227. Memorandum From Thomas Latimer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1

SUBJECT

  • CIA’s Memo2 on the Soviet Buildup on the Sino-Soviet Border

This is a comprehensive examination of the significance of the Soviet military force now deployed opposite China. Its major conclusions are as follows:

  • —The 37 to 41 division force structure which the Soviets have developed opposite China now exceeds what would be required to repulse any foreseeable Chinese incursion.
  • —The present Soviet force could probably carry out large scale raids in the border regions of China but in view of their underdeveloped [Page 677] service support structure they could probably not occupy and defend a significant amount of Chinese territory.
  • —With the divisions filled out to combat strength, a process which would take about three weeks, and provided with normal army and front level support, the Soviets would be capable of large scale offensive operations in the peripheral regions of China. Under these circumstances, the full strength Soviet force probably could seize and occupy sizable portions of territory, including Manchuria, the eastern part of Inner Mongolia, and the Dzungarian Basin in Sinkiang, using only conventional weapons.
  • —To date, there is no persuasive evidence of a Soviet intent to commit deliberate aggression against China. The forces now in being are not ready to undertake protracted large scale offensive operations. Were the Soviets planning to initiate a deliberate aggression, there would be a concerted effort to fill out existing understrength divisions and support units. In addition, some tactical missile units probably would be redeployed from other areas.

The CIA memorandum states that the Soviets probably had several objectives in undertaking the buildup. One objective, already realized, may have been to set the stage for discussions on the border. The Soviets also probably calculated that a credible land war threat near the China border will enhance their ability to influence events in China after the death of Mao. In addition, of course, the buildup has—from the Soviet viewpoint—put the damper on any inclination the Chinese may have to launch military forays against Soviet territory. From the standpoint of providing security for Soviet territory, the forces near the China border are not excessive when compared with Soviet forces located opposite other potential enemies.

Tab A3

Intelligence Report

THE SOVIET MILITARY BUILDUP ON THE SINO-SOVIET BORDER

Summary

Since 1965 the Soviets have tripled their ground forces opposite China. There are now some 37 to 41 Soviet ground force divisions [Page 678] deployed in the border area, about 6 of which are fully combat ready. All of the others have one or more subordinate regiments with sufficient strength to undertake combat missions. About 210,000 troops are deployed with these divisions, and nondivisional support elements bring the total to about 335,000 men. The buildup is continuing.

In 1965, when the buildup was initiated, there were only 11 or 12 divisions in the border area, and only one of these was at combat strength. All of the others were understrength and some were only cadre divisions.

Over the same period tactical air forces have increased from a single air army of 190 combat aircraft and about 40 helicopters deployed in the Vladivostok area to at least 725 combat aircraft and 300 helicopters deployed along the entire border.

Soviet strategic air defenses in the border area also have been improved in recent years, but most of this probably would have taken place even if there had been no rift with China. Most of the new missile and aircraft deployment probably results from a continuing program to strengthen air defenses throughout the USSR.

Three operational units of the 500 nautical mile Scaleboard surface-to-surface missile system—the only confirmed units in the USSR—have been deployed near the border since 1967.

Strategic ballistic missile and bomber forces have not undergone any major changes that can be attributed to the confrontation with China, other than some command and control adjustments.

The Soviet ground and tactical air forces in the border area are deployed in two essentially separate operational theaters. Most of these forces—29 to 33 divisions and nearly 700 aircraft—are located opposite northeast China in the Trans-Baikal and the Far East Military Districts and in Mongolia. The other 8 divisions and about 35 aircraft are deployed in the newly formed Central Asian Military District opposite Sinkiang.

There are, in addition, 4 divisions in the Siberian Military District and 6 in the Turkestan Military District which probably are available as reinforcements for the border area. These are located in remote areas, and except for an airborne division in Turkestan, all are at low strength. Only one, a cadre division moved into the Siberian Military District in 1969, has undergone any change since the buildup began in 1965. These divisions are not believed to be currently available for early commitment.

Other reinforcements could be obtained by redeploying divisions from the western military districts. Depending on the readiness level of the divisions to be moved and the distance to be traveled, divisions could begin arriving in the border area 10 to 17 days after the Soviets decided to reinforce.

[Page 679]

The 37 to 41 division force structure which the Soviets have developed opposite China now exceeds what would be required to repulse any foreseeable Chinese incursion. The present force could probably also carry out large scale raids in the border regions of China, but in view of their underdeveloped service support structure they could probably not occupy and defend a significant amount of Chinese territory.

With the divisions filled out to combat strength, however, and provided with normal army and front level support, the Soviets would be capable of large scale offensive operations for objectives in the peripheral regions of China. Such a force would have about 570,000 troops, 8,200 tanks, at least 5,400 conventional artillery pieces, and some 250 missile and rocket launchers for direct nuclear support.

With their present air forces the Soviets probably could quickly establish air superiority in the peripheral regions of China. This would enable them to provide massive support to the ground forces with tactical air and medium bomber forces.

Under these circumstances, the full strength Soviet force probably could seize and occupy sizable portions of territory, including Manchuria, the eastern part of Inner Mongolia, and the Dzungarian Basin in Sinkiang, using only conventional weapons. The Soviets would probably refrain from the use of tactical nuclear weapons unless it appeared necessary for the achievement of their military objectives.

To date, however, there is no persuasive evidence of a Soviet intent to commit deliberate aggression against China. The forces now in being are not ready to undertake protracted large scale offensive operations. Were the Soviets planning to initiate a deliberate aggression there would be a concerted effort to fill out existing understrength divisions and nondivisional support units such as artillery, engineer, ponton bridge, and assault crossing units. In addition, some tactical missile units probably would be redeployed from other areas. There would also be a heavy influx of trucks to provide both divisional and rear service motor transport.

To bring the forces in the border area to full combat readiness, reservists and civilian trucks would have to be transported from centers in the central and western USSR to supplement those obtained from local mobilization. The Soviets have the resources and transportation facilities to accomplish this in about three weeks.

The availability of stocks of ammunition, POL, and general supplies in the border area is not known. Because the forces opposite China are located at the end of long and, in some areas, vulnerable supply lines, the Soviets probably have made some effort to develop their logistical base in the area. If the current rate of military traffic on the Trans-Siberian Railroad has been maintained throughout the force [Page 680] buildup, the Soviets could have provided the troops now in place with stocks of ammunition and POL sufficient for 90 days of combat. Unless it is interdicted, the Trans-Siberian Railroad has ample excess capacity to supply the daily tonnage of supplies needed to support the present force in combat without seriously reducing civilian traffic.

The fact that the force is still not fully combat ready after five years of buildup suggests that the immediate objective of the Soviet buildup was not to initiate hostilities against the Chinese. The pace of the buildup may have been limited by a Soviet desire to avoid drawing down forces opposite NATO or straining the civilian economy.

The personnel and equipment strengths of the developing divisions in the border area continue to increase gradually. Some divisions probably will reach combat readiness during the next year or so. Others may stabilize at less than combat strength. This would be consistent with the manner in which the Soviets have structured their forces in the USSR intended for use against NATO, where only about one-third of the divisions are kept at combat readiness during peacetime.

If the Soviets should follow this practice with the forces in the border area, it would suggest that they believe that the time it would take the relatively immobile Chinese forces to mount a serious threat would permit the Soviet forces in the border area to be filled out with reservists and mobilized civilian trucks.

Conversely, if the Soviets continue working to bring all the forces to full combat readiness, it would indicate that they believe a large scale conflict could break out suddenly with little warning. This would reflect a more serious view of the Chinese threat than is now apparent, or it could mean that they were contemplating the initiation of offensive action themselves.

The Soviets probably had several objectives in undertaking the military buildup opposite China. One objective—already realized—may have been to set the stage for the Sino-Soviet discussions on border issues. The Soviets probably calculate that the possession of a credible land war threat near the China border will enhance their ability to influence events in China after the death of Mao. In addition, of course, the buildup has—from the Soviet viewpoint—put the damper on any inclination the Chinese may have to launch military forays against Soviet territory. From the standpoint of providing security for Soviet territory, the forces near the China border are not excessive when compared with Soviet forces located opposite other potential enemies.

The pattern of the buildup to date suggests that the Soviets are developing a force structure of at least 3 and possibly 4 army groups (potential fronts)—two or three opposite Manchuria and one opposite Sinkiang. This would imply a force of 42 to 48 divisions and 900 to 1,000 aircraft. At full strength, this force would have about 780,000 [Page 681] troops. Such a force would probably still not enable the Soviets to carry a conventional land war against China beyond the peripheral regions. It would, however, provide the Soviets with a capability to respond to the initiation of hostilities on a level of their own choosing, up to and including an attack to seize and hold indefinitely the most important peripheral regions of China such as Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, or large parts of Sinkiang.

[Here follows the table of contents and the body of the report with annexes and illustrations.]

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 713, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. IX. Top Secret; Sensitive; Contains Codeword. Latimer handwrote “action” at the top of the memorandum. The memorandum bears Kissinger’s initials and the handwritten comment, “Tell Helms excellent job.” On October 28, La-timer sent Kissinger this paper and a similar report prepared by DOD (see footnote 2, Document 210) under a cover memorandum that bears Kissinger’s handwritten remark, “Sum up both memos for Pres[ident] as info.” (Ibid.)
  2. An attached cover memorandum to the CIA report indicates that the paper is a response to Kissinger’s request, September 21, for a study on the Sino-Soviet border dispute. (Ibid.) For Kissinger’s request, see Document 209.
  3. Top Secret; Ruff; Umbra; Handle via Talent–Keyhole–Comint Control Systems Jointly. According to a footnote in the source text: “Note: This report was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Strategic Research and coordinated with the Offices of Basic and Geographic Intelligence, Current Intelligence, and Economic Research.”