44. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon1
SUBJECT
- Ambassador Bunker’s Conversations with President Thieu on our Ceasefire “Package”
Ambassador Bunker has now had two conversations with President Thieu regarding our upcoming package proposal for a cease-fire in Vietnam,2 and he has found that Thieu is in general agreement with what we wish to do.
During the latest conversation,3 President Thieu made the following points:
- —He felt that we should make a package of our four proposals (cease-fire, withdrawals, release of POW’s, and an international conference). But we should indicate that we were prepared to discuss the issues separately.
- —He assumed that we would be prepared to discuss the mechanics of cease-fire—including supervision—with the other side.
- —He commented that the exchange of POW’s would be the subject of reciprocity, and should not be used for bargaining on political issues.
- —He understands that it is a non-starter to put withdrawal in the framework of mutual withdrawal, but said that a negotiated settlement would necessarily involve the withdrawal of non-South Vietnamese forces (including North Vietnamese) from the Indochinese countries.
- —He thought negotiations might be of two kinds: preliminary, which would include the interested countries; and final, which would include additional countries who could undertake to guarantee the peace.
- —He envisaged that internal political problems in each country would be handled by the parties directly concerned, later to be brought to an international conference for overall settlement.
- —He said he would be ready to discuss further details at any time, and he asked about the timing of our proposal.
Thieu commented that Mme. Binh’s statement4 was designed in part to put the Viet Cong to the forefront in the negotiations, and to embarrass us in our elections. He thought we should try to keep her on the defensive until we made our own proposals, perhaps, for example, by stating that the POW issue should be discussed on the basis of reciprocity and on humanitarian grounds and not tied to withdrawals.
Through a special and sensitive source Mr. Helms has obtained a report on a private conversation Thieu had before his meeting with Ambassador Bunker. In that conversation, Thieu said the following:
- —That he did not wish to be left out of any U.S. initiative, but also that he did not wish to make one himself because he had promised the Vietnamese to make no more proposals until the other side responded.
- —South Vietnamese political affairs could not be discussed as part of this package, but should be handled separately, though the Communists would want to discuss such matters as POW’s only when there was a political settlement.
- —If the Communists asked for the withdrawal of South Vietnamese forces from Cambodia, the GVN could say that they would leave when it was no longer necessary for them to be there (i.e., when the Communist forces had left).
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 119, Vietnam Subject Files, Viet-Cherokee-9/70. Secret; Sensitive; Cherokee. Sent for information. The President initialed the memorandum.↩
- See Document 37. In telegram 15009 from Saigon, September 15, Bunker reported the first conversation, noting that Thieu claimed that he and Ky believed the “time might be appropriate to advance proposals,” but neither believed “the chances of acceptance by the other side were good.” Thieu asked to have until the September 18 “to think through the implications of our proposals.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 119, Vietnam Subject Files, Viet-Cherokee-9/70)↩
- Bunker reported on this conversation in telegram 15282 from Saigon, September 20, which Smyser forwarded to Kissinger on September 21. (Ibid.)↩
- See Document 43.↩