Office of the Historian

288. Message From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Sullivan) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1

Paris, January 17, 1973, 2059Z.
1.
You have asked for my views on Hanoi trip. Following are preliminary thoughts:
2.
DRV (and especially Le Duc Tho) obviously place great store by this trip. In good Vietnamese fashion, we should examine what they want and what we can get in return.
3.
They obviously want:
(A)
Reparations, which they are willing to call reconstruction aid.
(B)
Conspicuous U.S. presence, which they can use to flaunt in faces of USSR and PRC for advantage.
4.
In these circumstances, we examine what we want. In a strategic sense, this is clear, and our approach is designed to reinforce it. In tactical sense, two things come to mind:
(A)
U.S. prisoners
(B)
cease-fire in Laos
5.
Both these thoughts arise from time schedule for visit, which will end approximately 15 days after signature of agreement. First tranche of POW releases is due at this time and also cease-fire in Laos.
6.
Therefore, I suggest, before you firm up your schedule with Le Duc Tho, you say that you wish the first tranche of U.S. prisoners to leave Hanoi by U.S. medevac aircraft immediately prior to your takeoff from Hanoi on February 11. (I haven’t yet figured the camera angle for you). Secondly, you say that you will fly to Vientiane and wish the cease-fire to take effect there shortly before your arrival. (I’m thinking of little round-heeled girls spreading flower petals before you as you descend from the airplane.)
7.
All PR jazz aside, these are two thoroughly comprehensible byproducts for Le Duc Tho’s mentality to grant you and will confirm his general view of the way to do business in the Western world, a view he is too old to change.
8.
As far as the restrictions we earlier placed on arrival, photography, etc. I think they will be superseded by fact we are no longer creating a surprise event. Therefore, only restrictions should be against our exploitation in “victory celebration.”
9.
As for general cradle in which to place this trip, I feel it should be a sort of promenade by the creator to see what he hath wrought. Hence, first to Saigon, then to Hanoi, next to Bangkok, on to Phnom Penh, return to Saigon, and home via Seoul. Bunker, however, should be absolutely certain you will get dinner or lunch and appropriate courtesies from Thieu during your first visit. Otherwise, you will visit only after rpt after Hanoi.
10.
If you agree with this scenario, greatest caution should be against any inference that we are paying ransom to get prisoners out. Hence, total embargo against any public statements about January 30 note2 or subsequent discussions in Hanoi until subsequent meetings of experts (demons?) to establish U.S.–DRV joint economic commission.
11.
Warm regards.
  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 119, Country Files, Far East, Vietnam Negotiations, Ambassador Porter’s File—Paris, June 1972–January 1973. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent via Guay and Scowcroft.↩
  2. Sullivan was referring to the proposed U.S. note to the DRV on reconstruction aid. See Document 274.↩