This is a comprehensive examination of the significance of the Soviet
military force now deployed opposite China. Its major conclusions are as
follows:
Tab A3
Washington, October 1970.
Intelligence Report
THE SOVIET MILITARY BUILDUP ON THE SINO-SOVIET
BORDER
Summary
Since 1965 the Soviets have tripled their ground forces opposite
China. There are now some 37 to 41 Soviet ground force divisions
[Page 678]
deployed in the border
area, about 6 of which are fully combat ready. All of the others
have one or more subordinate regiments with sufficient strength to
undertake combat missions. About 210,000 troops are deployed with
these divisions, and nondivisional support elements bring the total
to about 335,000 men. The buildup is continuing.
In 1965, when the buildup was initiated, there were only 11 or 12
divisions in the border area, and only one of these was at combat
strength. All of the others were understrength and some were only
cadre divisions.
Over the same period tactical air forces have increased from a single
air army of 190 combat aircraft and about 40 helicopters deployed in
the Vladivostok area to at least 725 combat aircraft and 300
helicopters deployed along the entire border.
Soviet strategic air defenses in the border area also have been
improved in recent years, but most of this probably would have taken
place even if there had been no rift with China. Most of the new
missile and aircraft deployment probably results from a continuing
program to strengthen air defenses throughout the USSR.
Three operational units of the 500 nautical mile Scaleboard
surface-to-surface missile system—the only confirmed units in the
USSR—have been deployed near
the border since 1967.
Strategic ballistic missile and bomber forces have not undergone any
major changes that can be attributed to the confrontation with
China, other than some command and control adjustments.
The Soviet ground and tactical air forces in the border area are
deployed in two essentially separate operational theaters. Most of
these forces—29 to 33 divisions and nearly 700 aircraft—are located
opposite northeast China in the Trans-Baikal and the Far East
Military Districts and in Mongolia. The other 8 divisions and about
35 aircraft are deployed in the newly formed Central Asian Military
District opposite Sinkiang.
There are, in addition, 4 divisions in the Siberian Military District
and 6 in the Turkestan Military District which probably are
available as reinforcements for the border area. These are located
in remote areas, and except for an airborne division in Turkestan,
all are at low strength. Only one, a cadre division moved into the
Siberian Military District in 1969, has undergone any change since
the buildup began in 1965. These divisions are not believed to be
currently available for early commitment.
Other reinforcements could be obtained by redeploying divisions from
the western military districts. Depending on the readiness level of
the divisions to be moved and the distance to be traveled, divisions
could begin arriving in the border area 10 to 17 days after the
Soviets decided to reinforce.
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The 37 to 41 division force structure which the Soviets have
developed opposite China now exceeds what would be required to
repulse any foreseeable Chinese incursion. The present force could
probably also carry out large scale raids in the border regions of
China, but in view of their underdeveloped service support structure
they could probably not occupy and defend a significant amount of
Chinese territory.
With the divisions filled out to combat strength, however, and
provided with normal army and front level support, the Soviets would
be capable of large scale offensive operations for objectives in the
peripheral regions of China. Such a force would have about 570,000
troops, 8,200 tanks, at least 5,400 conventional artillery pieces,
and some 250 missile and rocket launchers for direct nuclear
support.
With their present air forces the Soviets probably could quickly
establish air superiority in the peripheral regions of China. This
would enable them to provide massive support to the ground forces
with tactical air and medium bomber forces.
Under these circumstances, the full strength Soviet force probably
could seize and occupy sizable portions of territory, including
Manchuria, the eastern part of Inner Mongolia, and the Dzungarian
Basin in Sinkiang, using only conventional weapons. The Soviets
would probably refrain from the use of tactical nuclear weapons
unless it appeared necessary for the achievement of their military
objectives.
To date, however, there is no persuasive evidence of a Soviet intent
to commit deliberate aggression against China. The forces now in
being are not ready to undertake protracted large scale offensive
operations. Were the Soviets planning to initiate a deliberate
aggression there would be a concerted effort to fill out existing
understrength divisions and nondivisional support units such as
artillery, engineer, ponton bridge, and assault crossing units. In
addition, some tactical missile units probably would be redeployed
from other areas. There would also be a heavy influx of trucks to
provide both divisional and rear service motor transport.
To bring the forces in the border area to full combat readiness,
reservists and civilian trucks would have to be transported from
centers in the central and western USSR to supplement those obtained from local
mobilization. The Soviets have the resources and transportation
facilities to accomplish this in about three weeks.
The availability of stocks of ammunition, POL, and general supplies
in the border area is not known. Because the forces opposite China
are located at the end of long and, in some areas, vulnerable supply
lines, the Soviets probably have made some effort to develop their
logistical base in the area. If the current rate of military traffic
on the Trans-Siberian Railroad has been maintained throughout the
force
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buildup, the Soviets
could have provided the troops now in place with stocks of
ammunition and POL sufficient for 90 days of combat. Unless it is
interdicted, the Trans-Siberian Railroad has ample excess capacity
to supply the daily tonnage of supplies needed to support the
present force in combat without seriously reducing civilian
traffic.
The fact that the force is still not fully combat ready after five
years of buildup suggests that the immediate objective of the Soviet
buildup was not to initiate hostilities against the Chinese. The
pace of the buildup may have been limited by a Soviet desire to
avoid drawing down forces opposite NATO or straining the civilian economy.
The personnel and equipment strengths of the developing divisions in
the border area continue to increase gradually. Some divisions
probably will reach combat readiness during the next year or so.
Others may stabilize at less than combat strength. This would be
consistent with the manner in which the Soviets have structured
their forces in the USSR intended
for use against NATO, where only
about one-third of the divisions are kept at combat readiness during
peacetime.
If the Soviets should follow this practice with the forces in the
border area, it would suggest that they believe that the time it
would take the relatively immobile Chinese forces to mount a serious
threat would permit the Soviet forces in the border area to be
filled out with reservists and mobilized civilian trucks.
Conversely, if the Soviets continue working to bring all the forces
to full combat readiness, it would indicate that they believe a
large scale conflict could break out suddenly with little warning.
This would reflect a more serious view of the Chinese threat than is
now apparent, or it could mean that they were contemplating the
initiation of offensive action themselves.
The Soviets probably had several objectives in undertaking the
military buildup opposite China. One objective—already realized—may
have been to set the stage for the Sino-Soviet discussions on border
issues. The Soviets probably calculate that the possession of a
credible land war threat near the China border will enhance their
ability to influence events in China after the death of Mao. In
addition, of course, the buildup has—from the Soviet viewpoint—put
the damper on any inclination the Chinese may have to launch
military forays against Soviet territory. From the standpoint of
providing security for Soviet territory, the forces near the China
border are not excessive when compared with Soviet forces located
opposite other potential enemies.
The pattern of the buildup to date suggests that the Soviets are
developing a force structure of at least 3 and possibly 4 army
groups (potential fronts)—two or three opposite Manchuria and one
opposite Sinkiang. This would imply a force of 42 to 48 divisions
and 900 to 1,000 aircraft. At full strength, this force would have
about 780,000
[Page 681]
troops. Such
a force would probably still not enable the Soviets to carry a
conventional land war against China beyond the peripheral regions.
It would, however, provide the Soviets with a capability to respond
to the initiation of hostilities on a level of their own choosing,
up to and including an attack to seize and hold indefinitely the
most important peripheral regions of China such as Manchuria, Inner
Mongolia, or large parts of Sinkiang.
[Here follows the table of contents and the body of the report with
annexes and illustrations.]
