173. Memorandum of Conversation1
- The President
- The Secretary of State
- Walter Stoessel, US Ambassador to the USSR
- General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
- Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor, Department of State
- Arthur Hartman, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
- William G. Hyland, Department of State
- Jan Lodal, NSC Staff
- Alexander Akalovsky, Department of State
- General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev
- Andrey Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs
- Mr. G.M. Kornienko, Chief of American Section, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Mr. A. Aleksandrov, Assistant to Mr. Brezhnev
- Mr. K. Chernenko, Member of the Central Committee Staff
- General Kozlov, Deputy Chief of General Staff
- Mr. Detinov
- Mr. V. Sukhodrev, MFA
- Mr. A. Vavilov, MFA
Brezhnev: I think the Conference in Helsinki has been received very well by the public.
The President: Yes, I think the press coverage was very good. I have also seen a lot of good pictures in the papers.
Brezhnev: Let’s take off our coats; it will be easier to work that way.
[Everybody takes his coat off.][Page 705]
Brezhnev: How should we start? Perhaps we should draw lots. If the lot is in my right hand, Gromyko will start.
Gromyko: Perhaps. Why not?
Brezhnev: No, maybe we should ask Dr. Kissinger to start.
The President: Mr. General Secretary, I believe you made an outstanding speech at the Conference.2 I liked its tone and I believe the emphasis you placed on MBFR and SALT has set a correct atmosphere for today’s meeting. I would like to compliment you on your speech.
Brezhnev: Thank you very much. If your comment is not merely an expression of politeness, I thank you all the more. [Pause] You know, Mr. President, after this conference, it is morally more difficult to talk about increasing our armaments levels, about introducing new types of weapons, and the like.
The President: I believe it is very interesting to note that the only dispute that surfaced during the conference here was not a dispute between the US and the Soviet Union, but one between Turkey, Greece and Cyprus. This is a pleasant change.
Brezhnev: My close colleagues, when they heard those speeches, thought there would be a fist fight.
The President: If there had been one, I believe that from the standpoint of appearance Demirel3 looked stronger.
Brezhnev: There was also a divine representative there, with a heavy cross!
[Pointing to the cookies which had just been brought in] Dr. Kissinger, this is all for you, you seem to have grown weaker!
Mr. President, I must thank you for your support and assistance in having this conference precisely at this time. This is something we greatly appreciate and it would be rude of me not to say so. There is also something I would like to say off the record, and those taking notes please don’t do so. Well, we have an agreement, and we also have arms that could put both of us into the grave. After this conference, if we were to make announcements about the introduction of additional arms or of new types of armaments, that would be inappropriate in this atmosphere. But we do need a new agreement. The first one is valid until 1977 and the next one should cover another eight years. This, I am sure, would bring greater tranquility into the minds of our peoples. What we have to discuss is the shape of a new agreement.[Page 706]
The President: I agree. I hope, indeed I believe, that it is possible to reach agreement, and I am looking forward to your visit sometime in the fall to sign, and if need be, to complete the agreement. I believe Dr. Kissinger and your Foreign Minister have moved a number of issues to a point where technicians in Geneva can work out the specifics. We have made substantial progress on such issues as verification of MIRVs; on submarine MIRVs, I don’t think the remaining differences are very serious; as regards dimensions, it is a more technical problem. We could draw up a check list of the points where differences continue to exist. Perhaps we could proceed in that way. Last Friday, we gave you our communication.4 Perhaps you have looked at it and perhaps this would be a good starting point.
Brezhnev: [Pause] Mr. President, this is the second time I am meeting with you on this problem, which is so delicate and most important for our two countries as well as for the entire world. With Dr. Kissinger, we have had numerous meetings on this problem. I would like to speak openly: have we really done everything correctly? First we talked about throw weight, launching weight, modifications of dimensions by 10 to 15 percent, and a ban on the construction of new silos. That is fine, but the fact is that you and we have different fuels which are not comparable. After all, a cup of tea is not a cup of mercury, because the weight of the two is different. But if missiles are used, the result will be the same: Brezhnev dies and Kissinger dies. From the standpoint of the Pentagon and our Ministry, there may be a difference, but from the standpoint of our people at large there is none.
Now, Dr. Kissinger, what do you want: launching weight or throw weight? I am sure you could not answer this question.
The Secretary: I could try.
Brezhnev: We have made a number of concessions: for example, missiles once tested with MIRVs are all to be counted as equipped with MIRVs, although initially our approach was different. But when we asked you not to build B–1 bombers, you said you would. Also, we asked you not to build the Trident, but you are going ahead just the same and that means that we will have to build our Typhoon. Now we have the issue of cruise missiles, which can be launched from both the ground and the air. This is such a complex and delicate issue that it is very difficult to deal with it. But we must give some basic guidance to our representatives in Geneva so that we can sign a document.
Now, I remember that in Vladivostok you agreed . . . [confers with Gromyko] you indicated agreement concerning B–1 missiles of over [Page 707] 600 kilometers. I am raising this issue of cruise missiles only reluctantly, not because I would like to bypass it, but because I want to avoid anything that could spoil our relations, so that we could find some compromise.
When Gromyko met with Dr. Kissinger, we made a very big concession on verification of MIRVs, and it was really a major concession that was not easy for us to make. But Dr. Kissinger was told that this was linked with cruise missiles. [Gromyko prompts him] We told Dr. Kissinger that the solutions of the two issues should be treated as one complex of issues. Also, we said that each cruise missile should be counted as one, just as those on B–1 bombers. Furthermore, we said that air-based cruise missiles of over 600 kilometers and land-based cruise missiles of intercontinental range should be banned. But I must tell you, Mr. President, that Dr. Kissinger has completely ignored this proposal.
The Secretary: This is a total violation of the President’s instructions. I did all this on my own. If you hadn’t told this to the President, he would not have known it, so now I am in deep trouble.
The President: We have agreed to ban land-based cruise missiles with intercontinental range. You wanted this and we said OK. We also agreed to limit sea-based cruise missiles to a range of 1500 kilometers, so we have moved towards you on this issue. We have also agreed to include in the ban cruise missiles on transport aircraft.
Brezhnev: When you say cruise missiles of intercontinental range, do you mean land-based ones?
The Secretary: Land-based intercontinental cruise missiles and also cruise missiles on transport planes. You wanted to ban them and the President has agreed.
Brezhnev: It is also good that we have agreed on banning ICBMs based on the seabed and the ocean floor, including inland and territorial waters.
The President: Also in space!
Brezhnev: Yes, that is very good.
We are prepared to refer to the delegations in Geneva the question of the limits on dimensional modifications of silos. There are still some differences on this.
Gromyko [to Brezhnev]: Those differences will remain in Geneva as well!
The Secretary: Did I understand you correctly that the points you mentioned previously, such as cruise missiles with intercontinental range, should also go to Geneva? At any rate, let’s make a list of issues.
Brezhnev: No, I don’t think so.
The Secretary: Only silo dimensions?[Page 708]
Brezhnev: Silo dimensions and . . . [prompted by Gromyko] cruise missiles of intercontinental range.
The Secretary: We agree.
Gromyko: The problem is that the differences between our approaches will remain the same in Geneva as they are here.
The Secretary: We are not disputing, we only want to be sure we understand you correctly.
Brezhnev: I would like to give the floor to Gromyko.
Gromyko: There are various issues relating to cruise missiles. On some we have reached agreement, on others we have not. We have agreement on the following points. You have given a positive answer concerning cruise missiles of intercontinental range. So this is agreed and could be referred to the delegations for drafting appropriate language. We have proposed a ban on cruise missiles on all aircraft other than heavy bombers, and we have also proposed that all air-based ballistic missiles with a range of over 600 kilometers, except those on heavy bombers, be banned. You have given a positive answer concerning cruise missiles but are passing over in silence ballistic missiles. So that part of this problem which has been agreed could go to Geneva.
The Secretary: We have agreed to count in the aggregate all ballistic missiles with a range of over 600 kilometers no matter what vehicle they are on.
Gromyko: If you say this, and you have not said it before, then we can state that all ballistic missiles with a range of over 600 kilometers are banned from all aircraft other than heavy bombers, but if you say that all such missiles are to be counted, then we still have some differences.
The Secretary: Are you, Mr. Minister, saying “count”?
Gromyko: No, not count, ban. Agreement concerning the counting of missiles on heavy bombers was reached in Vladivostok.
The Secretary: Our concern is how to differentiate between heavy bombers and other aircraft.
Gromyko: But you and we have agreed on what types of aircraft are to be regarded as heavy bombers.
The Secretary: Not completely. There is still one type at issue, although you are correct as regards aircraft on our side.
Gromyko: This is a separate issue. It relates to the Backfire and should be discussed separately.
As regards sea-based missiles, we have proposed banning all missiles with a range of over 600 kilometers from all ships. Here we have an obverse situation: You have replied positively as regards ballistic [Page 709] missiles but on cruise missiles you have agreed to ban only those with a range of over 1500 kilometers. So here we have agreement on ballistic missiles but not on cruise missiles, and only the first part of this issue could be referred to Geneva.
The Secretary: For clarity, will you please define what you understand has been agreed regarding sea-based ballistic missiles?
Gromyko: All over 600 kilometers are to be banned.
The Secretary: Correct, we agree.
The President: Yes, we agree.
Gromyko: As Comrade Brezhnev has said, there is also agreement between us regarding emplacement on the seabed and on the ocean floor, so this too can go to Geneva. The same applies to outer space.
All issues are important but the issue of cruise missiles is of particular importance. We understood in Vladivostok that missiles included in the aggregate of 2400 are not to be divided in categories of ballistic and cruise missiles. But you started doing so after Vladivostok and this has greatly complicated matters. As Comrade Brezhnev has said, this is a particularly important issue.
The Secretary: On the other hand, nothing was said in Vladivostok about cruise missiles on aircraft other than heavy bombers. But we are ready to reach agreement on this as well as on sea-based cruise missiles. So we are prepared to generalize this problem.
Gromyko: Well, in Vladivostok the cruise missiles issue was not even mentioned, so that we could not even conceive of drawing a line between cruise and ballistic missiles.
The Secretary: But there was nothing said in Vladivostok about cruise missiles on ships and aircraft other than bombers. Yet, now we are willing to count such missiles in the aggregate. We have also agreed to ban cruise missiles on all aircraft other than heavy bombers, to ban cruise missiles with a range of over 1500 kilometers on ships and submarines, and to ban ballistic missiles with a range of over 600 kilometers on ships.
Gromyko: You say nothing was said in Vladivostok on these issues. But it was you who started differentiating between cruise missiles and ballistic missiles. If we had proceeded consistently, there would be no division even today. Now, as regards what should be referred to Geneva. The General Secretary has already mentioned this. If no agreement has been reached on some issues at a high or the highest level, no progress can be expected on those issues in Geneva either. On the contrary, their referral to the delegations might make work in Geneva even more difficult.
Brezhnev: In Vladivostok, in the course of two days, we reached agreement on very important questions and principles![Page 710]
The Secretary: I would like to make two points. First, we should send to Geneva only those items agreed here. There is no point in sending other issues, because if the General Secretary and the President do not agree, Semenov and Johnson won’t either. So I repeat, only agreed items are to be referred to Geneva.
Second, as regards sea-based cruise missiles, most of your sea-based cruise missiles have a range of 300 to 500 kilometers—and I know that your technicians are always angry when I mention specifications of your weapons. With that range you can hit 40 percent of US cities, a great number of which are along the coast. With similar missiles we can’t hit your cities because you very unfairly and inappropriately have located your cities deep inland. So we have a choice: either you give us a longer range or move your cities to the coast.
Gromyko: A very revolutionary proposal! What kind of binoculars do you use?
The Secretary: Our Secretary of Defense proposed moving your cities to the sea coast.
Brezhnev: Put them on barges!
The President: I thought you would suggest moving our cities farther from the sea!
Brezhnev: Not too far!
[A lengthy pause, with Brezhnev reading his brief and then engaging in a long conference with his advisers, only portions of which could be overheard. After reading the paper, Brezhnev waved Kozlov from his seat and asked him what the issue was, commenting that he could not understand it because all missiles were subject to the 600 kilometer limitation. Kozlov, Gromyko and Kornienko explained that the issue was the difference between cruise missiles and ballistic missiles. Somewhat later Brezhnev asked if all SALT I provisions would remain in force until 1977. Gromyko replied in the affirmative but pointed out that if agreement were reached now on new points, the new provisions would come into effect under SALT II. After re-reading his brief, Brezhnev exclaimed that he still did not understand the essence of the issue. Gromyko and Kornienko repeated that it related to cruise missiles. Brezhnev asked if they had in mind land-based cruise missiles, with Gromyko and Kornienko saying that land-based cruise missiles were the lesser part of the problem; Kozlov added that sea-based cruise missiles with the range desired by the US could hit the USSR from the north. Pointing to a paragraph in his brief, Brezhnev asked what the issue of a definition of heavy missiles was all about. Kozlov’s response could not be heard.]
Brezhnev: I don’t want to burden you, Mr. President, with this question, but what is your view of the definition of heavy missiles? Should it be according to launching weight, or throw weight?[Page 711]
The Secretary: We proposed both, but if we had to choose we would prefer throw weight.
Brezhnev [to Gromyko]: I can’t invent anything new here.
Gromyko: You say both. How do you visualize the combination? Can you spell it out?
The Secretary: Your formula for launching weight is that there should be no missiles heavier than the most heavy of the light missiles you now have, that is the SS–19. We say that there should be no missiles with a throw weight larger than the one of the SS–19. We would use these criteria per missile and not overall.
May I make a suggestion. You have been helpful in giving us concrete ideas, and we gave you our proposals. Perhaps you can give us now your views on our recent proposals so we could discuss them with our colleagues and give you our response in a week or so. Then, when the Foreign Minister comes to the US or when I come to Moscow, we could continue our discussion.
Brezhnev: Mr. President, perhaps you don’t know the characteristics of our aircraft, but I want to tell you that what you call the Backfire is not a heavy bomber so that your proposal is completely without foundation.
The President: Our understanding is that the Backfire has sufficient range and arms to be counted as a heavy bomber. Perhaps you could give us some technical information that would show that it should not be counted. We understand that the Backfire is a replacement for the Bison, and the Bison is counted. So the Backfire should also be counted in the aggregate of 2400.
Brezhnev [to Kozlov]: This is not correct, is it?
Kozlov [to Brezhnev]: Myasishchev is a heavy bomber. But this is a medium bomber. It has half the range. TU–22 is a different matter.
Brezhnev: Mr. President, in including the Myasishchev bomber, or what you call the Bison, we gave you a big present. That aircraft is not capable of a two-way mission. But, nevertheless, for formal reasons, we agreed to include it as a heavy bomber. As regards the Backfire, it can’t do even half of what the Bison can do. Ask your experts. This is on the record, and I am responsible for what I say. So how can we include it?
President: Our intelligence tells us that the range and the other capabilities of the Backfire are reasonably comparable with those of the Bison. The two aircraft have a similar range and their other capabilities are also similar. I respect your statement, but our information does not coincide with what you tell me. I would have a monumental problem with our intelligence, and with our Congress as well as the American people at large, to whom I have to account, if I were to accept your [Page 712] figures. If we could see the figures, that could perhaps help us in finding some possible arrangement, but this would take time. I really cannot dismiss the information presented to me by my advisers. Every time when we encounter technical problems—and they are important—I am reminded of your opening statement on the importance of reaching an agreement that would be in the interests of both of our peoples. So with the time limitation we have, I believe it would be useful if your Foreign Minister and Dr. Kissinger, when Mr. Gromyko comes to the United States, continued discussing this problem. Then, when Dr. Kissinger visits Moscow, he and Mr. Gromyko could further narrow the differences. Then when we meet, we could further refine our views so as to be able to sign an agreement. The differences we have over the Backfire bomber are a very tough problem. Therefore, I would like to ask you if you have anything to say on cruise missiles, so that we could indicate some progress. If you could give us something on cruise missiles that we could take back with us, that would be very useful.
Brezhnev: It is most difficult to discuss these questions. You, Mr. Ford, are President, and I am General Secretary. Your intelligence reports to you certain things that are news to me, so what does it mean when you don’t believe what I tell you? My intelligence reports to me that you are converting light missiles into heavy ones. So you get your intelligence reports and I get mine. But we sit here and don’t believe each other. Perhaps not we, but our intelligence people, should sit here.
The President: You said we should not do anything to disrupt the good relationship we have established. I agree 100 percent with you on this point, and all Europe wants this. This was the opinion reflected in all the statements we heard at the conference. But we have to state our views openly. I rely on my intelligence, and you on yours.
If you could indicate some movement on cruise missiles, then we could say that our two meetings have been productive. We said 3,000 kilometers for airborne cruise missiles. I am willing to modify this, perhaps to 2,500, although this is very hard for me to do. In the case of surface ships and submarines, perhaps we could consider using something less than 1,500, say 1,200. I offer this despite the technical advice I receive to show good faith and to indicate that I make decisions regardless of advice. Again, I recall your opening words about the importance of reaching agreement, which impressed me greatly.
It seems to me that given the excellent environment created in Helsinki and the faith thirty-three nations have put in your and my hands, it would be very unfortunate if we were to walk out of here unable to say that progress has been achieved in this vital area.
Gromyko [to Brezhnev]: This doesn’t solve the issue.
[Lengthy pause][Page 713]
Brezhnev: You know, to work out a good agreement, an agreement that would be mutually advantageous, considerable time is needed. Dr. Kissinger plans to visit Moscow rather late. This will create great difficulties, because we will be preoccupied with preparations for the visit by Giscard, the Party Congress, etc.
So we should agree on when the next meeting will take place. [Turning to Gromyko] With the President?
Gromyko [to Brezhnev]: Well, maybe we will meet with Dr. Kissinger.
The Secretary: What are your suggestions?
Brezhnev: We should advance the meeting somewhat, although I have had no vacation yet. Also, if you come again with cruise missiles and the Backfire, well then we just won’t be able to get any agreement. So let’s think this over. Gromyko has not only summed up our analysis of the issues, but also has added something to it. I kept silent because it is impolite to repeat the same thing three times.
The Secretary: When is the Foreign Minister coming to New York?
Gromyko: On September 15 or 16. I believe the General Assembly starts on the 16th.
The Secretary: Why don’t we propose a date after the President has reviewed the schedule. To speed up things, perhaps I could come at the end of August.
Gromyko: August is not suitable. There is a great deal of work to be done. Our experts have to study the issues thoroughly.
Brezhnev: I propose a five-minute break.
The President: Of course.
The Secretary: But we don’t want to offend your allies!
Sukhodrev [to Brezhnev]: That is a reference to their departure for Romania.5
Brezhnev: Romania won’t perish!
[During the break, which lasted about 15 minutes, Brezhnev read his briefing papers, underlining certain portions in the process. He also conferred with Gromyko but their conversation was inaudible. Towards the end of the break, Brezhnev stepped out of the room for a few minutes.]
The Secretary [to Gromyko]: Ever since you joined the Politburo you have been even more difficult.[Page 714]
Gromyko: I don’t think so.
Brezhnev: Mr. President, when do you believe my visit to Washington would be convenient to you?
The President: I would say the second half of October. Would that be convenient to you? We have some flexibility. What can you suggest?
Brezhnev: You know, Mr. President, there are many issues that require thorough study: what kind of missiles, what characteristics of missiles, etc. I have not been able to study these matters here because I have had talks every day from morning till evening.
The President: As I said, we could be flexible. You asked for our view concerning the timing of your visit. I believe it is more important to reach a good agreement rather than set a deadline and not be able to meet it.
Brezhnev: In these circumstances, it is apparently difficult to solve the problem before us. But we must issue some kind of a statement.
The President: I have asked Dr. Kissinger to jot down the points we have agreed on, and perhaps he could read them to us. This could be reported to the public. We should not disappoint the public although we should not give it undue optimism. At the same time, we should not destroy the Helsinki atmosphere.
The Secretary: I believe we could say that we have agreed to refer to Geneva certain points on which we have reached agreement without specifying those points. As I see it, we have agreed that: (a) ballistic missiles with a range of over 600 kilometers on surface ships will be banned; (b) ballistic missiles and cruise missiles on the seabed, including in territorial waters, will be banned; (c) placing nuclear weapons in orbit will be banned; (d) development, testing, and deployment of cruise missiles with a range of over 600 kilometers on aircraft other than bombers will be banned; and (e) development of land-based cruise missiles of intercontinental range will be banned. So all these items should be referred to Geneva, but all we would say to the public is that a number of issues have been referred to Geneva.
Gromyko: With reference to cruise missiles on aircraft other than bombers, do you exclude ballistic missiles?
Secretary: We want to handle ballistic missiles together with land mobile missiles. I don’t believe there are great differences in this area but we are not yet prepared to refer this to Geneva.
Gromyko: Your list of items is correct; we agree on these items.
The Secretary: Thus, the President can say that we have agreed on a number of points to be referred to Geneva. He could also say that we would remain in touch, primarily through an exchange of visits be[Page 715]tween the Foreign Minister and myself. In this way, we would not create an impression of stalemate.
The President: I would like to add that Dr. Kissinger could come to Moscow on the 6th or 7th of September rather than in August. And then you, Mr. Foreign Minister, would be coming to New York after his visit.
The Secretary: I am also prepared to go to Leningrad.
Brezhnev: You haven’t been there?
The Secretary: The city may not even exist!
Gromyko: Don’t you believe your own wife?
The Secretary: We are also prepared to refer the verification issue to Geneva!
Gromyko [shaking his head]: No, no. There is no proposal on this matter, so we can’t do it.
Secretary: I just wanted to catch you in a weak moment!
[At this point, Brezhnev, with Gromyko’s assistance, began making changes in the text of the Soviet press statement on the meeting. This drafting session lasted about five minutes.]
Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger, the agreed points you have listed are not to be specified. The list is only for our own purposes, isn’t it?
The Secretary: Correct.
Brezhnev: So we could perhaps issue a statement, I mean a unilateral Soviet statement, that would read like this, and you could issue a similar one.
[Brezhnev hands the text to Sukhodrev, who translates it into English.]
“On 2 August, a meeting between General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Leonid Brezhnev and U.S. President Gerald Ford in which member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko and U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger took part was held in Helsinki.
“The CPSU Central Committee General Secretary and the U.S. President highly assessed the results of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. It was stressed that the final act of the conference, which embodies the collective political will of its participants, creates a good basis for transforming Europe into a continent of peace and fruitful cooperation and makes a major contribution to the consolidation of world peace and security.
“The two sides continued their exchanges of views on problems of the further development of Soviet-American relations. Great attention was paid to the problem of limiting strategic weapons. The questions on which agreement was reached during the talks will be referred to [Page 716] the delegations in Geneva for appropriate finalization. Negotiations on the remaining issues will continue.
“Leonid Brezhnev and Gerald Ford expressed satisfaction with the exchange of views that took place, which was of a constructive character, and reaffirmed the great significance of personal contacts between the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States.”
[Sukhodrev: The text then ends with a list of participants in the meeting.]
The Secretary: After the first meeting, we said that it had taken place in a “friendly atmosphere”. Questions will be asked if there is any difference.
Gromyko: We can include such a phrase in this statement as well.
The Secretary: You make no mention of the discussions between the Foreign Minister and myself, but I believe we can say this unilaterally.
Brezhnev: I see no need for mentioning names.
Aleksandrov: Dr. Kissinger is asking whether he could tell the journalists about those talks.
Brezhnev: Well, the talks might be with me too! But I have no objection anyway.
The Secretary: If we are asked about the General Secretary’s visit we will say that there has been no change in plans, but we would not say what the plans are.
Brezhnev: So far, no change is envisaged in our plans.
The President: Mr. General Secretary, thank you very much. I believe we have made a little, although not enough, headway and I look forward to further discussions. We value your readiness to seek agreement—we certainly seek it—and I trust that we will be able to reach an agreement that would meet the interests of the American and the Soviet people as well as of the entire world.
Brezhnev: I want to repeat that there should be no public announcement of the points that have been agreed. Otherwise, the question of trust will arise! Now, Mr. President, I would like to have a brief conversation with only you and Dr. Kissinger.
[The meeting broke up at 12:10 p.m., with the President and the Secretary staying in the room for the restricted meeting.]
- Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East Discussions, 1974–1976, Box 1, USSR Memcons and Reports, July 30–August 2, 1975—Ford/Brezhnev Meetings in Helsinki (CSCE). Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Akalovsky. Brackets are in the original. The meeting was held at the Soviet Embassy.↩
- For the English text of Brezhnev’s speech on August 1, see Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XXVII, No. 31 (August 27, 1975), pp. 12–14. For Ford’s speech on the same date, see Public Papers: Ford, 1975, No. 459.↩
- Turkish Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel.↩
- July 25. See footnote 2, Document 171.↩
- Ford and Kissinger traveled to Romania and Yugoslavia for official visits before returning to Washington on August 4.↩