First, as the President mentioned last night, we might wish to consider a
blockade of North Vietnamese ports without bombing the Hanoi/Haiphong
complex, but by expanding our bombing efforts to include interdiction as
far south as possible of the rail lines from China. We might inform the
Soviets that this is the only way—given North Vietnamese
intransigence—that a Summit would be possible and point out to them that
our only other alternative would be the cancellation of the Summit, or a
postponement of the Summit and the most stringent aerial activity.
The second would be a tougher version of the first option, but this would
cost us the Summit. It would be premised on the theory that we want to
apply maximum conceivable military pressure on Hanoi in an effort to
break their back. This would involve announcement of the postponement of
the Summit in softest terms, announcement of the establishment of a
blockade while avoiding bombing the Hanoi/Haiphong area, but at the same
time to extend our bombing to interdict to the degree possible the
communication routes leading from China to North Vietnam.
Attachment
Memorandum From Helmut
Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council
Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Kissinger)2
SUBJECT
The attached paper, as you requested, examines probable Soviet
reactions to a unilateral postponement by us of the summit as well
as the considerations, pro and con, of an agreed postponement. I
have set it up as a memorandum from you to the President,3 in case you want to forward it.
Meanwhile, I have also thought of some ways of going through with the
summit. The underlying assumption for all options—postponement as
well as going ahead—is that the trend in the fighting in the South
has not been fundamentally reversed by the time of the summit and
that we are engaged in major air and naval actions against the
North, perhaps including strikes against Haiphong and Hanoi. This last assumption is, in my view, crucial to
all options, but especially to those that involve going through
with the summit.
All options carry the risk that the Soviets will pre-empt with a
postponement or even cancellation of their own. It is hard to judge
whether this risk is greater for the postponement options or for the
going-ahead options. In the former cases, Brezhnev may want to grab the
initiative to demonstrate his “control” of events to all his various
audiences. In the latter cases, given heavy US attacks on the North, he may find the situation
“morally” tolerable—again, partly for domestic reasons and partly
for international communist and prestige reasons.
My net judgment, however, remains that
Brezhnev has so much
riding on the summit—and on the German treaties, which would almost
certainly go down the drain with the summit—that he will prefer to keep the summit alive. From his
side this argues for (1) accepting postponement, if proposed by us,
or (2) going ahead, if we are prepared to do so.
[Page 731]
Analytically, we must distinguish in our minds between on the one
hand the maneuvering in the pre-summit period and around a
postponement effort and, on the other, the situation that exists if
a summit is actually held.
I will now briefly discuss two ways of holding the summit, assuming we get that far. I repeat, the
underlying assumption is that we are acting vigorously against the
North. That is the only way we can go to Moscow
from strength.
1. A Stripped-Down Summit.
Here we would cut down the length of the visit, say to three days; we
would reduce all ceremony to an absolute minimum; we would make it a
working visit, with the entourage stripped down accordingly (no
wives, for example).
This would be a sort of deglamorized, crisis summit, where two great
powers would work responsibly on those areas that are clearly of
mutual interest (pre-eminently, SALT). At the same time, based on his strong military
actions against the North, then in progress, the President would
turn the heat on Brezhnev in
regard to Vietnam. He would withhold affirmative action on economic
concessions on the grounds that these would not be understood (or,
in the case of MFN pass through
Congress) while Soviet arms fuel the DRV offensive.
A stripped-down summit would lessen some of the elements of
incongruity, indeed hypocrisy, of having the President cavort with
the Soviet leaders, toast friendship, issue joint principles, etc.
While the war goes on in Vietnam. These aspects might also make such
a summit more appealing to the Soviets.
To have a determined, business-like President go to Moscow in the
midst of crisis would make him look less like going there at any
price. The fact that some important business had been transacted
would act as a regulator of domestic US reactions to what is happening in Vietnam—perhaps
more than a postponement which could become a cancellation. It may
also act as a regulator on wild Soviet responses to our actions in
Vietnam.
The major risk is that Brezhnev would try to humiliate the President (true
under any going-ahead option). He could send the President packing
after three or four days with no or only a few accomplishments,
while the Vietnam situation deteriorates and the Soviets continue
doing their “socialist duty” to the DRV.
Even if Brezhnev did not take
this course, the difficulties could come later, as the situation
deteriorates in Vietnam and we may find “compromises” (involving
withdrawal and a coalition in Saigon) more attractive. At that
point, the Moscow trip will look at best futile and at worst like a
deal wherein we agreed to get out of Vietnam for the sake
[Page 732]
of good US-Soviet relations. The Soviets would
claim part of the credit for Communist victory in Vietnam and on top
of it have the benefits of US-Soviet
détente.
2. A “Cynical” Summit.
Here we would go ahead as planned. We would say that we accept the
Soviet position that disturbances like Vietnam (and India–Pakistan)
should not get in the way of better US-Soviet relations, which are fundamental to the peace
of the world.
But we would still try to go from strength, accentuating this point
by, in effect, having the President run the war against the DRV from Moscow for eight days. (A
couple of generals in the entourage and a command-post aircraft at
the airfield would underline the point.)
The image that we would project would be one of having cool nerves,
of being reasonable in regard to anything bearing on US-Soviet relations but wild when it
comes to Vietnam. The President would trade on his reputation of
“unpredictability”: showing Saigon that he is not selling it out;
implying to Hanoi that Moscow is colluding in our assault against
the North; telling Moscow that we can play the same game of
“compartmentalization” as the Soviets, when it suits our
purposes.
The risks here are much as in the previous
case. Moreover, the problem of the disparity between the symbolism
of US-Soviet cooperation and the
reality of proxy-war in Vietnam would be even greater than in the
“stripped-down” case.
