2. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1
SUBJECT
- Important Items
1. I saw Dobrynin at 12:30 pm today due to a conflict in his schedule. I told him that in response to his message of yesterday2 and after discussing the issue with you and the President we wished to confirm that there would be no air activity over Hanoi or Haiphong during the period just prior to the arrival of the Soviet Delegation and through [Page 7] their departure. I told him that this was consistent with the discussions held by the President with the Soviet Leaders at the time of the Moscow Summit, adding that if I could have a firm assurance of the time that the Soviet Delegation would be spending in Hanoi it might be possible to add some additional restrictions but in any case it would be impossible to halt U.S. air activity throughout North Vietnam. Dobrynin stated that he thought the group would be there three or four days and could not be sure precisely but that in any event the period would be so brief that it would not result in a major military implication for the U.S.
I then told Dobrynin that you had asked me to see him urgently and inform him that during the February visit to Peking3 it had been agreed that you would make a subsequent visit to that capitol and that in recent days Peking had expressed a great sense of urgency that your followup visit take place very soon. I pointed out that we had been attempting to delay the visit but that the June 26 visit of the leaders of the House, the Democratic Convention during which it would be impossible for you to be in Peking for domestic political reasons and in light of the actions planned for September, you and the President had determined that it would be necessary for you to accept Peking’s invitation and that you planned to be in Peking for three full days next week, arriving Monday evening and departing Friday a.m.4 I emphasized that matters of Soviet interest would be assiduously avoided and that the President was most anxious that the Soviet leaders were aware of his determination to abide strictly to the provisions of the principles arrived at by the two parties during his visit to Moscow.5 Dobrynin seemed a little disturbed and noted that we were aware of the Congressional visit and the Democratic Convention long before now and he, therefore, wondered why the Soviet side had not been informed of your visit to Peking earlier. I pointed out that we had hoped to have it occur much later but that Peking was insistent and that they had made reference to the situation in Southeast Asia. Therefore, in the light of all these factors the President had decided to proceed next week. I mentioned that this decision had just been made and that you had flashed me from Tokyo so that Ambassador Dobrynin would be informed as soon as possible. I pointed out that the visit was not known by any other U.S. officials and that we now planned to make a low-keyed announcement on Wednesday at 11:00 a.m. I also pointed out that you were very anxious to meet with the Ambassador at breakfast on Tuesday morning and would cover in greater detail the circumstances surrounding your visit to Peking. He stated that he was scheduled to [Page 8] have breakfast with Secretary Peterson on Tuesday and I told him that I would take care of that problem and he offered to meet with Peterson Wednesday, Thursday or Friday.
[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than U.S.-Soviet relations.]
10. Breakfast is set up in the Map Room at 8:30 am tomorrow morning with Dobrynin.
[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than U.S.-Soviet relations.]
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 494, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 12. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. A handwritten notation at the top of the memorandum reads: “HAK has seen.”↩
- Not found.↩
- Kissinger accompanied Nixon on his trip to China, February 21–28.↩
- June 19–23.↩
- See footnote 10, Document 1.↩