Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume IX, Vietnam, October 1972–January 1973

217. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Moorer) and the Deputy Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Vogt)¹

December 22, 1972, 8:26 a.m.

0826—Secure Telecon/Outgoing—Gen Vogt, USAF

CJCS—How did things go last night—or during the last period?

Vogt—We had a mission today at 1500. The weather was overcast and we had went in on LORAN and we used 60 strike sorties all done on LORAN on the Bac Yen and Viet Tri rail yards we had no losses and we shot down one MIG.²

CJCS—Good, excellent.

Vogt—I have had the photography in from the TACAIR recce and we looked at the Hanoi Prison area. There has been no bomb damage in the prison yard.³ I think all you can see are big craters in the RR yard there was a large secondary explosion, however, which scattered quite a bit of shrapnel and debris probably through several blocks, including the Egyptian Embassy which is only 115 meters from the rail yard. There is no bomb damage that we can find on the Egyptian Embassy and we cannot find any bomb damage in the Cuban Embassy. However, there was quite a bit of glass and shrapnel from the exploding of a large secondary in the rail yard and we are going to have to get a better photograph (maybe from our drone photography today) to see the full extent of any secondary explosions and damage. I am certain there is no damage in the Hanoi Prison as the enemy is claiming.

CJCS—That’s wonderful, okay, John.

Vogt—When we realign the photograph which we’ll get in and we’ll let you know anything that’ll cause you problems.

CJCS—How about the Power Plant, have you gotten any photograph of the TPP …

Vogt—What have you done to this phone, Admiral?

CJCS—It’s your fault. You say you were going to let me know if you had any problems. I was asking you did you get any pictures of the TPP?

Vogt—Yes, we had a recce airplane over the TPP but there were heavy clouds cover so we were not able to get any pictures of it.

CJCS—You didn’t get a chance to go for all the other power plants last night?

Vogt—They are scheduled today (middle of the day) with lasers on them. When they got in there they found the weather solid overcast so they were not able to bomb the power plant and the LORAN strikes off of those 3 marshalling yards, Kep Bac Yen and Viet Tri.

CJCS—I got that. What I want to do (I’ll call you I know you are about ready to go to bed) if you’ll think about this a little bit because what you think we ought to do next week. They are going to have a Standdown for 30 hours.

Vogt—Christmas?

CJCS—Yes, and New Year’s. I just talked to Laird about that and I don’t think too much of the idea. Nevertheless they decided to do it but we are not going to announce it. We are going to wait until it is over and the operations have resumed after the standdown for the holidays and they propose to handle the public affairs that way. Tell Freddie⁴ that it will begin 1800 the evening of Christmas Eve.

Vogt—1800.

CJCS—And it’ll end about midnight Christmas night and it would probably have to adjust that one hour because Saigon and Hanoi got different times and we don’t want to hit Hanoi on Christmas Day. That is the idea, but anyway, I am writing up a message right now and we are not announcing it so we want to hold it close. We are not going to announce it here until after it is over and we have resumed operations after the standdown for the holidays.

Vogt—We’ll just not schedule that day and wait until the time is over.

CJCS—That’s right. What I want you to think about, what we do next week. Of course, the President has called me last night and he wants that when we do go back in there after the Ceasefire to go back in with “a roar” and as heavy an attack as possible if the weather permits.⁵ I feel that, as follows: The B52s have just about hit every worthwhile target in the immediate vicinity of Hanoi and so we ought to begin to spread them out a bit away from that area not because so much of the defense, I don’t think there are many lucrative targets in there and going to Haiphong today with the big rail complex inside the Buffer Zone tomorrow Lang Dang when you get those 2 bridges associated with that bypass bridge and regular bridge real juicy target on the Chinese Border I am still working on that would be so far as tacair is concerned I think we should be using LGBs when we can make certain we have eliminated all the power on the way down you were … if the weather permitted last night and then go to work on the transportation, namely primarily the NE Rail Line. I am just stating my ideas. What would be your ideas as to what we ought to do next week after the standdown?

Vogt—I agree with you we should finish up on the power which I think we can do. Then I’ll go to work on the NE Rail Line and we’ll be on it today and two of those rail yards we have had some impact already and go to work on the Cul Nung Bridge. Incidentally, we aren’t authorized to hit the Bypass.

CJCS—Hit both of them. It’s all right.

Vogt—Take that out and cut a rut on that point and work on down to the Rapel Canel and, also, I’d like to get the By Pass bridge built over the Red River they have a bridge partially completed.

CJCS—Good idea go ahead and do that.

Vogt—I think this thing has no “BE” number.

CJCS—I’ll get one. I’ll handle that one. I’ll give you authority for that. I know exactly the one you are talking about.

Vogt—It lets all the trains in Hanoi.

CJCS—If they finish it, right.

Vogt—They got the center connection which has barges with rails that hook together and go all the way into Hanoi.

CJCS—See what we can do about that. Even the DuMier Bridge (which is kind of a status symbol) and not being used too much we should damage it further.

Vogt—We are watching it and still have 3 spans right in the water and they haven’t been able to fix it.

CJCS—Watch it and knock it out anyway just to discourage them give that a little thought and I’ll call you after you wake up. The best plan for next week after Christmas.

Vogt—How are we doing back there with the White House over all these B52 losses, are they getting nervous?

CJCS—As you know they make these decisions to do these things and then when something goes wrong they get nervous, but not as nervous as you think.

Vogt—That’s fine, I do think we ought to keep out of the Hanoi area for awhile because we still don’t have the answer for that problem yet.

CJCS—I agree with you.

Vogt—Lang Dang on that line I think we can handle that.

CJCS—Maybe if we get a feel today but the weather is overcast and real hazy effect?

Vogt—Roger, we are going to be watching this one.

CJCS—I just hope they don’t bag a couple of those Russian ships because they’ve done just about everything else. The Navy has knocked off a Russian, Chinaman, Frenchman and a Polish and now hitting that thing with the picture of Gia Lam [air field].

Vogt—What was their reaction?

CJCS—They don’t know about that one. We don’t have a picture.

Vogt—Does Laird know?

CJCS—He doesn’t know either, I didn’t tell him what you said because I wanted the pictures available when I talked to him.

Vogt—I’ll get them into you because we had some Canadians come in to town and they say the Airport is in shambles.

CJCS—The funny part about it is the Russians aren’t saying one word.

Vogt—We didn’t have the guts to do it legally but we did it accidentally but we’ll have a tough time explaining it; although they’ll think we’re really tough guys now.

CJCS—Good thing it happened. It’s uncanny that I’ve lived through this; this A–7 pilot dropped one bomb down there at Hon La Island and hit the Captain of the ship on the head with his bomb (and he couldn’t do that again if he’d practice for 10 years); then the Navy throws a bomb and bags the French Consul and they couldn’t do that if they tried probably and then we have this thing on Gia Lam which if we had scheduled the strike we couldn’t have been anywhere near the target.

Vogt—I had Chick Clarey in the office this afternoon and Cooper and we were all sitting around looking at the pictures and just shaking our heads.

CJCS—I am going to have a hard time, you guys did that on purpose!

Vogt—You can do it, Boss.

CJCS—Did you have a chance to talk to Haig?

Vogt—Freddie and I had breakfast meeting with him over at the Embassy⁶ and he told us that he was to lay it on the line with Thieu and he did lay it on the line apparently a real grim meeting. He was waiting to get the “yes or no” out of Thieu before he left and he got a response it was in a sealed envelope and Thieu said take this back to the President and don’t open it. So when Haig got back to the Embassy he and the Ambassador did open it and read it. I haven’t seen it myself but they say it was that Thieu was going on for 4 or 5 pages saying neither “yes or no” and this was in response to President Nixon’s question, “Are you with me on a settlement, yes or no.” Apparently that is what the President asked instead of a yes or no he got 4 or 5 pages of baloney.

CJCS—They better watch it or we’ll run off and leave them.

Vogt—I’m pissed off at these guys, they think they have got us by the balls and think we can’t walk away from this thing because we’ve got too much invested. They are getting a little smart.

CJCS—I’ll tell you they’d better wake up and realize that we are going to have a helluva time in the form of aid and any other kind of support for them from the Congress if they drag their feet.

Vogt—We don’t have any problem with the field soldiers. All the Corps Commanders think it is time for some kind of settlement and are all for it, although Gen Vien the Chairman of the JGS and Thieu and that crowd, Christ! They are impossible! I don’t know how we are ever going to get them in line.

CJCS—Okay, fine.

Vogt—They won’t even talk to you. As a matter of fact Thieu has got the word out that nobody is to even to be talking about the thing and you have got to go out to the field corps commanders area before the people will talk to you and they all say we have bled white and for a pretty long while and we are getting weak and 6 months ceasefire here by the guy in the field wants to do it he supports what Nixon’s trying to do but in Saigon around Thieu he is a little concerned about his power base and doesn’t want to go along with it.

CJCS—I’ll keep in touch. You are doing a great job but don’t wear yourself out.

Vogt—These 24 hour schedules are really invigorating!

CJCS—I’ve got to go to a briefing but I’ll probably call Freddie again and talk to him, but I just gave you the plans for the Ceasefire we’re not going to say anything—no public announcement.

Vogt—I’ll pass that on to him but he’s over at Gen Vien’s right now and it’ll be a rather late party.

CJCS—When he comes home or, in the morning. You’d better go to bed—Goodnight!

1. Source: National Archives, RG 218, Records of the Chairman, Moorer Diary, July 1970–July 1974. Top Secret. Moorer was in Washington; Vogt was in Saigon.
2. Vogt was referring here to daylight, non-B–52 strikes over North Vietnam.
3. See footnote 2, Document 214.
4. General Weyand.
5. On December 17 the President called Moorer to tell him that Linebacker II was “the last chance for the Air Force and Navy to put forth a maximum effort against NVN.” See Document 190. However, no record of a telephone conversation between the two on the night of December 21 has been found. The President’s Daily Diary shows that Nixon was in Key Biscayne on that date. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, While House Central Files)
6. See Document 204.