Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972

98. Backchannel Message From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Ambassador to Vietnam (Bunker)¹

Washington, December 23, 1970.

General Haig mentioned the matter of the desirability of Sir Robert Thompson returning to Vietnam to make a study of the police problem early next year. Bill Colby also told Dick Smyser last week in Saigon that he and Prime Minister Khiem favored the project. However, I assume that you will want to check with Thieu before we contact Sir Robert. If not please let me know. My concern is that if Thieu is not really behind police improvement there would be no value in going ahead with Thompson’s project. We are not wedded to Thompson project and will be responsive to your wishes. I will await word from you before proceeding.

We have reviewed NSC team’s findings with the President and discussed the military campaign which General Haig mentioned to you. I am confident that the President will approve the program largely along the lines Haig outlined.

Secretary Laird has now been apprised of the President’s wishes with respect to both the Cambodian and the post-Tet phases of this plan.² The President has decided to inform no one else during this planning phase until Secretary Laird and Admiral Moorer return from Southeast Asia. General Abrams will be given authority to proceed with the Cambodian phase of the campaign sometime today³ and Secretary Laird and Admiral Moorer have been instructed to consult further on the post-Tet phase during their visit.

The President told Secretary Laird and Admiral Moorer that they were to approach this portion of the campaign positively, with the view toward its full implementation. The President has asked Secretary Laird to avoid using U.S. airlift for purely ARVN troop lift if at all possible and to justify U.S. airlift in terms of logistic support.

General Haig has apprised us of President Thieu’s concerns with respect to U.S. support for the military campaign and his concerns about troop levels. As of this writing, the President is inclined to withhold decision on our troop levels for the period following July 1 until we have had an opportunity to appraise at least the early phase of the military campaign. Haig also informed me of Thieu’s position on the political initiative and I anticipate that you will keep us informed via this channel of Thieu’s thinking as it crystallizes.⁴

General Haig was most complimentary of the courtesies extended by you and your embassy personnel during the visit of our team to Saigon last week.

Warm personal regards.

1. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 3, Chronological File. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The message is the copy as submitted for transmission. According to a note on a December 23 covering memorandum from Haig to Kissinger, it was dispatched at 4 p.m.
2. See Document 96.
3. Moorer authorized the Chup Plantation operation in message JCS 16892 to Mc-Cain and Abrams, December 24. He instructed them to continue coordination and planning with FANK and GVN and informed them that, pending final U.S. concurrence, the United States would provide B–52 TACAIR support, fighter bombers, fixed wing or helicopter gunships, and troop and MEDEVAC airlift that was beyond the capacity of the VNAF. A copy of the message was attached as Tab G to a paper entitled, “Topics for Discussion,” December 28, which indicated that the coordination and planning for the operation had been approved. (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–76–76, Box 4, 337 WH)
4. In his December 21 diary entry, Haldeman wrote that Nixon informed Kissinger that he was considering traveling to Vietnam in April to “build up Thieu” and then make a “basic end of the war announcement.” Kissinger argued against committing to a total withdrawal in 1971, because “trouble can start mounting in ‘72 that we won’t be able to deal with, and which we’ll have to answer for at the elections.” He recommended withdrawing by the end of 1972 “so we won’t have to deliver finally until after the elections.” Haldeman noted that Nixon seemed to agree, but still believed he would need to do something significant in early 1971. (The Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition)