Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972

54. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 17, 1970, 5 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• Henry A. Kissinger
• Ambassador Dobrynin

[Omitted here is unrelated discussion.]

On Vietnam, Gromyko had probed to find out whether we had any interest in a coalition but he had found out from the Secretary that there was no real progress to be made in that direction.² Dobrynin said the reason for this probe was not because the Soviet Union wanted to interject itself into the negotiations but because they would undoubtedly be asked by the North Vietnamese what our position was and they wanted to make absolutely sure. They had been told by the North Vietnamese that the only thing that they were interested in was a coalition government.

I said we shouldn’t play games with each other. They weren’t asking for a coalition government; they were asking for a thinly-veiled takeover. They wanted to determine the membership of the PRG contingent in a coalition government and have a veto over the two components—from the Saigon administration and from the other element. They would accomplish this by saying that they had to stand for freedom, peace, independence, and neutrality. But only they knew what peace, independence, and neutrality meant. They also gave themselves another out by saying “genuinely” standing for peace, independence and neutrality. Dobrynin said I might not believe this but the Soviet Union genuinely had no interest in exacerbating the relationship but they also knew that they had no real influence with the North Vietnamese. Therefore, they were functioning primarily as a communication contact. I said I felt they had some influence but I wasn’t going to press the subject.³

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Vietnam, with the exception that during the discussion, Dobrynin said that Nixon would have to be the one to make a proposal on Vietnam during his upcoming meeting with Gromyko.]

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 490, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1970, Vol. 2. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting was held in the Map Room at the White House. According to Kissinger’s Record of Schedule, the meeting ended at 7:15 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1969–1976) The full text of the memorandum of conversation is in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XIII, Soviet Union, October 1970–October 1971, Document 14.
2. Rogers and Gromyko met on October 16 in New York from 8 to 11:45 p.m. Kissinger summarized the meeting in an October 18 memorandum to the President; see ibid., Document 16. A memorandum of conversation, October 16, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15 VIET S.
3. Kissinger is probably referring to the Communist presentation at the September 17 plenary session in Paris where, according to a (North) Vietnamese official history, the PRG delegation demanded: “The establishment in Saigon of an administration without Thieu-Ky-Khiem, standing for peace, independence, neutrality, improving the people’s living conditions, ensuring the democratic freedoms, releasing people imprisoned for political reasons, [and] dismantling concentration camps so that the people might return to their native place and earn their living.” (Luu and Nguyen, Le Duc Tho–Kissinger Negotiations in Paris, p. 149) Kissinger’s comment on his September 7, 1970, meeting in Paris with Xuan Thuy is also applicable here: “We were not to leave until we had overthrown all the leaders who had been our allies—President Thieu, Vice President Ky, and Premier, Khiem. . . . If we did not overthrow this government, Xuan Thuy said, ‘no settlement can be reached.’” (Kissinger, White House Years, p. 977)