55. Memorandum of Conversation1
PARTICIPANTS
- Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
- Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker
- Mr. William R. Smyser
During the conversation, the following points were covered:
Withdrawals.
Ambassador Bunker said that he had informed President Thieu of the additional 30,000 to be withdrawn by the end of the year. Thieu had said that the Vietnamese could make up for our withdrawals in Vietnam but that he would have to pull one task force out of Cambodia. Thieu said he could still, if necessary, put in a division in case Phnom Penh was threatened.
Dr. Kissinger said that we had to make the additional withdrawals because of Secretary Laird’s cutback in the draft calls. There simply were not enough men to go around. Ambassador Bunker said he understood. He was worried by a report he had heard from General Stilwell that the January draft calls were down to 15,000. That figure might suffice for Vietnam but not for the other obligations, and we might find ourselves in the same situation again. Dr. Kissinger said he would immediately get on top of this in order to prevent further maneuvering which would prejudice our freedom of action.
Ambassador Bunker said that President Thieu hoped he could learn about our later long-range withdrawal plans in order to make his own plans. Dr. Kissinger said this presents problems because any schedule that the President gave President Thieu would be leaked here and would tie our hands.
Ky.
Ambassador Bunker said that Vice President Ky had talked to him about some new negotiating initiatives. Bunker had later learned that those initiatives represented Thieu’s ideas rather than Ky’s, although [Page 138] Ky did not attribute them to Thieu. Ambassador Bunker said that he hoped that the President and Dr. Kissinger would have a chance to meet with Ky while he was here. Dr. Kissinger said we would arrange to meet with Ky but wanted to be careful not to build him up as a rival for President Thieu. He said he had been much impressed with Ky during their conversation in Paris.
The South Vietnamese Economy.
Ambassador Bunker said he thought we were now on top of this problem. Chuck Cooper had taken hold very well and was working very closely with the Vietnamese. There had been some price increases after devaluation but it had not been as bad as it might have been and the situation was under control. He said it was important that we keep up our support of the economy for the next few years.
North Vietnamese Plans.
Ambassador Bunker said he did not believe the North Vietnamese were ready to talk seriously, and in fact he thought they would try to keep the war going at least until the 1972 elections. He said the North Vietnamese could threaten Cambodia and could also hit us in I and II Corps. He said he was worried about the step-up in infiltration and wanted to do more about the Laos trails. General Clay, he said, was now concentrating our air power on the infiltration routes. Ambassador Bunker said he hoped we could do more to interdict the Lao Trail and Kissinger remarked that State was actively dissolving all the Thai units which he hoped could help us there.
The 1971 Elections.
Ambassador Bunker said he thought Thieu had a good chance of winning those elections. He felt that after Tet much of the Government’s and general South Vietnamese activity would be focused on the elections.
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 149, Vietnam Country Files, Viet 1 Oct 70. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. Sent for information. According to Kissinger’s Record of Schedule, the meeting ended at 3:45 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1969–76) The memorandum of conversation was prepared on October 20 and Smyser forwarded it to Kissinger under a covering memorandum on that day. Kissinger approved it, and wrote that there should be no further distribution.↩