Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume IX, Vietnam, October 1972–January 1973

216. Backchannel Message From the Ambassador to Vietnam (Bunker) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Saigon, December 22, 1972, 1000Z.

307. Subject: Views of Prime Minister Khiem on recent developments concerning negotiations and on President Thieu’s attitudes following General Haig’s visit.

1. I sent Tom Polgar to see Prime Minister Khiem yesterday to obtain the latter’s reaction to the most recent developments concerning the cease-fire negotiations, especially to see whether his views had changed since those previously reported and to get his reactions to Thieu’s present posture.

2. The Prime Minister restated his previously expressed position that he views the continuation of the American-South Viet-Nam alliance as the most vital consideration, compared to which all other matters including the cease-fire agreement, its specific provisions, and even the continuing presence of North Vietnamese forces in South Viet-Nam were decidedly of minor importance. He said he had no illusions whatever regarding South Viet-Nam’s ability to continue the war on its own. On the cold grounds of logistics alone he would have to subordinate all other problems to the necessity of maintaining continued American support. He said he had discussed this in detail with President Thieu. He also said that he recognized and accepted as a fact of life the domestic and Congressional pressures which will confront President Nixon in the near future and that these would have to be taken into account by South Viet-Nam. The problem was how to bring along President Thieu to our way of thinking.

3. Thieu has reacted negatively to General Haig’s most recent presentation and resented what he regarded as an ultimatum to him. Khiem remarked that only a “soft sell” should be used with Thieu. The latter simply will not decide to move on an issue unless he reached a conclusion as to the desirability of the action on his own. One can influence his decision but this is best done softly and obliquely. Often it took from two to eight months to obtain Thieu’s consent on measures of significance in connection with the pacification program and the current problems are, of course, of far greater importance. Pressure tactics simply will not work. Whenever pressures are applied, Thieu feels challenged and reacts accordingly.

4. Nevertheless, and despite Thieu’s response to President Nixon, the Prime Minister felt that Thieu had softened and was beginning to move in the right direction. Khiem said that he had read the letter to President Nixon² and that he could assure us that there was only one point in that letter on which President Thieu now stood firm, namely the juridical presence of North Vietnamese troops in South Viet-Nam. All of the other differences with the U.S. position reflected in the letter have been included as points on which Thieu was prepared to yield to show his good faith. On the North Vietnamese troops, he still was firm, however.

5. There was no doubt in Khiem’s mind that President Thieu has not yet faced up to the seriousness of the situation and perhaps doesn’t fully understand the problems which are looming between the U.S. Congress and President Nixon on one hand and between the U.S. Government and the GVN on the other. While Thieu says he understands these matters, Khiem doubts that this is, in fact, so. He said that we must remember that Thieu comes from a very narrow background; that he has been a soldier all his life, that he has never lived abroad except for a short time in the U.S. in a purely military milieu, and that he tends to think in terms that if he, as president of a small country, has a great deal of power and authority, then President Nixon, as the president of a very large country, must have that much more power.

6. With respect to the future, Khiem repeated that there must be continuing steady but gentle pressure on President Thieu. He said that Ambassador Bunker was the logical person to carry the argument to Thieu and that he should emphasize both the ineffectiveness of the North Vietnamese Army elements in South Viet-Nam and the need to come to President Nixon’s aid, to help him fend off his opponents in Congress who are also opponents of South Viet-Nam. Khiem also recommended that similar approaches be made to Vice President Huong, JGS Chairman General Vien and to the President’s brother, Ambassador Nguyen Van Kieu, in Taiwan. Khiem said that there was no need to waste time on other generals, because he felt that he and Vien would have no trouble lining up the military to support any concessions which Thieu could be persuaded to make. Khiem emphasized that General Vien had considerable influence with the younger generals.

7. Khiem said that he would pursue identical lines in discussions with President Thieu. He said that about a week ago, the President had a long meeting with him alone where the cease-fire problem was discussed in detail. On the basis of that discussion, Khiem felt that the President’s position was by no means frozen and that he has already moved quite a way in the right direction. The problem was whether he can be persuaded to move fast enough to meet the pressure of events over which he had no control and which he did not fully appreciate.

8. Polgar emphasized to Khiem the necessity of regaining psychological and political initiative in the negotiations and that our continuing cooperation was far more important than the specific terms of the cease-fire agreement. From the point of view of the American domestic situation, an agreement was essential and short of that it was imperative to maneuver the Communists into a position of intransigence against a united and identical U.S. and GVN position. Khiem said that he understood all of that and suggested that we keep in close touch in developing tactics.

9. Comment: I think the above probably in fact represents Khiem’s views, although how much of it he has said to Thieu is difficult to estimate. It may be true also that Thieu does not really understand the American system of government, although I have done my best over a long period to educate him and, as Khiem said, he professes to understand it. Thieu’s deliberateness in reaching decisions is inherent in his character in which caution and suspicion are prominent traits, but there is an obvious limit to this if a satisfactory agreement is obtainable. Certainly the President has been extremely patient and forebearing with Thieu as well as frank and the soft sell cannot be pursued indefinitely. In the meantime, however, I shall continue to work on him. As I said in Saigon 0300,³ Thieu will probably continue to put off making a decision as long as he can, but in the end he will opt for survival.

10. Warm regards.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 413, Backchannel Messages, From Amb. Bunker, Saigon, Sept. thru Dec. 1972. Top Secret; Operational Immediate; Sensitive. The message was forwarded to Kissinger and Haig at Key Biscayne.
2. See Document 206.
3. Document 191.