Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume IX, Vietnam, October 1972–January 1973

214. Message From Richard T. Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)¹

Washington, December 21, 1972.

1. It appears that we may have lost three B–52s in today’s 30 sorties. One is definitely down in North Vietnam and another is probably lost in the same area. A third is heading for Thailand, having sustained battle damage. It is not clear whether they will make it back to base or not. This could mean losses thus far amount to 12 B–52s which is on the high end of the 2–3% losses predicted statistically. The problem is that in the last two days the percentage of losses per sortie has been much greater.

2. The North Vietnamese today claimed that some POWs at the Hanoi Hilton had been injured by the U.S. bombing.² This is undoubtedly a propaganda ploy although it is claimed that Joan Baez and others examined damaged areas of the compound. From the descriptions it seems likely that any damage may have resulted from B–52 shock waves. Defense claims the nearest target was a marshalling yard, some 700 yards away, and this was hit by visual means. After resolving some differences of opinion on press handling, DOD is making statement that we hit only military targets and that it is the responsibility of the North Vietnamese under the Geneva Convention to insure that prisoners are kept away from areas of danger.

3. Conditions were good for visual bombing today and will probably be good again tomorrow. Direct hits were scored on the Hanoi thermal power plant and the downtown railroad station. We have an intercept from the Indian Embassy indicating it sustained some damage and that it has no power or water. In addition, it is believed 9 SAM sites were destroyed by TAC air today.

4. PR campaign is underway on the Hill and elsewhere involving the usual players, who are now under control after the usual painful effort with which you are so familiar. Sullivan will do a few one on one interviews with friendly supporters who are available in the area and we have a fact sheet talking paper for calls and drop-offs based on HAK and Sullivan backgrounder.

5. The situation on continuation of the experts meeting is somewhat confused. Hanoi Radio quotes a statement from Paris indicating they have been suspended but the Paris delegation knows nothing of this. It likely is another confused utterance compounded by press misinterpretation. We had proposed the next plenary for January 4 but the North Vietnamese have now recommended December 28. We are sticking with January 4.

6. HAK has a message ready for Guay to deliver at 8:00 p.m. Friday evening Paris time.

7. Carver has prepared two papers for HAK. One analyzing Hanoi’s strategy and another shorter one discussing Thieu’s strategy.³ The Hanoi paper concludes as follows:⁴

Quote: “Conclusion. Hanoi’s political and propaganda force play keyed to the 20 October draft has now been countered by our resumption of the bombing. At a minimum, this new situation will make the Politburo reconsider its game plan. The major strategy decision of whether to stick to that plan or revise it—with concomitant revisions in Hanoi’s negotiating posture—has probably not yet been made. It will probably not be made until Hanoi gauges our political ability to sustain the resumed and intensified bombing program, its physical and psychological impact on the situation on the ground in both North and South Vietnam, and the extent of support or backing for its adamant negotiating stance that Hanoi can anticipate from China and the Soviet Union. Unless the Politburo has made some prior decision to modify its negotiating position promptly if we reinstitute full scale bombing (an unlikely hypothesis with no supporting evidence of which I am aware), Hanoi’s outward behavior is not likely to change until the Politburo has debated and framed these collective estimates. Given the fact that the Politburo is a committee, this process is likely to take time, particularly since the relative positions and powers of the Politburo’s members may themselves be affected by the course of recent events or the outcome of these debates. The time in question will probably be measured at least in weeks. Given the nature of the issues involved plus their complexity, the number of weeks required could easily stretch into two or three months. Until this process of debate and assessment is completed, however, the Politburo’s own members would probably find it difficult to predict with confidence just what Hanoi’s new game plan will be.” Unquote.

The Thieu paper follows.

Warm regards.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1020, Alexander M. Haig Special File, Gen. Haig’s Vietnam Trip, Tohaig/Haigto & Misc., December 17–22, 1972 [3 of 3]. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Printed from a copy that was approved for transmission as Tohaig 51.
2. Radio Hanoi claimed that the U.S. bombing on December 21 and 22 had damaged the Hilton-Hanoi, which had been turned into a prison holding captured American airmen, and injured “a number of residents.” (Michael Getler, “Hanoi Claims Bombing Hit POW Camp,” The Washington Post, December 22, 1972, p. A1)
3. Kennedy transmitted Carver’s shorter paper—which concluded that Thieu would eventually be cooperative on the settlement but would not compromise on South Vietnam’s legal right to exist—to Kissinger, who was at Key Biscayne with the President, via a memorandum dated December 21. Kennedy also sent with the memorandum the Saigon Station Chief’s report of a conversation he had had with South Vietnamese Prime Minister Tran Thien Khiem also on the December 21 that supported Carver’s conclusion. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 162, Vietnam Country Files, Vietnam, Dec 1972) Kennedy also sent Carver’s report on Thieu and the Station Chief’s report to Haig. (Message Tohaig 52/WH 29946, December 22, 0250Z; ibid., Box 859, For the President’s Files (Winston Lord)—China Trip/Vietnam, Sensitive Camp David, Vol. XXIII)
4. The 21-page memorandum from Carver to Kissinger entitled “Hanoi’s Game and Current Game Plan,” December 21, is in the Central IntJob 80–R01720R, Box 1, Folder 9, GAC [George A. Carver, Jr.]Chronology, Memoranda for Kissinger, August–December 1972.