15. Note from the Counselor of the Department of State (Sonnenfeldt) to Secretary of State
Kissinger1
Washington,
August 14, 1974, 11:30 p.m.
Attached is a counterdraft from Jackson, et al. plus additional memorandum on
interpretations, numbers and other issues.2 These were delivered by Perle late this evening.
I have done comments on this material in the form of a memo from you to
the President, should you wish to hand it to him.
As noted in that memo, the drafting changes in the basic letter are not
too serious, though they naturally tend to raise the demands upon the
Soviet Union some more.
The interpretations, which would be incorporated in a letter of response
to which you, in turn, would respond with an acceptance, pose the
familiar problems of excessive detail and specificity.
The additional issues involve complex arrangements with other Communist
countries, the dubious waiver procedure and the absurd point about not
counting emigrants leaving the USSR
under agreements with countries other than the U.S.
I think the President should use his current political clout to tell the
Senators we have run out the string. The letter is barely tolerable and
the interpretations go beyond what can be asked explicitly of the
Russians. If we are going to have a compromise, our letter should do it
and adequate review language in the legislation will protect everybody’s
interests.
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Attachment
Draft Note From Secretary of State Kissinger to President
Ford3
Washington,
August 14,
1974.
Mr. President:
Late last night, Senator Jackson sent us a revised draft of our proposed
letter, plus a memorandum on the interpretative response the Senator
would make to the letter and some other issues.
The revisions in the basic letter (attached at
Tab A) are not too serious and could probably be accepted by us.
They do, however, in each case place a somewhat greater burden on
the Russians in meeting the proposed performance standards and thus
make the likelihood of actual Soviet compliance in practice that
much less.
The proposed interpretations (attached at Tab
B) pose more serious problems. In each case, the Soviets would be
obliged to accept stringent definitions of impermissible or required
practices. It is doubtful that we could do more than intimate to
them the nature of the demand; they would almost certainly decline
to provide the required assurance, whatever their intention
regarding compliance.
The Senators are prepared to reduce their earlier demand for a 75,000
per annum rate to 60,000, but would regard this as a benchmark for
measuring progress to the eventual level, which they define as
“corresponding to the number of applicants.” (Jackson currently claims that
there are some 300,000 potential emigrants and that they would wish
to leave within some four to five years. This would mean an annual
rate of some 60–75,000 by his requirements.) There is little or no
chance that the Soviets would associate themselves with this
arithmetic.
Jackson also raises a series
of other issues (attached at Tab C),4 which
involve difficulties.
First, he demands that the number of emigrants resulting from our
arrangements with the Soviets must not include emigrants leaving the
Soviet Union by virtue of arrangements with other countries, such as
the FRG. (Several hundred ethnic
Germans leave the USSR each
month.) We could probably accept this as an internal U.S.
interpretation, but it would hardly wash with the Soviets.
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Second, Jackson wants us to
negotiate separate emigration arrangements with all East European
countries (and presumably China) affected by Title IV of the Trade
Bill before they could qualify for MFN and credits. In these instances, however, Jackson’s requirements are less
stringent than for the USSR; they
would deal mostly with dual nationals and special hardship
cases.
Third, the Senators stick to their waiver approach. That is there
would have to be a finding that the USSR is in compliance with the terms of our letter plus
interpretations before the full terms of Title IV could be waived
for no more than one year at a time. (Jackson’s staff continues to imply that the Senator
might be flexible on this concept if the rest of the deal is
acceptable.) Our concept is that the Bill should permit at least a
trial period during which MFN and
credits could be granted and Soviet performance would be tested. I
see no chance of Soviet compliance until we first deliver MFN and credits (which the Soviets
believe, correctly, were promised them as part of the comprehensive
trade agreements of 1972).
