Summit in the Balance: U.S.-Soviet Relations and the Decision to Mine Haiphong, April 26–May 12, 1972


173. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 718, Country Files, Europe, USSR, XXI–A, April 1972 (continued). Secret; Eyes Only; Outside the System. Sent for immediate action. Kissinger initialed approval of both decisions. Attached to an April 29 memorandum from Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, was David’s statement as approved on April 29 and text of a statement authorizing Science Adviser to the President Edward David to engage in discussion in Moscow. (Ibid.) Other bilateral issues are assessed in memoranda from Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger of April 26 (on natural gas) and of April 29 (on Lend-Lease repayment). (Both ibid.) Attached to a memorandum from NSC staff secretary Jeanne Davis to Eliot, May 23, is an April 27 memorandum from Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, on nuclear fuel supply policy. (Ibid., Box 719, Country File, Europe, USSR, Vol. XXII, May 1972)


175. Memorandum From President Nixon to his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President’s Personal Files, Box 3, Memoranda from the President, Memos—April 1972. No classification marking. The memorandum is unsigned. A notation in Nixon’s handwriting on a draft of this memorandum reads: “OK. Retype as modified & send to Kissinger today. RN.” (Ibid.)


177. Memorandum From Winston Lord of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 74, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Moscow Summit 1972 [2 of 2]. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for information. The city of Quang Tri, the capital of South Vietnam’s northernmost province by the same name, fell to the NVA on May 1. The deliberations on the ramifications of this defeat are in the minutes of the May 1 WSAG meeting. (Ibid., NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–116, WSAG Minutes, Originals)


180. Conversation Among President Nixon, Secretary of State Rogers and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 716–2. No classification marking. According to his Daily Diary, Nixon met with Rogers and Kissinger in the Oval Office from 4:11 to 5:29 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files) The editors transcribed the portion of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume.


181. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Nixon

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 485, President’s Trip Files, Issues/Papers, USSR IV, (Part I)—The President. No classification marking. A notation on the letter reads: “Handed to Gen. Haig by Minister Voronstov, 4:15 p.m., 5/1/72.” In his memoirs Nixon wrote: “On May 1, the day Kissinger was to leave for Paris, I received a letter from Brezhnev that increased my fear that we had failed to impress upon the Soviet leadership my unshakable determination to stand up in Vietnam. Brezhnev bluntly asked me to refrain from further actions there because they hurt the chances of a successful summit.” See RN: Memoirs, p. 594. Kissinger also commented upon the message in his memoirs: “On May 1, Brezhnev wrote to Nixon suggesting that prospects for negotiations would improve if we exercised restraint. This was damaged merchandise, it was exactly the same argument used to obtain the bombing halt in 1968, but a bit shopworn after 147 fruitless plenary sessions. Brezhnev, trying a little linkage in reverse, suggested that such a course would also enhance the prospects for the summit. “Nixon saw in the letter a confirmation of all his suspicions that Hanoi and Moscow were in collusion. To me, however, Brezhnev’s intervention seemed no more than standard rhetoric. His letter made no threat; it spoke of the impact of bombing on the ‘atmosphere’ of the summit; it made no hint at cancellation. Since I was leaving that evening for Paris, it was idle to speculate. Our course would have to turn on Le Duc Tho’s attitude, not on what the Soviets said.” (White House Years, pp. 1168–1169)


182. Conversation Among President Nixon, Secretary of State Rogers, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and White House Chief of Staff (Haldeman)

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 716–4. No classification marking. According to his Daily Diary, Nixon met with Rogers, Kissinger, and Haldeman in the Oval Office from 6:01 to 6:47 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files) The editors transcribed the portion of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume.


184. Conversation Between President Nixon and his Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 717–10. No classification marking. According to his Daily Diary, Nixon met with Haig in the Oval Office from 11:27 a.m. to 12:08 p.m. The editors transcribed the portion of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume.


185. Conversation Between President Nixon and his Chief of Staff (Haldeman)

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 717–19. No classification marking. According to his Daily Diary, Nixon met with Haldeman in the Oval Office from 12:08 to 12:42 p.m. The editors transcribed the portion of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume.


186. Conversation Between President Nixon and his Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 717–20. No classification marking. According to his Daily Diary, Nixon met with Haig in the Oval Office from 12:42 to 1:20 p.m. The editors transcribed the portion of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume.


187. Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 718–9. No classification marking. According to his Daily Diary, Nixon met with Kissinger in the Oval Office from 10:59 to 12:11 p.m. The editors transcribed the portion of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume.


189. Conversation Between President Nixon and his Chief of Staff (Haldeman)

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 718–4. No classification marking. According to his Daily Diary, Nixon met with Haldeman in the Oval Office from 10:02 to 10:50 a.m. The editors transcribed the portion of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume.


190. Letter From President Nixon to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 494, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1972, Vol. 2. Top Secret. The letter is unsigned. An attached covering note, May 25, reads: “Peter—Did the attached letter to Brezhnev from the President go in the attached form (as a double-spaced draft with no signature)? HAK met with Dobrynin from 9:45 to 9:57 a.m. on May 3, in the White House Map Room. [No Memcon]—Wilma.” The word “yes” in an unknown hand is written on this covering note. An attached note at the top of the letter reads: “Handed to D. by K., 5–3–72, 9:45 a.m. Map Room.” No other record of this meeting has been found. In his memoirs Kissinger noted: “Our first move was to warn the Soviet leaders that grave decisions were impending. On May 3 a Presidential letter, drafted by Sonnenfeldt, Lord, and me, was sent to Brezhnev informing him of my fruitless meeting with Le Duc Tho. It seemed to us, the letter told Brezhnev, that Hanoi was attempting to force us to accept terms tantamount to surrender. We would not permit this.” (White House Years, p. 1176)


191. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and President Nixon

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 372, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking.


193. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1330, NSC Unfiled Material, 1972, 5 of 8. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only.


194. Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 719–4. No classification marking. According to his Daily Diary, Nixon met with Kissinger in the Oval Office from 9:35 to 9:59 a.m. The editors transcribed the portion of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume.


196. Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 720–4. No classification marking. According to his Daily Diary, Nixon met with Kissinger in the Oval Office from 9:14 to 10:09 a.m. The editors transcribed the portion of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume.


198. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 372, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking. The President was at Camp David; Kissinger was in Washington.


199. Memorandum for the Record

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Office Files, Box 146, 1972 Offensive—Misc. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room.


200. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Nixon

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 494, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1972, Vol. 2. No classification marking. Translated by the Soviet Embassy from a Russian version, also attached but not printed. Also attached is a reworking of specific points in a redraft of the Basic Principles. Notations on both the letter and the attachment read: “Handed to Dr. Kissinger by Amb. D, 5/6/72, 5:30 p.m.” Dobrynin called Kissinger at 4:05 p.m. that day to inform him of receipt of this letter and to schedule an appointment with Kissinger. (Transcript of telephone conversation between Kissinger and Dobrynin, May 6, 4:05 p.m.; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 372, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File) According to the transcript of a telephone conversation at 5:05 p.m. on May 6, Nixon instructed Kissinger to “be just cold turkey”; to simply receive the message and not engage in any discussion about it or related issues with Dobrynin. (Ibid.) As noted in his Record of Schedule, Kissinger met with Dobrynin in the Map Room of the White House from 5:20 to 5:45 p.m. (Ibid., Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–1976) According to the transcript of a telephone conversation between Kissinger and Nixon at 5:45 p.m. that evening, Kissinger made the following report on the meeting: “Now, I got that message from Dobrynin and it’s nothing. It is a very friendly letter to you from Brezhnev.” Kissinger further described this note from Brezhnev as being “a good reply” and “a soft reply.” (Ibid., Box 372, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File) In his memoirs Kissinger described the letter as “a letter distinguished by its near irrelevance to the real situation.” He also noted that “Brezhnev’s letter served only to reinforce our determination.” (White House Years, p. 1182)