93. Memorandum Prepared by Admiral R.C. Robinson of the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff1
Washington, December 22, 1970.
Subj: Memorandum of Conversation
- 1.
- Dr. Kissinger and Adm Moorer met in the White House at 1200 today to discuss the status of contingency planning for SEA. BG Haig and RAdm Robinson were in attendance.
- 2.
- Dr. Kissinger requested Adm
Moorer to brief him on
the concept for the use of ARVN
forces in Laos. Adm Moorer
described this plan as involving four phases:
- —Phase I. A US-reenforced brigade would conduct operations along Route 9 from the East to the ARVN/Laotian Border, and establish a forward operating base and airfield to facilitate future operations to the West.
- —Phase II. Upon completion of Phase I, RVNAF elements would conduct limited objective attacks in the vicinity of Tchepone. Saturation bombing would be conducted in the area followed by the seizure of Tchepone Airfield.
- —Phase III. RVNAF engineers would upgrade the airfield for C123 operations and blocking positions would be established to the North. Enemy stockpiles would be destroyed in the vicinity of Base Area 604.
- —Phase IV. FAR, guerillas and RVNAF elements would be inserted into or remain in the objective area.
- 3.
- Dr. Kissinger then asked whether the operation would result in the destruction of significant enemy stockpiles. Adm Moorer answered in the affirmative, stating that Gen Abrams selected the Tchepone area [Page 234] because it contains many lucrative targets. With respect to the timing of this operation, Adm Moorer advised that it could commence shortly after Tet—around the early part of February. Dr. Kissinger commented that “the earlier the better,” and added that the only chance we have is to initiate bold moves against the enemy. Adm Moorer agreed, noting that because of budget problems and planned troop withdrawals, we only have until next Spring to take such initiatives.
- 4.
- The discussion then turned to the scope of US military support for such an operation. Both Adm Moorer and Haig pointed out that Gen Abrams will need authority to use the full range of US air support, to include tactical and strategic bombing, airlift and gunships. Dr. Kissinger said that he would do his best to get the authorities we need, and that in the interim we should continue our planning on the basis that such authority will be forthcoming. He said that he would try to get Presidential approval for these authorities within the next day or so. In this connection, he felt that the only restriction would be against the use of US ground forces, but such a restriction would not prevent the landing and take-off of helicopters.
- 5.
- The need for early consultation with SecDef was emphasized,
particularly in view of his forthcoming trip to SEA where discussions with President Thieu on this matter
would be inevitable. Adm Moorer recommended that the President call an early
meeting for the purpose of setting forth his views. HAK thought that it would be best to
arrange such a session on Sunday, 3 January just prior to SecDef’s
departure. Both Adm Moorer
and Haig felt that such a
delay would be untenable, especially in view of the fact that
Haig’s views on his
recent trip are already being requested by SecDef’s office. HAK concurred in the need for an
earlier meeting and said that he and Haig would discuss this matter with the President
today and that a meeting between the President, SecDef, CJCS and himself, would be held on
Wednesday or Thursday.2
HAK confirmed this tentative
schedule by telephone with the President’s office (I think with
Bob Haldeman). During
this meeting of the principals the President will be asked to raise
the issue of future operations within the context of Haig’s recent trip. Specifically,
he would say that he had asked Haig to look into the various options available, and
he had found an interesting plan involving the insertion of ARVN troops into the Tchepone area.
Since this initiative looked far more productive than some of the
others discussed by the WSAG, he
had decided to proceed with the detailed planning and wanted the
necessary directive issued as a matter of priority. Haig noted that
[Page 235]
he had determined a number of views
during his trip, including the following:
- —Ambassador Godley had sent a proposal similar to the Tchepone Plan Alex Johnson in early December. Johnson shelved the matter as “preposterous”.
- —Souvanna would support the Plan, but would want solid assurance that the US was completely behind the operation. He would be more concerned about the duration of the operation than the fact that ARVN forces would enter Laos.
- —Ambassador Bunker strongly favored the Plan and recalled that it was very similar to one that he had brought back to Washington with Gen Westmoreland several years ago.
- 6.
- RAdm Robinson pointed out that the same authorities envisioned for the Tchepone operation would be necessary in a lesser degree for the move into the Chup Plantation. HAK foresaw no difficulty in obtaining Presidential permission for the use of US airlift support for this operation. Robinson then noted that the extent of ARVN planning for both operations might easily surface in the form of a CAS Report, thus revealing the concept to all Washington subscribers. HAK directed Haig to call in Bob Cushman and make it clear that CIA will not publish any report on prospective operations out of SVN into Laos without first obtaining White House permission.
[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to contingency planning in Southeast Asia.]
Very respectfully,
R. C. Robinson
3