Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972

295. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, May 28, 1972, 9:35–11:55 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• Andrei A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
• Anatoli F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to USA
• Georgi M. Korniyenko, Chief of USA Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
• Mr. Bratchikov, Interpreter
• Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President
• Winston Lord, Special Assistant to Dr. Kissinger
• Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff Member (notetaker)

SUBJECTS

• Communiqué; Middle East

The Communiqué

[The Foreign Minister first took Dr. Kissinger aside for about eight minutes of private conversation in the Foreign Minister’s private office. They began on the subject of the phrase “inviolability of frontiers,” as proposed by the Soviets for the communiqué section on Europe. They then joined the rest of the group in the conference room, resuming on the same subject.]² [The working text of the communiqué is at Tab A.]³

Dr. Kissinger: There is one possible compromise suggested by Korniyenko: “inviolability of their frontiers.”

For. Min. Gromyko: It is obvious whose are referred to.

Dr. Kissinger: Are we finished with the communiqué?Sonnenfeldt and Korniyenko are running the whole affair.

Mr. Korniyenko: We will omit the parts about the maritime matters.

Dr. Kissinger: You want to say “agreed to continue the negotiations aimed at reaching an agreement on maritime and related matters. They believe that such an agreement would make a positive step…?” All right.

You want to say [in the commercial/economic section] “encouraging the conclusion of long-term contracts?”

Amb. Dobrynin: We supported your position and now you take it out.

Dr. Kissinger: Our economic expert Flanigan says the U.S. Government has no right to encourage contracts among private firms.

Amb. Dobrynin: Do you always listen to the experts?

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Foreign Minister, Dobrynin was always under control until the last few meetings! Oh hell, I’ll accept yours.

Amb. Dobrynin: I think you’re splitting the hair.

Dr. Kissinger: No, I am accepting it. I will have trouble with Flanigan.

I have suggested that the English text use the phrase, “encouraging the conclusion of long-term contracts” and the Russian text refer to “the importance of long-term contracts”—exactly the opposite of what is expected!

Are we all set on the communiqué? Anyone who has the ability to settle anything in one hour with Mr. Sonnenfeldt has my admiration.

Is the Middle East section set?

For. Min. Gromyko: On the Mideast, I sent it to Mr. Brezhnev. When he reads it I will communicate with you. Probably tomorrow morning.

Amb. Dobrynin: Before 10 o’clock.

Dr. Kissinger: We won’t have much time tomorrow.

For. Min. Gromyko: On Indochina, probably there will be separate statements.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

For. Min. Gromyko: On the Mideast, it may be joint.

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Foreign Minister, I will miss dealing with you. You are always precise.

All right, on Indochina, which will we use for our text if there are separate statements?

For. Min. Gromyko: Since it’s one-sided, it’s up to the sides to decide.

Dr. Kissinger: I have only one experience with two-sided communiqués.

For. Min. Gromyko: In Peking.⁴ What was your experience?

Dr. Kissinger: It is more time-consuming. What we did was use the formula that each side was free to say what it wanted but each was free to comment on the other’s and each would take the other’s comments seriously.

It is not in anybody’s interest to have sections which give the impression of cosmic confrontation. Here too, particularly in view of the spirit of our conversations this morning.

For. Min. Gromyko: We will do this after we hear your formulation.

Dr. Kissinger: All right.

[Sausage is brought in.]

For. Min. Gromyko: A change.

Dr. Kissinger: I like sausage too, but I just ate.

On the principles, I have one change. You want to change “social systems” to “political systems.” That’s all right.

Mr. Lord: we’ll say “political.”

Dr. Kissinger: On the fourth principle, our experts tell us that the language implies that the Warsaw Pact is obligated to assure NATO’s compliance with its obligations and vice versa. We should say, “agreements to which they are jointly parties.”

For. Min. Gromyko: In Russian, there is no need.

Dr. Kissinger: In English, it could refer to multilateral agreements to which one but not the other is a party.

Amb. Dobrynin: Do you need this?

Dr. Kissinger: This is the one contribution the State Department has made to this document, literally.

For. Min. Gromyko: You are right in your interpretation, but in Russian it is not necessary.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand, Mr. Korniyenko, that you and our people will get together tomorrow to conform the texts.

Mr. Korniyenko: Yes.

For. Min. Gromyko: You may say “jointly.”

Dr. Kissinger: I have no complaint about the Russian text. I must say my contribution on this is not what I have accomplished with you but what I have accomplished with our own people.

Mr. Korniyenko: Should I meet with State tomorrow?

Dr. Kissinger: But with Sonnenfeldt present.

Mr. Korniyenko: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: Can we keep the plenary very general and brief?

For. Min. Gromyko: We are moving in that direction. It will be very brief.

Dr. Kissinger: The Indochina paper you have of ours is a long one.

For. Min. Gromyko: A separate statement is more probable.

Dr. Kissinger: It would be sensational if we had a joint statement on that.

Middle East

For. Min. Gromyko: Have you thought about the principles [as we discussed this morning]?

Dr. Kissinger: I have written an outline for possible future discussion. [He hands the paper over at Tab B.⁵ Gromyko and Dobrynin read it. Gromyko takes out a pen.]

Dr. Kissinger: Are your signing it?

Mr. Foreign Minister, this is not a document every word of which has been fully weighed. I talked to the President after our conversation, and these are more “thinking points.”

For. Min. Gromyko: In the first point, the phrase “on a priority basis”—I think this does reflect…

Dr. Kissinger: It was an attempt to reflect your thinking.

For. Min. Gromyko: In the second principle,⁶ you need “the” Arab territories. You don’t need “Arab;” it’s not Indian or Japanese territories.

Amb. Dobrynin: we’ll trade you “Arab” for “the.”

For. Min. Gromyko: Why not “Egyptian, Syrian, and Jordanian territories”?

Dr. Kissinger: I don’t mind saying that. I would like to avoid the article at this point.

Amb. Dobrynin: What do you mean “at this point?”

Dr. Kissinger: Frankly, it is an issue on which we’re not fully agreed. But substantially agreed. I tried to phrase it in a way that allows both.

For. Min. Gromyko: If I were you, I would accept “the” and would try to explain it, and then reflect your point in the third point.

Dr. Kissinger: If I were you I’d try to have two ways of arguing, one in the second point and one in the third.

I must say I understand your point very clearly, very precisely.

For. Min. Gromyko: I have no doubt you understand, but you don’t accept it.

Dr. Kissinger: I don’t exclude it.

For. Min. Gromyko: Your third point⁷ covers it.

Amb. Dobrynin: It mentions border changes.

Dr. Kissinger: Let’s reserve on the second and go to the third.

For. Min. Gromyko: In English is there a difference between “changes” and “rectification?” “Rectification” is more flexible.

Dr. Kissinger: No, it’s less flexible.

For. Min. Gromyko: How about “minor rectifications are not excluded relative to some of the parties but, even if they take place, they should result from voluntary agreement—” but without saying “between the parties.”

Dr. Kissinger: Suppose we say “border rectifications are not excluded between the parties but should be by voluntary agreement.”

For. Min. Gromyko: You are against “minor.”

Dr. Kissinger: Because “rectification” implies “minor.”

For. Min. Gromyko: In Russian, “rectification” is utochnit’. I remember even the Israelis speak of “minor.” Suppose we say “minor rectifications.”

Dr. Kissinger: How about “minor changes”?

For. Min. Gromyko: In Russian, nyebol’ shiye izmenyeniya. Or “some rectifications are not excluded.”

Mr. Korniyenko: “Any rectifications, which are not excluded, should be the result of voluntary agreement.”

For. Min. Gromyko: “Any border rectifications, which are not excluded….”

Dr. Kissinger: No, it has to be stated positively.

For. Min. Gromyko: “Which may take place, should result from voluntary agreement among the parties.”

Dr. Kissinger: Are you considering this accepted on your side?

For. Min. Gromyko: More or less.

Dr. Kissinger: Tentatively let’s use it as a working hypothesis.

For. Min. Gromyko: Fourth, you would like “Arrangements for security should include demilitarized zones and the most effective international guarantees.”⁸

Dr. Kissinger: Or “could include.”

For. Min. Gromyko: Or rather, “Mutual arrangements for security could include demilitarized zones and the most effective international guarantees.” We could say “with the participation of the Soviet Union and U.S.” We would prefer this if you don’t mind.

Dr. Kissinger: This is a working paper for us alone, not to show to anyone. What about “if appropriate, with the participation of the Soviet Union and the U.S.?” Or “as appropriate?” “As” is not so conditional.

For. Min. Gromyko: “With appropriate participation by.”

Dr. Kissinger: All right. “Could” is a saving clause.

For. Min. Gromyko: Maybe we should mention here the special phrase “it may be provided that the UN Security Council should take part as a component of the security arrangements.”

Dr. Kissinger: We’re getting too detailed. Since this is between us, any side can raise this at any point. I was not too impressed by the Security Council last December.

For. Min. Gromyko: [Reading point 5]: “The agreements should lead to an end of a state of belligerency and the establishment of peace.” Unquestionably… [Reading point 6:] “Freedom of navigation through the Straits of Tiran and the Suez Canal should be assured. Unquestionably… One thing I could say here, which would give matter [substance] to the principles is, “This would not be detrimental to Egyptian sovereignty over the Canal.”⁹

Dr. Kissinger: I don’t mind that. You want to put it in? Can we put it another way, so as not to be implying that in case of conflict sovereignty prevails? “This can be assured without impairing Egyptian sovereignty over the Canal.”

For. Min. Gromyko: [Reads point 7:] “Completion of the agreements should at some stage involve negotiations among the signatories.”¹⁰ This is politically unpalatable to us.

Dr. Kissinger: Why? Why can’t you say “at some point?”

Amb. Dobrynin: Is it so important now?

Dr. Kissinger: It seems to me difficult on the part of the Arabs to say they are willing to live in peace with Israel and not be willing to talk to Israel about that peace. We’re not saying “from the beginning.”

For. Min. Gromyko: But Jarring will be shuttling back and forth.

Dr. Kissinger: With the energy for which he is known. [Gromyko laughs] This does not exclude indirect negotiations.

All we are saying is that before the agreements are finally concluded it will happen, that we can’t complete the negotiations.

For. Min. Gromyko: I’m not sure it would be realistic. If the parties should at some point be willing to have contacts, it will be okay.

The UN General Assembly once had a list of recommended disarmament measures. It said the countries could do this, would do that, and then do this. It then had one line at the end: “if everything is all right!”

We’d prefer to cross this out. It would just harm it. It can hang in the air.

Dr. Kissinger: Can we say it another way? “It is recognized that the two sides cannot impose a solution.”

For. Min. Gromyko: Not just in theory but in practice it is impossible to settle without direct contact. If it depended on us, there would be no question—only the substance would matter.

Dr. Kissinger: Is it your view that the Arabs would never talk to Israel? How can they get the document signed? How can they say they’re willing to talk peace but not talk to each other?

For. Min. Gromyko: Again, it is prestige. This is reality, part of life. “If the parties should consider it possible to be in touch before signing, it should not be precluded.”

Amb. Dobrynin: [To Gromyko:] Put “could” instead of “should.”

For. Min. Gromyko: “If the parties concerned find it possible to be directly in touch with one another before the signing of the agreement(s), it should not be excluded.” Maybe it is clumsy. There could be different combinations of contacts.

Dr. Kissinger: We don’t have to leave the impression that we can impose a settlement. Our principle says “negotiations;” we’re not saying “direct negotiations.” In a way, exchanges through Jarring are a form of negotiation. We are trying to find some role for the parties concerned. If the parties won’t talk in any form, then these principles will have to be imposed.

Amb. Dobrynin: They will sign together.

Dr. Kissinger: Then what will they do? Who would exclude it? You won’t and we won’t.

For. Min. Gromyko: It reflects our general mood. You and we are not against something. We cannot say to the Arabs that we agreed with you on this point. They would blame us at once. They may crucify us.

Dr. Kissinger: With music?

Amb. Dobrynin: Let’s drop it for the time being.

For. Min. Gromyko: Can we say something about the possibility of including among the security arrangements the presence of UN Security Council personnel?

Dr. Kissinger: Where?

Amb. Dobrynin: In point 4.

For. Min. Gromyko: At Sharm el-Sheikh.

Dr. Kissinger: I have no objections.

For. Min. Gromyko: Just insert after “demilitarized zones,” the phrase “placing UN Security Council personnel at Sharm el-Sheikh.” The Arabs will not like it, but I think we and you can do this. I think it would add something material to this.¹¹

[Pause] Do you have doubts?

Dr. Kissinger: No. I want to be candid. When we say “demilitarized zones,” we don’t exclude other things. I wanted to be sure you understood.

For. Min. Gromyko: “The temporary stationing of UN personnel at Sharm el-Sheikh”—temporary, not until the Second Coming of the Christ!

Dr. Kissinger: An interesting formulation to put to the Jews and the Arabs: “These forces will stay until the Second Coming of the Christ!”—signed by a Socialist country and the U.S., and put to the Jews and Arabs! [Reads:] “Mutual arrangements for security could include demilitarized zones, the temporary stationing of UN personnel at Sharm el-Sheikh and the most effective international guarantees, with appropriate participation by the Soviet Union and the United States.”

For. Min. Gromyko: “A limited number of UN personnel.”

How about the Palestinians? I wonder who in the world could give a precise solution to this problem.

Dr. Kissinger: The way the Foreign Minister is going we will reach agreement tonight. [He picks up and reads the U.S. draft of “Basic Provisions for a Final Settlement in the Middle East.”]

What would you like to say about the Palestinians?

For. Min. Gromyko: “The problem of the Palestinian refugees should be solved on the basis of the restitution of their legitimate rights and appropriate (or corresponding) UN decisions.”—as a principle.¹²

Dr. Kissinger: But here we’re describing very general principles. I don’t mind saying “a settlement should include provision for the Palestinians.” Frankly I would like to study the UN resolutions closely to see what your proposition means.

Amb. Dobrynin: You mean the UN resolutions for which the U.S. voted?

Dr. Kissinger: I have no difficulty in saying in any working program for us that there must be an appropriate section on the refugees. Our concern now is whether we want to expand on this and how.

For. Min. Gromyko: Would you not want to mention specifically the region of Gaza and say that one possible solution to its status would be to have a plebiscite?

Dr. Kissinger: I am reluctant, not because I disagree but because it’s difficult to do this here at this table. It is not like SALT, in which I had the benefit of years of preparation and study.

What are we trying to do? We are just telling each other what we are prepared to do. On Gaza, I don’t exclude the possibility of a plebiscite; in fact it may be useful.

For. Min. Gromyko: Suppose one more principle is added, maybe at the end. “Both the U.S. and Soviet Union recognize as one of the main principles relating to the situation in the Middle East that all states of the Middle East, including Israel, have the right to exist as sovereign independent states.”¹³

Dr. Kissinger: A very good principle, a very positive principle.

For. Min. Gromyko: We took this consistent principle ever since the creation of Israel as a state in 1947. “The U.S. and Soviet Union recognize that one of the most important principles relating to the situation in the Middle East is recognition of the right of all states, including Israel, to exist as sovereign independent states.”

Dr. Kissinger: Read it back. “The U.S. and Soviet Union agree …” Just a stylistic point.

For. Min. Gromyko: Can you imagine if we showed this now to the Syrians, what they would do?

Dr. Kissinger: Both of us are terrified of what our allies would do. This is the best guarantee of secrecy.

We don’t have to say “agree,” because the whole statement is joint.

For. Min. Gromyko: “Recognition of the independence and sovereignty of all states in the Middle East, including Israel, is one of the basic principles on which the settlement has to be based.”

Dr. Kissinger: “One of the main principles of a stable peace.”

For. Min. Gromyko: “On which the settlement must be based.” This is the eighth point, then.

Dr. Kissinger: The ninth. Since we won’t finish here, why not leave it for Anatol and me to finish?

For. Min. Gromyko: But we should have a rough agreement on principles here.

Dr. Kissinger: What was that principle again? [Bratchikov reads it again.] We accept that.

For. Min. Gromyko: On the Palestinians, do we have a formulation? Our suggestion was “the problem of the Palestinian refugees should be solved on the basis of the restitution of their legitimate rights and appropriate UN decisions.”

Dr. Kissinger: What does “restitution of their legitimate rights” mean? Your proposal in the paper is more flexible and easier to deal with than a general principle.

For. Min. Gromyko: What would you prefer?

Dr. Kissinger: “Should be settled on an equitable basis?” “On a just basis?”

For. Min. Gromyko: Let us say, “on a just basis in accordance with the decisions of the UN.”

Dr. Kissinger: My problem is I don’t remember what the UN decisions were.

“On a just basis and in accordance…” Is it possible for me to say that for tonight it is all right and get back to Anatol within a few days? I want to study the UN resolutions. You can’t hold me to something we don’t want to carry out. If you left out the UN, we would accept it immediately.

For. Min. Gromyko: Leave it subject to your confirmation. The U.S. not only supported these resolutions but prepared them.

Dr. Kissinger: From my present knowledge, it’s all right. But I want to confirm. When will the Ambassador return?

Amb. Dobrynin: Sunday,¹⁴ if my Minister will permit it.

Dr. Kissinger: I won’t be back from Key Biscayne until Monday night.

For. Min. Gromyko: Not later than Sunday he will return.

Dr. Kissinger: I won’t be available until Tuesday. We return Thursday afternoon. I brief on Friday, then go to Key Biscayne or New York on the weekend—I haven’t decided.

Amb. Dobrynin: He missed Japan.

For. Min. Gromyko: You missed Japan twice!

Dr. Kissinger: If you get your allies to restrain themselves, I may get to Japan.

For. Min. Gromyko: It was a pleasure to visit Japan.

Dr. Kissinger: A pleasure? You were there.

For. Min. Gromyko: It was very interesting.

Dr. Kissinger: I’ve not been there in an official capacity. They have a very complex way of thinking. Can you tell what is in their minds?

For. Min. Gromyko: Like the Chinese.

Dr. Kissinger: It is not easy with the Chinese either, but they’re not as formal as the Japanese.

For. Min. Gromyko: For example, with us and in the West, the sooner something is done, the better. It is a sign of effectiveness. For the Chinese, it is a sign of inefficiency.

Amb. Dobrynin: Or weakness.

For. Min. Gromyko: Of a not-serious approach to a problem. If an answer is given the same day, they would be surprised.

Dr. Kissinger: Then they think they have made a bad proposal.

You’re right. They have a much more complex way of thinking than the Western.

For. Min. Gromyko: It is because for centuries and centuries their general pace of life was too slow, as far as social phenomena, in terms of technique. Slowness became the norm. It can be explained, as a subject of social philosophy.

Dr. Kissinger: We have found that almost everything the Chinese say to us in any context, even social, has some meaning. We may not know it, but looking back it has some meaning they’re trying to convey. It may not be immediately apparent, but three weeks later it all fits into a mosaic. Nothing is totally spontaneous.

For. Min. Gromyko: I think you’re right. It is our deeply implanted impression.

Dr. Kissinger: You have much longer experience with them.

For. Min. Gromyko: Suppose they stay longer and verify the text.

Dr. Kissinger: You think we’ve finished with this? All except the one on negotiations.

For. Min. Gromyko: Number 7: “Completion of the agreements should at some stage involve negotiations among the signatories.”

Dr. Kissinger: My problem is, it is a tautology. Why would we object, if they wanted to be in touch? It is not a useful statement. May I say this? Why don’t we, the U.S., say it unilaterally as an interpretive statement? I would rather state a meaningful statement.

For. Min. Gromyko: Draw a line on the paper then and have your interpretive statement.

Dr. Kissinger: “The U.S. believes that…”

For. Min. Gromyko: What is the title of this document? “A Basis for Principles?” “Basic Working Principles?”

Dr. Kissinger: All right.

For. Min. Gromyko: Basic in the sense of limited to the most important points.

Dr. Kissinger: Why don’t we copy out what we have, with the changes? [Dr. Kissinger asks Mr. Rodman to copy out the agreed language, and to coordinate with Mr. Korniyenko at the end of the meeting to conform the two sides’ texts.]

Dr. Kissinger: How about “General Working Principles?”

For. Min. Gromyko: All right.

Dr. Kissinger: How do we handle this?

For. Min. Gromyko: We are at your disposal. We prefer to handle it in a general way. It would be without formalizing it, and [the document] would be at your disposal and our disposal.

Dr. Kissinger: As far as we are concerned, it will stay in the White House.

For. Min. Gromyko: We will guard it on our side as well.

Dr. Kissinger: We do not care what you do, but it will stay in Moscow at the highest level?

For. Min. Gromyko: Yes.

Amb. Dobrynin: And in the Embassy in Washington, too.

For. Min. Gromyko: If the Minister sends it to the Embassy.

Dr. Kissinger: You put your interpretation in and we will not challenge it.

For. Min. Gromyko: Oral interpretation.

Dr. Kissinger: We are putting down point seven as our interpretation and you put this down. We will not dispute it. We will not say we disagree.

Mr. Korniyenko: Putting such a sentence means that we do not agree.

Dr. Kissinger: You gave your consideration with respect to security zone; it is incorrect for us. Withdrawal from Arab territories [point 2] does not exclude all territories. It does not imply it, but it does not exclude it.

Amb. Dobrynin: We should add the word “the.” This would underline the different interpretation.

For. Min. Gromyko: Orally you accept our interpretation and orally you do not dispute it.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand the subtle point. You say that paragraph 2 means, that the Soviet side interprets this to mean withdrawals from the Arab territories subject to considering it in context with paragraph 3. We do not dispute that this is your interpretation and we leave it open.

For. Min. Gromyko: This is the difference: we dispute the interpretation but are not disputing the context.

Dr. Kissinger: This is a terribly important point that I would like to fully discuss with the President.

There is one other point which I will confirm to the Ambassador at the first meeting; as soon as I get back to Washington I will confirm it to him. We will try to do what you propose on point 2; you are willing to leave the phrase as it is. You orally make your interpretation. There will be no written record.

For. Min. Gromyko: Right.

Dr. Kissinger: Orally, I say that I do not question your interpretation of the context. I would like to check this with the President and confirm with your Ambassador in a week.

For. Min. Gromyko: We will leave it as it is.

Dr. Kissinger: If I don’t confirm to your Ambassador, you are not bound by number 2.

Amb. Dobrynin: Or number 3 in this context.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand.

For. Min. Gromyko: We believe that your reservation is met by paragraph 3.

Dr. Kissinger: When I am back in Washington I would like to review previous exchanges on this subject, so when we do say something we can say it with confidence. I believe the combination of 2 and 3 should be satisfactory, and I consider the way you are handling paragraph 2 to be a fair way of meeting our concerns. But because it is so important, there is no sense in agreeing to it now. I would mean more to you if we accept it a week from now.

Mr. Korniyenko: The Foreign Minister is saying that the content of this phrase means the Arab territories.

For. Min. Gromyko: “All.”

Dr. Kissinger: “The.” I understand the content the Foreign Minister is giving this principle, and I do not contest it.

For. Min. Gromyko: Meanwhile we will leave the second and third points as they are without any revisions.

Dr. Kissinger: Plus this oral exchange.

For. Min. Gromyko: The third is as agreed. Yes. We will have further discussion.

[Dr. Kissinger reads through the principles.]

When I go back I will say that there are no secret agreements.

For. Min. Gromyko: We agree.

Dr. Kissinger: You will keep it as we discussed. You will not discuss it with Egypt.

For. Min. Gromyko: Right.

[The Foreign Minister and Dr. Kissinger then adjourned to the Foreign Minister’s private office for an extended discussion. It was 11:55 p.m.

[In the meantime, Mr. Korniyenko, the Ambassador, and Mr. Rodman went over the “general working principles” to produce an agreed text. There was a dispute over point 6: Dr. Kissinger in the meeting had added, “This [freedom of navigation] can be achieved without impairing Egyptian sovereignty over the Canal.” Mr. Korniyenko suggested, “Should be achieved.” Mr. Rodman argued that this changed the meaning. Mr. Korniyenko and the Ambassador claimed that it did not. Mr. Rodman suggested they raise it with Dr. Kissinger and the Foreign Minister.

[When Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Gromyko emerged, Dr. Kissinger insisted that Mr. Korniyenko’s suggestion changed the meaning completely. The sentence was meant as a statement of fact, not as a statement of an objective. When Dr. Kissinger finished, the Foreign Minister—rather quickly—suggested “This is fully consistent with Egyptian sovereignty over the Canal.” This was immediately agreed.

[The “conformed [confirmed?] text” of the “general working principles” as finally agreed upon is at Tab C.]

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 73, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Mr. Kissinger’s Conversations in Moscow, May 1972. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The meeting was held in the Conference Room of the Foreign Minister’s Office at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
2. All brackets in the source text.
3. The tabs are attached but not printed.
4. See footnote 3, Document 54.
5. The attachment at Tab B is entitled “Working Outline for Future Discussions.” Tab C is entitled “General Working Principles” and a handwritten notation reading: “Confirmed text—evening of 28 May 1972” indicates that the paper was confirmed following this meeting.
6. The second point in the “Working Outline” reads: “The agreement should contain provisions for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Arab territories occupied in 1967.”
7. Point 3 reads: “Border changes should not be based on the principle of annexation but of security. They should result from agreement among the parties.”
8. Point 4 reads: “Arrangements for security should include demilitarized zones and the most effective international guarantees.”
9. The revised version of point 6 in Tab C adds the sentence: “This is fully consistent with Egyptian sovereignty over the Canal.”
10. The revised paper at Tab C has a sentence reading: “The US position is that completion of the agreements should at some stage involve negotiations among the signatories.” as an addendum.
11. Point 4 in the revised text reads: “Mutual arrangements for security could include demilitarized zones, the temporary stationing of UN personnel at Sharm el-Sheikh, and the most effective international guarantees with the appropriate participation of the Soviet Union and the United States.”
12. The revised paper includes as Point 8: “The problem of the Palestinian refugees should be solved on a just basis and in accordance with the appropriate UN decisions. (Reserved by the US side).”
13. Point 7 in the revised paper reads: “Recognition of the independence and sovereignty of all states in the Middle East, including Israeli, is one of the basic principles on which the settlement must be based.”
14. June 4.