, both with the number of states involved and the types of arms. But it seems not to have been developed further.

Kissinger: We are studying it, and the possibility of including it is not excluded.

Regarding your third point, we would be interested in bilateral exchanges on that before major steps are taken in Vienna, because it might facilitate matters.

Gromyko: Good. Well, then, when and where do we take up the main question?

[Page 792]

Kissinger: We can take it up now.

Gromyko: Let’s do it.

Middle East

Kissinger: I thought if I raised another subject, you might forget about the Middle East.

Gromyko: You’re the last one to visit the Middle East, so perhaps you’d like to tell us something. [Laughter]

Kissinger: I have said my views on this, including publicly. Our objectives in the Egyptian-Israeli negotiation were several: First, to prevent a situation in the Middle East where a stalemate would lead to such frustration that it could lead to another war. Second, to make some progress in order to unlock the possibility for further progress.

We seriously considered an overall approach, for some months. For a variety of reasons, including domestic, we decided that it wouldn’t work. As I explained in my speech the other day [at Cincinnati],4 we have always considered that the step-by-step approach would merge eventually into a comprehensive approach.

Could we turn the air conditioning on?

The presence of the Soviet Foreign Minister activates so many other electronic devices—to photograph you, tape you, and give you a medical examination, that it overloads the circuit. [Laughter]

Gromyko: [to Dobrynin] What we suspected was true! [Laughter]

Kissinger: There are two ways we can proceed. One is by encouraging a negotiation between Syria and Israel. And/or reactivating the Geneva Conference. Or something in between, like intensive consultations with the parties outside the framework of the Conference, leading eventually to reconvening the Conference.

We are prepared to consult seriously with you to consider the feasibility of these approaches, or any other you might think useful. We have no intention of pursuing the conclusion of these negotiations as a solo American effort. So the only question is how to proceed now, what might be discussed, what could succeed and what possibility exists for contacts between us or between the parties. A Syrian step or an overall step, or an overall that might include as a first step Syria—all these are possibilities, and we have reached no conclusion. As I’ve communicated with you and said publicly, we are prepared to discuss all of this with you.

[Page 793]

[At 9:22 p.m. the party moves out of the dining room to the larger room, where the doors are opened to let in some ventilation.]

Gromyko: I have a question, Mr. Secretary. Do you have any specific plan in the Middle East from now on? Of late you have been making frequent references to the Geneva Conference. You just now expressed the possibility of conducting affairs there with the broad participation of relevant other countries. So, do you have a plan? Or maybe you don’t have a thought-out plan? I have a second question.

Kissinger: You’re counting on my vanity never to admit I haven’t a plan.

Gromyko: While you’re always adding to my difficulties, I want to make your situation easier. [Laughter]

My second question is: insofar as the Geneva Conference is concerned, how do you think it can be reconvened and conduct its deliberations? How could it be, so to speak, constitutionalized? How should it be reconvened, or reactivated?

Kissinger: With respect to your first question, we do not have a fixed unchangeable plan. We have some ideas. As soon as our sanity is restored, for example, we could encourage some sort of negotiation with Syria and Israel, some sort of arrangement on the Golan Heights to continue the steps in the Sinai. If they are interested. We told President Asad we might encourage it if they are interested. It would be difficult, like the last one, but not impossible. The Israeli statements are not encouraging, but they are never encouraging at the beginning. That’s one approach. With all the participants in the last war having gotten something, there is a possibility for Geneva.

The other approach is more comprehensive. I have no detailed idea. If, for example, one did not want to reconvene Geneva immediately, because of its formality and complexity, it wouldn’t be excluded to have informal meetings of the co-chairmen, and then meetings with the parties. I have no precise proposal.

You ask how it could be organized. If it is reconstituted, the easiest way would be to reconstitute it first with the participants who were there the last time, without prejudice to other possible participants later. This would enable it to begin, leaving the possibility of other participants to come later.

These are some ideas.

Gromyko: With respect to the Geneva Conference, right now we have a very poor understanding as to how the Geneva Conference could be reconvened, in view of the situation that has taken shape after the separate agreement between Egypt and Israel, with you as intermediary and with your active participation. What is the situation now? [Page 794] The Syrians now are not prepared to take part in the Geneva Conference.

Kissinger: Have you asked them?

Gromyko: Yes. We have been in contact with them and it is our impression the Syrians are not prepared to take part, given the present situation.

The second point is the Palestinians have their own position, and their own proposals regarding the situation in the Middle East. They claim—and we feel they have every right—the right to take part in a reconstituted Geneva Conference. We feel that unless this is resolved there is no possibility for fruitful work of the Conference.

So, on the one hand, there is the question of the Palestinians. We know less about the position of Jordan, but, as far as we know, Jordan is not enthusiastic about the work of the Conference. But I can’t vouch for them.

So what kind of Conference is it if the Syrians and the Palestinians don’t participate? Who will participate? The partners in the deal that took place without us, for the reasons you know? Egypt, Israel, and the United States? Such is the situation. If you have opinions on this, tell us. According to our information, that is the situation now in the Middle East.

Kissinger: But . . .

Gromyko: That’s my first point. My second point is . . .

Kissinger: Excuse me.

Gromyko: My second point is: If I understand you correctly, you do allow the possibility of undertaking something outside the scope of the Conference but with the participation of a broad circle of participants, and probably you’re thinking of the Soviet Union and the United States as well.

Kissinger: Yes.

Gromyko: But what kind of action outside the Geneva Conference and in a broad circle are you visualizing? And how would such a mechanism actually operate? You say the United States is ready to consult with the Soviet Union. We are ready to consult with you and always have been. The hitch hasn’t been on our side. We are always ready to consult and we have always said the two powers have not used their full powers in this matter. But we do rule out the possibility of having a reconstituted Geneva Conference in which the participants would be the United States, Soviet Union, Egypt and Israel and probably Jordan, but not Syria and the Palestinians. It would be one thing if the Syrians and Palestinians said they wouldn’t mind to have the question discussed by those, without them, but I’m sure you’ll agree that’s highly unlikely.

[Page 795]

In terms of a profound consideration of this problem, we believe the United States and the Soviet Union could utilize their contacts with other parties and jointly or separately use their contacts to encourage a settlement. And we are prepared to do that. But in the past, whenever you say you are ready to engage in joint efforts, several weeks after this understanding it just broke up in the air. We don’t take a dogmatic approach. We want to see what can be done.

The third point: We do not approve of what has been done in the Middle East recently. As I told the President, there will be no campaign. But we do not approve of what has been done on a separatist basis. Because Arab territory is still occupied by Israel—even if a small part has been given up. We have said on various levels, including the level of the General Secretary and the President, that the Middle East doesn’t only have an Arab-Israeli aspect but an international aspect. So even if one Arab state said that it would sacrifice one part of its territory for peace, we would not accept that. We would not accept the situation where an aggressor could be given a prize for his aggression. So even if some Arab state were to say: “Due to circumstances that it’s impossible to regain all our territories, we are compelled to sacrifice part of our territory,” we would regard this as unfair and we could not accept a situation where an aggressor could get a prize for aggression. Because involved here is a broader international aspect, and involved here are many other countries’ interests, not only in the Middle East.

You have been aware all along of our readiness for joint measures and to act jointly in all questions regarding the Middle East problem. But evidently other considerations, narrower considerations, got the upper hand in your thinking.

So we should do some more thinking, and after this meeting we should visualize further consultations on what should be done. If you are prepared to make a change in your position, as evidenced by what was done, then perhaps there is a possibility for something still to be done and on a joint basis.

It’s up to you to let us know how it can be done.

Kissinger: With respect to Geneva, we are prepared to reconvene but we do not insist on it. If there is no basis for reconvening, then it shouldn’t be done. We have not asked the parties about it, and this would have to be the first step. So what you say about Syria is unfamiliar to us. My experience with Syria—which is not as extensive as yours—is that you shouldn’t always take their first word as the last. It is not implausible, knowing them, that for a few weeks they’ll take this position.

I agree with you, Mr. Foreign Minister, there is no sense convening the Geneva Conference with only the United States, Soviet Union, Egypt, Israel and Jordan.

[Page 796]

Gromyko: How can it take place without Syria and the Palestinians? The Soviet Union will be out too.

Kissinger: We will not attend the Geneva Conference without the Soviet Union; that is a firm decision. This strengthens my case. I agree, it is unlikely that Syria and the Palestinians will ask us to hold it without them.

As I told you privately this afternoon,5 the Palestinian question is an extremely difficult one for us, and if that is the precondition of starting it, it can’t start. We believe it is a discussable subject if it reconvenes with the present participants and considers other participants. Maybe we can ask the Syrians, if you don’t object.

Maybe we can discuss having an informal conference, broader than Geneva but outside it.

After all, the consumer-producer conference now is beginning with a preparatory conference. It’s not an unheard-of diplomatic phenomenon.

Your third point. I must say I was a little surprised to hear the Soviet Union wouldn’t accept it if one Arab state decided to modify its frontiers. We haven’t heard any Arab state that said it would do so, and we have not proposed it to any Arab state. But I always thought that you supported the ’67 frontiers but if one Arab state modified its position you would support it. It may be a purely theoretical question, because there is no Arab state that would.

Gromyko: We support the 1967 frontiers.

Kissinger: I know, but it’s a new position to state that if one Arab state made a change you would not accept it. That is new, and if carried out, will be an interesting statement.

You say you think we act on narrow considerations. I have explained to you and to your Ambassador: We don’t want to be involved in a purely theoretical exercise. We have always thought that to move in attainable stages would move us more easily towards solutions. Rather than have a theoretical exercise that proved impossible.

This gives us no special advantage, because the history of the Middle East shows how relationships are transitory. Especially because friendships in the Middle East are expensive, and usually express themselves in money. In order to avoid pressures, political and economic, there had to be some progress. And there could be progress only by the methods we used. We did it to promote progress. I said it publicly, and I will reiterate it. It is not inconsistent with your position. Your approach has been to state general principles, and our approach has been to make concrete progress.

[Page 797]

Are we serious? It was us, not you, that initiated the present discussions.

Gromyko: But before.

Kissinger: You’ve done it often. But this latest exchange was initiated by us. But I agree, in light of our discussion, we should perhaps begin a more intensive discussion between us. I’ve told you we are encouraging a negotiation between Syria and Israel, but not with overwhelming rapidity. So there is time for an exchange of ideas. We can meet again. Your Ambassador and I could meet. Or Sisco and your Ambassador could resume their discussions. Or whomever you designate.

Gromyko: Of course we are prepared to discuss the substance of these matters, first and foremost the substance. We have been talking up to now about methods, forms—even this evening—not territories, a Palestinian state. So if we really want to promote a Palestine settlement, isn’t it high time we discussed the matters at hand? You proposed discussions outside of the Geneva Conference, with a broader circle, but how do you contemplate this? If it’s a conference outside a Conference, surely the Syrians and Palestinians won’t participate. So how will it take place? How do you solve a question that interests the Syrians and Palestinians?

This isn’t the first time we’ve had the United States say the Palestinians should be in the Conference at some later stage after it’s reconvened. But how do you do it in practice? But how do you find a solution to the Palestinian problem? Perhaps there will be some correction in your position. What is your substantive position? They have a problem, and practically the whole world supports them. Where is the question of their statehood? A solution to the substantive part of the Palestinian question?

Kissinger: In all frankness, as we conduct our discussions, both of us have the possibility of putting before the other positions that one can’t fulfill and to use them to embarrass the other. Our problems with the Palestinian question are obvious, and I say this to every Arab leader. I never promise what I can’t deliver. We can’t change our position on the Palestinian problem. It’s a proposition with which the Palestinians will have to get used. They’ll have to accept the framework in which progress can be made.

Borders, guarantees—we all know the agenda. But where do we go? We have in the past been unable to cooperate because the goal of the discussion wasn’t clear. A discussion must take into account—I’ll be frank—our possibilities. We say this to the Arabs. Any discussion that doesn’t take this into account will lead to concern on our part that it’s only being done to embarrass us.

[Page 798]

The question of the Palestinians to us is a very complicated one, which requires some evolution. It’s simple as far as you’re concerned.

Whether the Syrians would cooperate in Geneva or outside the Geneva framework, I’m not so sure. The worst mistake one can make in the Middle East is to accept anyone’s statement as conclusive the first time, or even the tenth time.

I have the impression the Syrians are interested in a negotiation. They haven’t said it explicitly. I have the impression they’ll do it without the direct participation of the Palestinians. They’ll find some way to do it—a Joint Command, or some way. I’m just reading between the lines. Then, if they’re interested in a negotiation, in what framework will it be? We are prepared to exchange ideas with them, and with you, and we’ll keep you informed.

We are at the point where a decision can be made. In the spring, the options were narrowed. Today, we have more maneuvering room. There are many possibilities, including intensive discussions with you.

How should it be constituted? We two could invite the parties. There are many ways it could be done.

Gromyko: Let us agree, then, to continue our consultations on various levels, on the Ambassadorial level, or if needed, the Foreign Minister level. Bilateral consultations. But with the understanding that these should relate not only to methods, forms and approaches, but to the substance of the matter at hand.

On the substance, let us agree the discussion will not circumvent the Syrians or Palestinians, so that if they object to an exchange of view without them it won’t be done. But if they agree, consultations will proceed. I’m not saying that without Egypt and Jordan it can be done.

Kissinger: And Israel. [Laughter]

Gromyko: Of course. It goes without saying. Unless the United States objects.

Kissinger: To Israel participating?

It adds excitement to the exercise. [Laughter]

Gromyko: To ignore the views of Syria and the Palestinians would mean marking time without any progress whatsoever. It’s a cliche, but we should continue our consultations. You seem more optimistic regarding participation of the Palestinians and the Syrians.

Kissinger: Syria. I know nothing about the Palestinians.

Gromyko: But there should be complete clarity about one thing: circumvention of the Syrians and Palestinians would mean no productive consultations without their consent, and no productive reconvening of Geneva could be contemplated.

Can we agree the United States and the Soviet Union will from now on return to the formula that was agreed on previously but sus[Page 799]tained a failure, namely that we will act in concert for a solution to the Middle East issue? Or do you feel it’s too early and it can’t be considered at this point? If you agree, we should agree on who should meet and when to resume consultations—I don’t mean the exact date. To resume where we leave off.

Kissinger: With respect to your first point: We, of course, have no contact with the Palestinians, and therefore we are generically conducting our policy without consultation with the Palestinians. So that part of your presentation we can’t accept. Inherently.

We have the highest regard for President Asad and we will do nothing to the detriment or isolation of Syria. So we agree to the proposition that we will do nothing without consultation with Syria. All the more so as we’ve said the next negotiation, if there is no overall approach, would be a Syrian-Israeli negotiation which would, of course, require Syrian participation.

We are, of course, prepared for serious discussion of what steps could be taken. Perhaps Sunday,6 after we’ve had time to think a bit, we could discuss where and what meetings could take place.

Gromyko: Let’s return to the matter on Sunday, then. To specify the point under discussion.

How many more problems do we have to discuss tonight? Five?

Kissinger: I’m willing to surrender. [Laughter]

Gromyko: Conditionally? Unconditionally? [Laughter]

Kissinger: You wouldn’t accept an unconditional surrender! Have you any topics?

Gromyko: No, we could adjourn now.

Kissinger: So, 8:00 Sunday.

Dobrynin: 7:30. Is it convenient?

Kissinger: Let me think. Let’s say 8:00. Because we may not get to New York on time.

Gromyko: 8 o’clock.

  1. Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East Discussions, 1974–1976, Box 1, USSR Memcons and Reports, September 18–21, 1975—Talks with Gromyko. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Rodman. All brackets are in the original. The dinner meeting was held in the Monroe–Madison Room at the Department of State.
  2. Georgi Plekhanov, On the Question of the Individual’s Role in History (1898).
  3. Kissinger and Gromyko met in Nicosia, Cyprus, on May 7, 1974, to discuss Soviet-American relations and the Middle East. See footnote 2, Document 34.
  4. Kissinger delivered an address, “Global Peace, the Middle East, and the United States,” on September 16 before a dinner meeting of the Greater Cincinnati Chamber of Commerce and other area organizations. For the text of the speech, see Department of State Bulletin, October 6, 1975, pp. 493–500.
  5. See footnote 2, Document 193.
  6. September 21.