1. Memorandum of Conversation1
- Anatoli Dobrynin
- Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Dobrynin had just returned from Moscow and was effusive about the meeting.2 He had a message from Brezhnev to me personally commenting on my constructive handling of the negotiations. The Soviet leaders were convinced that I had made a major contribution to the success of the Summit and they wanted me to know their appreciation. Brezhnev looked forward to my return to Moscow early in September. And if I came before September 15, he hoped that I would be his guest in the Crimea.
Dobrynin had a message also from Brezhnev to the President. He thanked the President for the manner in which he conducted the Moscow negotiations. He pointed out that there were many successes at the Summit but the greatest success in the eyes of the Soviet leaders was the personal relationship established between Brezhnev and the President.
Dobrynin then said that he looked forward to further discussions with me on a variety of issues, especially the Middle-East. Gromyko had been very pleased by our discussions, particularly by the direct [Page 2] way in which I had handled it. He also thought that we should start talking about the trade negotiations. In fact, Kosygin had said to him that it was obvious that Rogers didn’t know what he was talking about and that unless Kissinger got involved, Kosygin did not have too much confidence.
I asked Dobrynin about the plan to send Podgorny to Hanoi. Dobrynin replied that Podgorny was still planning to go. They had sent a summary of the conversations with me to Hanoi but indicated that Podgorny stood ready to give a fuller explanation. Hanoi had not yet replied and therefore the matter was still in abeyance. He expected that the trip would take place in the near future though.
I gave him a letter from the President to Brezhnev (Tab A) and promised him copies of clarifying statements on SLBM’s which we were preparing for congressional presentation. [These were delivered to Dobrynin later in the day (Tab B).]3
There was some desultory small talk and then the meeting broke up.
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 494, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 12. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The meeting took place in the White House Map Room.↩
- A reference to the Moscow Summit, May 22–30, 1972. The records of the meetings between President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev, as well as documentation on discussions leading up to and preparations for the summit, are printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972.↩
- Attached but not printed. Brackets are in the original.↩
- Top Secret. A handwritten notation at the top of the page reads: “Handed by K to D, 10:50 am, Thurs, 6/8/72, Map Room.”↩
- For the text of the agreements, signed at the Moscow Summit, see Department of State Bulletin, June 26, 1972, pp. 921–926.↩
- For the text of the agreement, see ibid., pp. 926–927.↩
- The text of the U.S.-Soviet joint communiqué issued on May 29 after the Moscow Summit reads in part: “In the interests of broadening and facilitating commercial ties between the two countries, and to work out specific arrangements, the two Sides decided to create a U.S.-Soviet Joint Commercial Commission. Its first meeting will be held in Moscow in the summer of 1972.” (Public Papers: Nixon, 1972, p. 637) The formation of the commission was first announced on May 26 in Moscow by Peter Flanigan. See “Joint Commission Set Up To Resolve Trade Issues,” The New York Times, May 27, 1972, p. 1.↩
- The United States and the Soviet Union signed two strategic arms limitation accords on May 26: the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. The former limited each signatory’s deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems to two designated areas, including the national command authority. The latter limited the overall level of strategic offensive missile forces. For the text of the SALT treaties, see Department of State Bulletin, June 26, 1972, pp. 918–921.↩
- The text of the U.S.-Soviet joint communiqué reads in part: “The U.S. and the USSR are in accord that multilateral consultations looking toward a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe could begin after the signature of the Final Quadripartite Protocol of the Agreement of September 3, 1971.” It continues, “Both Sides believe that the goal of ensuring stability and security in Europe would be served by a reciprocal reduction of armed forces and armaments, first of all in Central Europe.” In conclusion, an “Appropriate agreement should be reached as soon as practicable between the states concerned on the procedures for negotiations on this subject in a special forum.” (Public Papers: Nixon, 1972, p. 640)↩
- For the text of the “Basic Principles of Relations Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,” May 29, see ibid., pp. 633–635.↩
- For the memoranda of these conversations, May 23 and 24, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Documents 263 and 271.↩